Idraak

China and Pakistan: Dangerous Liaisons

2011-06-21T04:12:00.000-07:00

Pakistan’s relation with the US has been marked by an unprecedented low post the elimination of Osama Bin Laden in a US commando operation inside Pakistan. Amid these moments, Pakistan’s “time-tested and all-weather friend” China has been continuously expressing support for the country. Pakistan PM Yusuf Raza Gilani’s four-day official visit to China from May 17 to May 20 was a crucial event post the killing of Osama Bin Laden. On 17 May 2011, Beijing expressed its “unswervingly” support to Pakistan in its efforts to counter terrorism. The timing and nature of these words were intended to send a strong message to powers like the US and India.

During the visit, China agreed to expedite the delivery of 50 JF-17 fighter aircrafts, fully funded by China to boost Pakistan’s defence capability. Further negotiations are being undertaken for the supply of Chinese J-20 Stealth fighter and Xiaolong/FC-1 multi-purpose light fighter aircraft to Pakistan. This is yet another testament of the ever growing and strengthening alliance between China and Pakistan.

Following the visit, Pakistani Defense Minister Chaudhry Ahmed Mukhtar stated that Pakistan would be grateful to the Chinese government if a naval base was constructed at the site of Gwadar for Pakistan. China has a penchant for undertaking strategic moves surreptitiously and the naval base issue spilling out in public seemed to have embarrassed the Chinese government. Beijing unequivocally responded that the “issue was not touched upon.” Most of the aspects of Sino-Pak strategic cooperation materialize behind closed doors; therefore it becomes difficult to infer the exact nature and magnitude of their nexus.

The Sino-Pak cooperation is proving to be an imminent threat for India, even though the government tends to downplay it to a certain extent. But, it seems that the government is finally waking up to the threat. Recently India’s Defence Minister AK Antony while replying to a press question on the JF-17 deal between China and Pak said “It is a matter of serious concern for us. The main thing is, we have to increase our capability, that is the only answer”. India and China’s economic cooperation is on the rise, owing to which, many believe that the mutual dependencies between them is likely to keep a conflict at bay. However, while the economies flourish and there is stability in the strategic sphere, the undercurrents of suspicion and dilemma continue to affect the relations at the tactical front. The level of mistrust between India and China continues to be reinforced by the Chinese moves of constructing dams on the river Brahmaputra in Tibet. Many experts believe that the dams could reduce the flow of water in the river as it enters India. In addition China’s changing stance on Jammu and Kashmir, the issue of stapled visas, assistance in nuclear materials to Pakistan and its growing footprints in Pakistan Occupied Kashmir (PoK) have kept Sino-India relations on tenterhooks. Chinese activities are posing considerable challenges not only along the LAC but also along the LoC with Pakistan. PoK is of immense strategic importance owing to its location. The Chinese continue to make inroads into the PoK region in order to gain strategic influence over the Islamic countries of West and Central Asia . It is important to note that the area of Indian Kashmir is 101,437 sq kms and the Kashmir area under Pakistan and China is 120,799 sq kms.

Reports about the presence of 11,000 Chinese construction workers and PLA combat engineers in Pakistan Occupied Kashmir (PoK) tends to emerge periodically but no concrete moves are being undertaken to counter this rising threat. Pakistan seems to have outsourced the area of Gilgit-Baltistan to China for “developmental activities.” In May 2011, Indian intelligence agencies confirmed that the many hundreds of Chinese working in PoK are actually People's Liberation Army (PLA) engineers. They continue to verify whether the engineers are engaged in any type of military construction like bunkers. Such developments reinforce the Chinese pattern of using Pakistan in order to secure its interests in the region. Reports in the Pakistan media state that few deals (like a $2.2 billion Pakistan Steel with Metallurgical Corporation of China MCC) are non-transparent and Chinese companies are given contracts without open bidding.

As reported in The Hindu, the Government of Pakistan has allowed Chinese companies to take up construction work for large-scale power generation and tap power from the Jhelum and Neelum rivers. China is also involved in the widening of roads such as the Neelam Valley Roads (from Muzaffarabad to Athmuqam) and the Tariqabad Bypass (Eastern). It is also engaged in the construction of the Naluchi Bypass (Western) near Muzzafarabad. A major project also includes a Pakistan Rupee (PKR) 185.60 billion Neelum-Jhelum tunnel, which is being constructed by the China International Water and Electric Corporation (CIWEC). Through developmental projects, China is strengthening its alliance with Pakistan and gaining strategic influence in the region.

Another ambitious collaborated project by China and Pakistan is the laying of cross border Optical Fibre Cable (OFC) system at a cost of PKR 10 million between Pakistan and China for secure communications. The project would be funded out of a Chinese soft loan and consists of laying 820 km of OFC along the Karakoram Highway, from Rawalpindi to Khunjerab Pass (Chinese border via Mansehra, Chilas, Danyore (Gilgit), Karimabad and Sust). These measures are possibly being undertaken to support PLA troops stationed in Gilgit-Baltistan and PoK. Basing troops requires supporting infrastructure, communication and logistics nodes to be established. The laying of OFC lines would further establish Chinese claim and presence over PoK.

An IDSA report titled, “PoK: Changing the discourse,” stated that, “If the current pace of Chinese penetration is sustained then China may completely take over Gilgit-Baltistan by the year 2020.” Though Pakistan has always been a pivot of Chinese foreign policy, especially in South Asia, its importance in China’s grand strategy is likely to rise further. As the Indo-US relations gain further strength, China is strengthening its strategic cooperation with Pakistan to counter this strategic relationship. It will continue to use Pakistan as a proxy against India to keep the latter boxed in South Asia.

Aditi Malhotra is an Associate Fellow at the Centre for Land Warfare Studies (CLAWS), New Delhi

SOURCE: CLAWS Web Article
http://claws.in/index.php?action=master&task=884&u_id=119

The Institute of Peace and Conflict Studies (IPCS) SPECIAL REPORT

2011-06-21T04:09:00.000-07:00

AFTER OSAMA: PAKISTAN’S RELATIONS WITH THE US, CHINA & INDIA
Samarjit Ghosh , Aditi Malhotra , and Rohit Singh

For the complete text of the report, visit the link below:

http://www.ipcs.org/pdf_file/issue/SR104-Final.pdf

Taking stock of Japan’s Nuclear Crisis

2011-06-21T04:06:00.000-07:00

The Fukushima Dai’chi nuclear plant continues to remain the focus of the world’s attention as workers grapple with the probable meltdown in the power plant. The nuclear crisis at the Fukushima plant is a result of the earthquake, followed by the tsunami, which hit Japan on 11 March 2011, leading to massive human and infrastructure loss. The nuclear crisis is presently marked by three explosions in the Fukushima Dai’chi power plant (which consists of six boiling water reactors) after the cooling systems at different units failed, followed by the release of massive amounts of radioactive gas and food contamination. Over the years, Japan has become increasingly reliant on nuclear energy, though its nuclear safety record has not been very satisfactory and TEPCO, the organisation that constructed and operates the Fukushima Dai’chi plant, has had a checkered past as well. The country has seen some major nuclear accidents and subsequent cover-ups, leading to a degree of distrust among the Japanese public.

In 1999, an accident occurred at the Tokaimura plant when nuclear fuel was being prepared using enriched uranium; many workers were exposed to high levels of radiation in this accident. In 2004, at the Mihama Nuclear power plant, four workers were burnt to death and seven injured when a steam pipe burst in the non-radioactive part of the reactor. In 2002, the chairman and four other executives of TEPCO resigned, after they were suspected of having falsified safety records at TEPCO power stations. Additional instances of falsification were identified in 2006 and 2007.1 TEPCO is believed to have been involved in 29 cases related to damage in many parts of the reactor pressure vessel such as core shroud, jet pump, access hole cover, feed water spurger, on-core monitor housing and others. Consequently, the authorities had asserted the development of very high safety standards. The current nuclear crisis, however, belies these claims.

A question that comes up in the current context is the prudence of situating a nuclear power plant in low-lying land near the coast in proximity to a seismically unstable area. Some experts argue that the plant was placed near the coast primarily to use the seawater as coolant and dump the warmer water (post-cooling) in the sea. Another probable reason is the distance of these areas from densely populated regions. It is also important to note that the probability of a massive tsunami may not have been considered at the time when reactors at the Fukushima plant were being built between 1971 and 1979. New safety standards are not in consonance with the level of safety at Fukushima and the revision of seismic safety has been undertaken only three times in the past 35 years. Reportedly, TEPCO tested Units 1 and 2 for a magnitude of only 7.9 on the Richter scale.

Even more alarming is TEPCO’s track record with regard to the Fukushima plant. In 2006, the Japanese government ordered TEPCO to check past data after it reported finding falsification of coolant water temperatures at its Fukushima Daiichi plant in 1985 and 1988, and that the tweaked data was used in mandatory inspections at the plant, which were completed in October 2005.2 While carelessness or overlooking of nuclear safety has not resulted in the current nuclear disaster, it is rendering the crisis more unmanageable as days pass. In a recent report, TEPCO stated that during a scheduled inspection (2 weeks before the present disaster), it had failed to inspect 33 pieces of equipment in the six reactors at the Fukushima Daiichi complex. The equipments so ignored included a motor and a backup power generator for Unit 1.3

Another issue with regard to the Fukushima crisis is the case of secrecy and the government’s inhibition in sharing information. While the nuclear emergency has been a cause of worldwide concern, public and international organisations like the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) are becoming increasingly vocal about their frustration with the information delay. Many experts have stated that the Japanese authorities, particularly TEPCO, are downplaying the severity of the event, especially on the International Nuclear Event Scale (INES).4 Japan had rated the current crisis at scale 4 till March 18 and raised it to scale 5, which is lower in comparison to the IAEA rating of scale 6. The scale 6 level puts the Fukushima events in the league of the Mayak Nuclear Power plant explosion in the erstwhile USSR in 1957, which resulted in a radioactive cloud spreading over hundreds of miles and causing at least 200 cancer deaths.5

Additionally, while Japan has declared a 20-30 km exclusion zone from the Fukushima plant, other nations (specifically, Australia, US, and Britain) have recommended an 80 km exclusion zone. The downplaying of the event by the Japanese authorities continues to be a cause of concern. TEPCO is failing to provide accurate and timely information so much so that on March 15 Prime Minister Naoto Kan admonished the utility officials for the delay in informing him about the fire in reactor No. 1.6 TEPCO has done this in the past as well, when it has delayed providing information or worse falsifying it. The case of cracks in the Fukushima plant in 1993 and 1994, which were downplayed by the authorities, deserves special mention. Cracks were detected in the core shroud at Units 1 and 4 at Fukushima Dai’chi in 1993 and cracks in the middle part of the shroud were detected at Unit 2 in 1994. The magnitude of the cracks in Unit 2 turned out to be far greater and more serious than what was stated in TEPCO’s official reports. Additionally, cracks were found in each shroud of Units 1, 3 and 5, which were covered up by the authorities.7

Tracing the developments in Fukushima, some commentators have concluded that nuclear energy is too risky to be pursued further and this incident should be a trigger to boost the anti-nuclear debate. While such a stance is plausible, realistically, the world is not likely to witness a nuclear-free environment in the near future. Also, no amount of hysteria will force governments to shut down reactors that have been operating for years. The dangers of a Fukushima-like-disaster are unlikely to discourage countries like China, Pakistan, India, Iran and US. Consequently, it remains important to focus on improving the safety and security of nuclear power plants.

1. Richard Black, “Uncertainty surrounds Japan's nuclear picture”, BBC News, 12 March 2011, accessed at http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/mobile/world-12723092
2. Jonathan Thatcher, “Japan's nuclear power operator has checkered past”, Reuters, 12 March 2011, accessed at http://us.mobile.reuters.com/article/topNews/idUSTRE72B1B420110312
3. “Stricken nuke plant missed scheduled inspections”, ABC News, 21 March 2011, accessed at http://www.abc.net.au/news/stories/2011/03/21/3169841.htm
4. 'Very serious' situation at Fukushima plant, RTE News, 16 March 2011, accessed at http://www.rte.ie/news/2011/0316/japan.html
5. Noel Brinkerhoff and David Wallechinsky, “Japan Reactor Emergency Passes Three Mile Island on Scale of Nuclear Disasters”, AllGov, 17 March 2011, accessed at http://www.allgov.com/Top_Stories/ViewNews/Japan_Reactor_Emergency_Passes_Three_Mile_Island_on_Scale_of_Nuclear_Disasters_110317
6. Mehul Srivastava and Shigeru Sato, “Conflicting Information Drives Anxiety in Japan Nuclear Crisis”, Bloomberg, 17 March 2011, accessed at http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2011-03-17/conflicting-information-drives-anxiety-in-japan-nuclear-crisis.html
7. Revelation of Endless N-damage Cover-ups, Citizens' Nuclear Information Center, accessed at http://cnic.jp/english/newsletter/nit92/nit92articles/nit92coverup.html

SOURCE: IDSA COMMENT http://www.idsa.in/idsacomments/TakingstockofJapansNuclearCrisis_amalhotra_220311

The IED Menace

2011-03-12T13:28:00.000-08:00

Improvised Explosive Devices are as devious as the minds of the persons who create them. Over the years, like with conventional weaponry, this method of warfare has also evolved to achieve greater assured destruction. The Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam of Sri Lanka, before it was decimated with frontal military assaults had earned for itself considerable notoriety in the use of IEDs and belt bomb triggering tactics used by suicide bombers were said to be its creation. India has learned two lessons: 1) The dog is the best detector of explosives and 2) Counter-insurgency is a manpower intensive warfare.

The Naxal menace continues to haunt the country with periodic attacks that persistently bleed the hapless security forces and the civilians. While the tactics employed remain similar to the past, the techniques of the latest attacks reflect a new chapter in the Naxal warfare. One aspect that clearly stands out is the sophistication of Improvised Explosive Devices (IEDs/roadside bombs/landmines employed in the latest attacks. Police figures from January 2008 to March 2010, reveal that IEDs are responsible for 70 per cent of casualties borne by security personnel. The increased reliance of the Naxals on IEDs coupled with greater accuracy and disastrous effects showcases that this tactic is here to stay.

Wide employment
IED can be defined as an explosive device that is planted or customised in an improvised way. It comprises of destructive and lethal chemicals or explosives and is prepared to devastate, cripple, harass or spread fear. The usual trend states that mostly IEDs incorporate industrial or agricultural components and rely less on military supplies. The history of IEDs can be traced back to the World War II, when IEDs were used by the Belarusian guerrillas against the German Army. It reached a new level, when it was effectively used by the Irish Republican Army (IRA) in Britain.
The tactic remained prominent in the Vietnam War, was utilised by the Mujahideen in the Afghan-Russo war and remains an overriding factor in the insurgent attacks of Afghanistan and Iraq.

Mass destruction
In India, IEDs / landmines have dominated the insurgencies in Jammu and Kashmir and the north-east and now constitute an important part of the Naxal strategy. Also, the armed forces of India have faced the menace of these explosives during the operations in Sri Lanka. IEDs give more dividends to the guerrilla warriors and ensure minimum casualty on their side. A threatening change in the techniques of the Naxalites can
be traced to September 21, 2004, when Naxalites consolidated with Left Wing splinter groups. Particularly, with the merger of major Left wing groups, namely Maoist Communist Centre of India (MCC) and the Communist Party of India (Marxist-Leninist) People’s War (also known as the People’s War Group or PWG), Left Wing Extremism
opened a dangerous chapter for India’s internal security. Improved techniques
of warfare, accuracy and enhanced sophistication of weapons marked a change in the Naxal violence. While the number of incidents of Naxal violence have decreased over the years, the casualties have increased exponentially. The existence of IEDs has been felt in almost all states in the Red Corridor. Their effect and presence is more prominent in the northern region of Naxal-infected area as compared to its southern region.

Weapon of choice
Naxals have reportedly set up four units to manufacture weapons and arms, where they are developing remote-controlled IEDs that can be set off with the push of a button. Other activities include making small bombs, mortar shells and ‘Claymore Mines’ or ‘directional IEDs’. Apart from this sophistication, Naxals have become innovative by employing bamboo sticks as IEDs or can bombs. Such devices usually are not easily detected. Considering the pervasiveness of IEDs in Naxal attacks, it is important
to delve into the reason for it to remain a guerrilla’s weapon of choice. An IED is extremely lethal, inexpensive to produce and can be paired with numerous detonation techniques (like detonation through mobile phones or remote controls)that pose minimum risk to the rebels. Additionally, the perpetrator can control the fatalities by deciding the detonation time and position of the bomb. IEDs can be produced at any place, with commercially-available-materials such as agricultural and medical supplies. These bombs are portable and don’t need any prescribed or specific environment for storage. Captured ‘IED makers’ in Afghanistan testified to learning
IED-making techniques from manuals distributed by terrorist organisations or the ones available online. This clearly illustrates that producing an IED does not demand high technical expertise. The placements of explosives are asymmetric in nature and possess idiosyncrasies, as the method of improvisation is not static and depends
on its maker.

LTTE trainers?
The blast in the Sheohar district in Bihar on October 23, 2010 when five cops succumbed to death was a deadly one. The effectiveness of the landmines used by the Naxals can also be attributed to their alleged external links. Tracing the use of IEDs / landmines, it is important to take into account the attack of May 17, 2010, when Naxals detonated the IEDs coupled with gelatine sticks and blew up a bus killing almost 40 people, including 12 Special Police Officers (SPOs). Experts consider the attack noticeably similar to the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE) attacks
against Sri Lankan soldiers, therefore stating that Naxals have been trained by
the splinter group of LTTE. The bomb was placed days prior to the attack and was planted by digging a tunnel from the side of the road to reach the crust of the road. The concrete top remains undisturbed therefore attracting no attention. A similar attack took place when an IED blew up an armoured vehicle killing eight CRPF personnel on a National Highway, close to a CRPF camp.

Easy access
It is important to note that Naxals rely on Gelatine sticks rather than exploring
the RDX option primarily because of the easy availability of gelatine sticks within India. Besides this, ammonium nitrate is an asset which is munificently used in the production of IEDs. On May 20, 2010 Naxals hijacked a truck in Bastar which was carrying 16.5 tonnes of high-grade ammonium nitrate explosives. A similar incident took place in the same area, when Naxals ransacked a truck carrying detonators,which was never traced by the police force. In March 2010 Naxals waylaid a truck in north Gadchiroli which bore ammonium nitrate mixture. The frequency of these incidents implies that dependency on IEDs would increase with greater intensity and Naxals would continue to utilise indigenous materials to prepare them. Owing to the fact that Naxals control most of the mining activities in ‘their’ region, they have a strong hold on the industrial explosives too. This is another overriding concern that needs to be tackled by policy. Also, other rudimentary form of explosive is the mixture of urea and diesel. It is rather essential to highlight that most of the Naxal-placed landmines discovered weigh in tonnes and not kilos. Reportedly, Naxals have planted IEDs and mines in forests of Chhattisgarh, Jharkhand, Orissa and West Bengal to inflict greater casualties to security personnel undertaking operations in the area. Even National Highways in the worst affected districts have been mined by the Maoists. The government intends to include army personnel to detect the bombs, as the paramilitary forces have limited experience in such operations. Although the Indian government persists to intensify its operations against the Naxals, it continues to maintain a slipshod attitude towards the issue of IEDs. The government has failed to legislate the Draft Ammonium Nitrate Rule, 2009, which was drafted to regulate the accessibility and supply of ammonium nitrate in India. The step was undertaken after the assertion that ammonium nitrate (used as fertiliser) was the main material used by Naxals in their IEDs. According to the Draft Rules, a consignment of ammonium nitrate passing through sensitive areas should be escorted by armed police personnel and the vehicle should be equipped with Global Positioning System (GPS).

Counter-measures
Naxals seem to be relentlessly evolving their IEDs, seemingly inspired from the Taliban and other insurgent groups in Afghanistan and Iraq. Unlike the Indian police or paramilitary forces, Naxals are not restricted by legalities and therefore can adapt faster to the changing scenarios and nature of warfare. The need of the hour is to arm the security forces with the latest technology and equipment needed to undertake Counter Insurgency Operations. As evident in J and K and north-east, Road Opening Parties (ROPs) have proved to be effective in neutralising the area before the security forces embark on operations, therefore reducing casualties. Prudently, ROPs should be conducted in Naxal infested areas before security personnel advance
for operations. The army can train the security forces with a solid training programme in order to acquaint them with counter-IED technology. Procuring equipment would be futile if not coupled with appropriate training. It is imperative for the security forces operating in Maoist-infested areas to revamp their strategy and
tactics to counter the landmines. More emphasis should be laid on movement by foot, rather than using vehicles in mine infested kuchha roads. This would render the massive landmines sometimes weighing in tonnes, ineffective. Simultaneously, a better
network of intelligence gathering should enable security forces to clamp down on IED manufacturing units in forests and villages. The cadres having expertise in bomb making should be identified and targeted. Effective area domination and improvements in road opening procedures inculcated from the army, would help in detecting mines on highways and other metalled roads prior to vehicle movements. Another way of limiting the menace of IEDs would be to restrict the easy availability of industrial explosives from reaching the Maoists. As earlier brought out, enabling trucks carrying explosive materials with GPS and better security at their storage areas, identifying agents who siphon off explosives to the Maoists would help in this regard. Most IED attacks turn out successful because paramilitary personnel tend
to step on the bombs / landmines.

In order to act swiftly and safely, the security forces require Mine Resistant Ambush Protected (MRAP) Vehicles. Additionally, electronic jamming systems can prove effective as a countermeasure to the IED menace. The system can be placed on the vehicles operating in the Red Corridor. This system would block the signals of radio guided initiators, like cell phones, long-range cordless sets. Another countermeasure can be to propose procurement of the PING (a Pentagon developed microwave project) from the US administration, which successfully locate insurgent weapons. Further, the government can also employ Unmanned Ground Vehicle (UGV), which is equipped with a mechanical arm to inspect and relocate suspected IEDs.

Moreover, the global market offers an IED standoff detection system based on lightweight, mobile ground-penetrating radar which can be installed on a vehicle. The system can detect metallic objects placed beneath the road-crust or at the roadside; these include mortar bombs or artillery shells rigged as IEDs. The radar has the ability to detect an IED / landmine from a distance of 300 ft, offering standoff safety and early warning for diffusion and neutralisation. Apart from these, the global market has numerous other weapon locating systems to order. It is important to point that the system of procurement is dominated by numerous procedures that remain both fruitless and ineffective. Rather than considering these procedures as gospel, the government needs to pull up its socks and equip the security forces with at least the basic equipment that ensure protection. Control it now The success of guerrilla operations greatly depends on IEDs, a threat that will continue to haunt India and the world at large. On June 10, 2010, US Defense Secretary Robert Gates declared that “countering the improvised explosive devices have become a high priority for NATO and that the United States has already begun to put training for IED detection high on its list.” The statement mirrors the gravity of the IED menace and the seriousness with which it is being acknowledged in this era of turbulence.

Undoubtedly, the sophistication of IEDs harming the US forces is more deadly as compared the ones harming the Indian forces. For India, now is the right time to counter this threat before it transforms into an unmanageable threat like the Naxalites themselves. More than technology, a better grip on the area by the security forces possible only by an increase in the number of better trained and equipped personnel for anti-naxal operations who follow the correct road opening and movement drills in landmine infested belts of the Maoist hinterland will bring about a change in the situation. A comprehensive and well crafted strategy to counter the lethal IEDs and landmines that combines better training and technology would bring down the number of security forces casualties suffered in left wing extremism considerably.

SOURCE: Defence and Security Alert, Vol 2, Issue 5, February 2011

How secure is India’s radioactive material?

2011-02-27T21:42:00.000-08:00

The WikiLeaks revelation about Al-Qaeda trying to stockpile ‘dirty’ nuclear explosives and recruit rogue scientists to plot 9/11-like terror attacks in major cities of the world, should be a concern for India. Another revelation that shows that the threat is real is The Telegraph’s report that the West Bengal Governor MK Narayanan told the Americans when he was national security adviser that India had discovered a “manifest attempt” by jihadi groups “to get fissile material” to manufacture a crude nuclear bomb. Considering the motivations of terrorist groups, it is time India shifts its attention towards its nuclear safety. Due to the non-transparent nature of India’s nuclear energy sector, it is relatively difficult to estimate the actual state of safety and security.

Despite few contentious issues like the Nuclear Liability Bill, India’s nuclear rise has renewed hopes for meeting the country’s ever-growing power needs. As India embarks on its nuclear expansion, it is important to focus on the current state of India’s nuclear safety and security, and prudent to highlight the issues and accept the lacunae (if any) or retardation factors in terms of nuclear safety measures and practices.

The Indo-US nuclear deal signed in 2005 ended the three decade old sanctions regime (imposed after India’s 1974 nuclear test) and provided opportunities to buy nuclear reactors and dual use technologies from the global market. At the April 2010 Nuclear Security Summit, the Prime Minister projected an increase in installed capacity by more than seven fold to 35,000 MWe by the year 2022, and to 60,000 MWe by 2032. The degree of expansion projected will result in new facilities being created through the fuel cycle. While there are numerous issues pertaining to India’s nuclear safety, this article focuses on the issue of theft of radioactive material.

One of the possible terrorist acts involving radioactive material can be its dispersion through the use of a Radiological Dispersal Device, a mixture of dynamite, with radioactive powder or pellets. When the device is set off, the blast carries radioactive material into the surrounding area. Such a radiological weapon can be used by the dispersion of radioactive aerosol or by detonating radioactive material with conventional explosives. While terrorist groups have so far employed conventional weapons, the future nature of their attacks may not remain limited to the same. Osama Bin Laden has reportedly declared the possession of nuclear weapons as a religious duty. Adding to the scare was a fatwa issued by Sheikh Nasir bin Hamid al-Fahd, allowing the use of WMD, even if it involves killings of innocent Muslims.

A dirty bomb with minimum amount of radiological material if exploded may not cause enough physical damages but may lead to mass hysteria and panic. Additionally, there will be significant environmental clean-up costs and indirect economic damages, such as devaluation of urban property rates and loss of agricultural market share due to stigmatisation of the contaminated target area, even after successful cleanup operations. What is of more concern is that radiation detection devices are not widely used in India except in nuclear facilities and airports.

Therefore, India needs to keep the nuclear fissile/radioactive material impregnable. The current state of protection of radioactive material in India can best be gauged by the following instances of theft. This also calls into question the reliability of India’s Material Protection, Control & Accounting (MPC&A) programme.

In July 1998, the Central Bureau of Investigation seized over eight kilograms of natural uranium stolen from the Indira Gandhi Centre for Atomic Research (IGCAR) in Chennai. In July 2002, a gamma radiography camera containing Iridium 192 with an activity of 729 GBq was stolen during transportation in Assam. The camera, a highly radioactive device, was left unlocked in the trunk of a public bus in a region plagued by insurgent activity. In August 2003, a large quantity of Cobalt 60 (Co 60) was stolen from a steel plant in Jamshedpur. Though the material was guarded by a sophisticated alarm system on the front door, the thieves simply bypassed it by breaking through the rear wall.

The Atomic Energy Regulation Board’s (AERB’s) Board of Radiation and Isotope Technology (BRIT) is the only government controlled institution that produces and supplies a variety of radioisotope products in India. AERB’s regulation may be comforting but a major problem lies in the lack of information with regard to radioactive material procured in India before the AERB was set up. This makes it difficult for AERB to be aware of any unaccounted material which may be in the public domain. Apart from this, there are other sources that may be exploited by terrorists for the acquisition of radioactive material in India. There are numerous facilities in India that use radioactive material for commercial purposes, and are believed to be stored in facilities that have lax physical protection measures for the material. Such places include hospitals or cancer treatment centres, research facilities in the universities, industries like road construction and gas exploration.

Another source of threats comes from almost 4000 tons of junk metal being imported into India on a daily basis. On paper, the guidelines governing the monitoring of junk imported looks good, but in reality, the enforcement practices and screening methods at the ports are poor. This may result in radioactive material getting siphoned for destructive use. The Mayapuri case was illustrative of the current scenario where imported scrap arrived without any check for radiation or any other lethal material at the Indian ports. Till the Mayapuri incident, the BARC, Atomic Energy Regulatory Board (AERB) and the Department of Atomic Energy or the National Disaster Management Authority (NDMA) had no control over such materials being shipped into India. Post-Mayapuri, the Home Ministry and NDMA devised plans but the same currently remain behind schedule.

One aspect that ails India’s nuclear security is the lack of acceptance that there is a lacunae in its security mechanisms. Instead of periodically asserting that the nuclear plants and material are completely secure, it is important for the authorities to undertake serious examination of the safety issues and work on areas that demand their attention. Additionally, too much secrecy about the current safety measures is also a source of public concern. M R Srinivasan, a former head of the DAE, asked the organisation to “adopt an enlightened policy of keeping the public informed at all times about safety aspects of its installations”. The persistent secrecy is bound to add to the public distrust and concern.

Aditi Malhotra is an Associate Fellow at the Centre for Land Warfare Studies (CLAWS), New Delhi

(The views expressed in the article are that of the author and do not represent the views of the editorial committee or the centre for land warfare studies).

Source: CLAWS Website http://claws.in/index.php?action=master&task=751&u_id=119

--

Notes:

Rajesh M. Basrur, Friedrich Steinhäusler, “Nuclear and Radiological Terrorism Threats for India: Risk Potential and Countermeasure”, Journal of Physical Security, http://jps.anl.gov/vol1_iss1/3-Threats_for_India.pdf, accessed on 1 February 2011.

Sitakanta Mishra, “How Prepared Are We? India and the Challenge of Nuclear Terror”, IPCS Special Report 82, September 2009, http://www.ipcs.org/pdf_file/issue/SR82-Sitakanta-NuclearTerror.pdf, accessed on 1 February 2011.

Chaitanya Ravi, “The Nuclear Safety Culture in India: Past, Present and Future” IPCS Special Report 90, May 2010, http://www.ipcs.org/pdf_file/issue/SR90-Chaitanya.pdf, accessed on 2 February 2011.

Winning hearts and minds

2011-01-18T03:32:00.000-08:00

Many parts of the world are inflicted with insurgencies and militaries world over have been deployed in numerous counter-insurgency (CI) operations. Similarly, the Indian Army along with defending the borders continues to remain deployed in counter-insurgency operations ranging from the North-East to Jammu & Kashmir, for almost 60 years. Considering the importance of the civil population in CI Operations, the doctrine of sub-conventional warfare of the Indian Army released in January 2007 placed winning hearts and minds (WHAM) as a prerequisite in conducting successful counter-insurgency operations. Redefining the basic definition of the role, the CI strategies of the Indian Army aims at not only winning the war but also avoiding it all together.

A manifestation of this strategy can be best reflected through Operation Sadhbhavna. In 1998, The Northern Command of the Indian Army launched Operation Sadhbhavna (meaning goodwill) and expanded its mandate to rebuilding the socio-economic lives of the people affected by terrorism. The operation aims at winning over alienated sections of the society and promoting development activities that focus on the basic needs of the people. Post-Kargil, in 2000, the operation was extended to Ladakh and Kargil by Lt Gen Arjun Ray, the then commander of 14 Corps. The initial aim of the operation was to prevent the Kashmir insurgency from spreading to the Ladakh region. It focused on bringing development and dignity to the 109,500 people residing in the 190 villages close to the Line of Control.

From 1998 to 2008, a total of Rs. 276.08 crores were allocated by the Ministry of Defence (MoD and spent on numerous developmental activities under this operation. Throughout the operation, the villagers of the conflict zones were the focal point around which the development was planned. Acting as the facilitator between the state administration and the villagers, the Indian Army assisted in planning, providing technical solutions and supervision of the developmental projects. The focus areas of the operation have been education, women empowerment, health care, community development and development of infrastructure. Local labour, artists and material was used to pump in money into the local economy. A wide range of projects were undertaken ranging from building and renovating schools; establishing vocational and computer training centres; bridges, roads, providing free medical services etc.

The results of the operation have been phenomenal and were illustrative of the change that the operation had aimed to achieve. Developmental projects helped transform the lives in border villages of Kashmir and instilled in the villagers a sense of confidence towards the army personnel. The locals cooperated enthusiastically in the completion of the projects and more importantly, people who harboured militants earlier, were now actively engaged in removing them.

In the year 2000-2001 alone, the army contributed a total of Rs. 35.34 crores to the local economy. In Ladakh region, 13 Army Goodwill Schools, 11 Women empowerment centres, 6 medical complexes were created. Additional facilities also included 6 cooperative poultry farms, a boys’ hostel in Drass and an orphanage at Kargil. Along with providing 40 generators, a total of eight villages in the remote areas of the region have been electrified and the numbers continue to rise. Almost 1000 MHP are being constructed to meet the electricity demands and 283 MHPs have always been accomplished.

With regard to the success of Operation Sadbhavana, the case of Turtuk is worth a mention. Turtuk was part of Pakistan-Occupied Kashmir (POK) until 1971 when India occupied it. In 1999, intrusion by Pakistani forces in the sector remained undetected because the locals did not inform the Indian Army, as it was viewed as an occupation force. The locals had refused to provide any logistical support to the Indian troops and reportedly even guided Pakistani shelling. After the launch of Operation Sadbhavana, the scene today is starkly different. The local population was the beneficiary of the army’s novel steps on border management and today the Indian army is considered as ‘apni fauj’ in the sector. Since Sadbhavana started, 80 men from the Turtuk area have joined the army and 32 the police.

Operation Sadbhavana since its inception has exemplified the Indian Army’s role in nation-building. The operation which continues to drive many developmental projects in border areas has positively impacted the lives of the populace and ameliorated the sufferings of those afflicted by militancy and insurgency. The operation in general created an urge among the local population to help themselves and become self-reliant. In the long run, it would be appropriate to transfer the projects to civil administration, which would best take the novel efforts of the Indian Army forward. The efforts by the army have also helped in projecting a positive image of the Indian government and civil administration. The strategy of WHAM has paid rich dividends and has also been an important factor in changing the perspectives of local populace towards the Army and has increased cooperation with the civil government.

Aditi Malhotra is an Associate Fellow at the Centre for Land Warfare Studies (CLAWS), New Delhi

Courtesy: The Indian Express, 15 January 2011

India's Silence on Chinese Incursions

2011-01-14T05:30:00.000-08:00

China continues to convince the world about its ‘peaceful rise’, a claim which gets periodically belied by Chinese actions and strategic developments. The New Year was greeted by the first flight of China’s fifth-generation stealth fighter aircraft Chengdu J-20 on January 4, 2011. The Chinese have regularly asserted that it is upgrading its military weapons for self-protection, which is normal for every country. Such assertions do not always seem to be realistic considering the massive military modernisation of the People’s Liberation Army (PLA).

Additionally, on January 5, 2011, Kyodo News reported that the Chinese military’s newly released policy papers aver that the military would consider a pre-emptive nuclear strikes if faced with a critical situation in a war with another nuclear state. More specifically, the report highlighted that the Second Artillery Corps (Chinese military’s strategic missile forces) would ‘adjust’ its policy if another nuclear state undertakes air strikes against Chinese targets ‘with absolutely superior conventional weapons.’ Expectedly, the very next day, Chinese Foreign Ministry spokesman Hong Lei strongly denied the reports and termed them as "totally false" and "made with ulterior motives."

Other issues of concern that best exemplify Chinese assertiveness is its offer to export one-Gigawatt (GW) nuclear plant along with the construction of two 300 MW reactors to Pakistan. Another example of China’s belligerence was the flare-up in the South China Sea in September 2010 due to a pair of Japanese Coast Guard vessels in disputed waters. While these developments are alarming, there are minimum traces of strong opposition from the world or an agreement on the way forward.

While it may seem that the world lacks a consensus about how to deal with the rising China, the claim is more realistic in case of India. The recent reports of Chinese incursions into Indian Territory in the Demchok area of Leh district on July 31, 2010 should not be a shocking revelation. It is just a small part of the numerous Chinese incursions that take place periodically, which sometimes remain unreported or at times are downplayed by the government. Following the media reports, the Centre termed the reports as "baseless" citing that perceptional differences exist between India and China with regard to where exactly the Line of Actual Control (LAC) runs on the ground.

As per an official report, these Chinese troops including motor-cycle borne personnel of the PLA, entered Gombir area in Demchok region and threatened the civilian workers to stop building the shed, the plan for which was cleared by the state rural development department. It should also be noted that in November 2009, a road project under Centrally-sponsored National Rural Employment Guarantee Scheme (NREGS), was stopped after objections were raised by the Chinese Army. Such an act should have alarmed the government but the claim was denied by Union Minister Farooq Abdullah who stated that the work may have been stropped due to severe cold. The continuous game of denial played by the Indian side is a point of serious concern.

Quoting Leh deputy commissioner T Angchuk, a media report had said, "The Chinese troops objected to the construction work last October. The matter was brought before both the ITBP and Army, manning the border, but they directed us to stop construction work."

The rounds of Sino-India talks in territorial disputes can be traced back to almost thirty years but they have proved to be fruitless and futile. China periodically asserts its claim over Indian Territory through border violations, by issuing stapled visas to residents on Jammu and Kashmir and objecting to funding of projects in AP by the Asian Development Bank (ADB). As a result India dropped projects in AP to be funded by the ADB. While some view this move as an effort to reduce tensions between the India and China, one may also consider this as India’s reluctance to take on the Chinese. Even though India may try to pass strong messages by lobbying key members of the Nuclear Suppliers Group (NSG) to counter the Sino-Pak nuclear deals, it tends to nullify any such assertions by silencing itself in case of Sino intrusions in the Indian terrotory. India continues to appease Beijing fearing that any objection to their action may provoke an armed confrontation between the two sides.

Instead of articulating a strong policy towards China, the South Block remains unperturbed and practices the policy of denying any anomalies in the Sino-India border. If we go by history, in 1962, China brazenly flouted the Panchsheel principles and unleashed aggression on India. The history is something that does not seem to direct the Indian actions or concerns. While it is imprudent to ignore the inevitable need to formulate a policy for the rising China, India needs to first and foremost recognise the threat and shed off its reluctance to act against the same.

According to Sun Tzu, the Chinese military thinker, “…supreme excellence consists in breaking the enemy's resistance without fighting”. Judging by india’s intaction, it would seem that the Chinese have succeeded. The need of the hour is to upgrade the military infrastructure and logistics on the border and direct efforts towards military preparedness, so that India can tackle any Chinese aggression (in any) and rightfully preserve the borders and its territory, the least we can do.

Aditi Malhotra, Associate Fellow at the Centre for Land Warfare Studies (CLAWS).

Source:Indian Defence Review
http://www.indiandefencereview.com/geopolitics/Indias-Silence-on-Chinese-Incursions.html

Thinking the unthinkable: US Foreign Policy and Think Tanks

2011-01-12T23:06:00.000-08:00

The foreign policy of the USA moulds events in almost all corners of the world. It is difficult to understand contemporary international politics without considering the dynamics of US foreign policy. In order to understand the decisions taken by US internationally, it is important to assess the features of its foreign policy-making process. Notably, the process of policymaking involves numerous actors, activities and functions, making it a complex affair. The US foreign policy-making process is influenced by many domestic entities to a large extent. Each entity bears its own sphere of influence, moulding the final product of process.

Out of multiple domestic actors involved, the essay will focus on the importance of ‘think tanks’ in the policy-making process. Think tanks have essentially been an important part of the US foreign policy-making process. Interestingly, as compared to other western democracies, there are comparatively higher numbers of think tanks in US and are relatively more influential in the policymaking process. Hence, it is important to trace the importance, role and reasons for influence of these entities in the American political set-up.

In simple terms, a ‘think tanks’ can be defined as “public policy research, analysis and engagement institutions that generate policy-oriented research, analysis and advice on domestic and international issues that enables policymakers and the public to make informed decisions about public policy issues.”

The advent of modern think tanks in the USA was at a time when it assumed worldwide leadership. The role of these ‘thinking cells’ was to provide the government with impartial advice on policy related matters. Institute for Government Research, the precursor of Brookings Institution (1927) was one of the earliest think tanks. The end of World War I and II marked the period of America’s vital involvement in world politics, escalating the importance of independent foreign policy advice. The pressures of establishing itself as a hegemonic power in a bipolar world made it essential for the government to consider expert advice on foreign policy and national security. By 1948, RAND Corporation was created to develop and protect the American security interests in a nuclear era.

American history is dotted with instances that evidently reflect the influence of think tanks on US’s foreign policy. One such illustration was after the end of World War II. Council on Foreign Relations published an article “The Sources of Soviet Conduct” written by U.S diplomat George Kennan. This article created the base for the containment policy, which was relentlessly employed by the US till the end of Cold War.

During the 1990’s, U.S think tanks highlighted their informal yet central role in foreign policy formulation. Ironing out the differences between diplomats, they were seen as an unbiased third party in political discussions. An example of this was the debate of NATO enlargement. The conflict between the diplomats was minimised by the involvement of think tanks, thus building support for NATO enlargement. The NATO enlargement debate was imperative to surpass the Cold War’s divide and build a peaceful Europe.

As mentioned before, the degree of influence enjoyed by think tanks is limited to the American system of governance. The political landscape of USA is different from conventional political models and relatively far more decentralised. This primarily provides an environment where think tanks thrive. US governance possesses some attributes that remain exclusive to its domain. These attributes makes it easier for think tanks to influence the policy-making procedure through various techniques. The following segment will address some prominent characteristics of the American system and how think tanks utilise it to their advantage.

The most distinguishing is the clear division between legislative and executive sectors of the government. This implies that the powers of the President and the Congress are divided, allowing room for other actors to influence. Congress remains a very strong force in American politics and is also subject to external influences. As noted by Peter Gowan, Congress holds an extraordinary power over the US foreign policy. This tendency still prevails despite continuous efforts of the executive to affirm institutionalised control over the external policy (since 1945).The Congress remains sensitive to external forces like business corporations and think tanks.
Secondly, weak and reasonably non-ideological political parties are instrumental in further augmenting the role of think tanks. Parties do not get involved in the major part of policymaking by creating policy research branches of their own. Conversely, they rely on think tanks to fill this gap thus providing them a reasonable degree of power in the policymaking process. Think tanks continuously generate innovative ideas, evaluate government programmes and analyse policies. At times, experts provide immediate policy consultations to the government on policy problems and issues of pressing concern. In times of conflict between parties, these institutions act as a third party mediator and help break deadlocks and facilitate a comprehensive dialogue between them.

Another special attribute of the US political system is the selection of cabinet ministers. Contrary to conventional parliamentary system practices, cabinet ministers are not selected solely from parliamentary factions, and senior officials not primarily chosen from the public service. There are multiple ways of coming to such positions. With a change in administration, people hailing from various spheres are chosen through different means. This offers a level of permeability, giving opportunities to outside actors in the process.

The most exclusive function enjoyed only in the American system is the ‘revolving door’. This refers to the arrangement of supplying experts for new administrations and becoming centres for retiring officials who do not want to get divorced from foreign affairs. This helps the researchers to experience the real world politics and apply the theoretical models to practical situations. Furthermore, think tanks offer places for ex-administration officials who can share their experiences and remain involved with the domain of global affairs. This facilitates entities like think tanks to be continuously engaged in the policy processes.

This practice is liberally applied by many governments who have appointed researchers/experts for governmental positions. Additionally, retiring government officials enjoy opportunities of employment in renowned think tanks. The ‘revolving door’ clearly blurs the distinction between government official and external analysts. For example, the previous Bush administration gave several positions to experts in foreign policy affairs. Following is a list of the officials.

Besides this, think tanks are extremely active during the campaigning periods and transitional phases of governments. These opportunities are best utilised for setting foreign policy agendas. The first and probably most influential channel think tanks use play out in presidential elections. Candidates usually approve a 'blueprint' on internal and external policies and are greatly influenced by them or sometimes simply use it as their own. As Martin Anderson of the Hoover Institution explains, “It is during these times that presidential candidates solicit the advice of a vast number of intellectuals in order to establish policy positions on a host of domestic and foreign policy issues. Candidates test these issues on the campaign trail. It's like a national test marketing strategy.” Besides hardcore political involvement, think tanks are instrumental in enhancing public understanding by interpreting complex policies and gaining support for policy initiatives. This is done through electronic and print media. Simultaneously, they publish books; arrange seminars, rotary meetings for public and government officials.

Additionally, supplementary aspects exist that are equally instrumental in establishing the highly influential role of think tanks. The capabilities of US think tanks to contribute directly or indirectly and, the eagerness of diplomats to consider their advice are significant. It is believed that US being a superpower owes responsibility to the international arena and has a range of challenges of various degrees. In order to undertake these responsibilities and combat challenges, think tanks are important to assist the policymakers with expert advice and long-term schemes.

Apart from the political angle, the social system supports this kind of arrangement. The traditions of philanthropy, corporate or individual funding helps think tanks to sustain. It is important to note that the above mentioned reasons are not solely responsible for enhancing the role of think tanks, but it is their confluence that makes it them prominent.

In statistical terms, a research was conducted by Lawrence and Benjamin on "epistemic communities". The work highlights that the rising complexities and improbability of international problems has "led policy makers to turn to new and different channels of advice" and particularly to innovative "networks of knowledge-based experts" in think tanks with the aim of articulating the objective causes of international issues, the "real" risks or security of regions affected by those problems, and appropriate policy remedies. Calculations reflect that experts are the second most influential entities in the policymaking process, business corporations preceding them.

Undoubtedly, it is important to appreciate the role of think tanks in the foreign-policy making process. Keeping this in mind, it is also essential to see the other side of the coin. Primarily, the main goal of these institutions is to influence government policy and public opinion. While in the process, they employ numerous that attract criticism in various degrees.

Unlike business corporations, a think tank’s success is gauged by the influence is has on the public and the policymakers (not in monetary terms, because the instituted are non-profit organizations). Also, when formulating policies, policymakers consider many aspects including public opinion. Majorly, perceptions of policymakers and public opinion are shaped by news and broadcast media. Therefore, influencing the media becomes increasingly important for think tanks.

Think tanks today operate in a market of heavy competition, where it is important for each to gain media attention in order to gain publicity. Think tanks experts disseminate their ideas and views through interviews, public briefings, opinion articles in newspapers, scholastic journals for academicians etc. For example, Brookings went to the extent of building its own TV and radio to facilitate media interviews. This makes it clear that think tanks extensively exercise marketing techniques to direct the content and direction of policies. This practice thus eventually places them in the same category as interest/pressure groups and other NGO’s. Albeit distinct differences, the distinctions between interest groups and think tanks is getting blurred.

These blurring distinctions have further heightened with the advent of advocacy think tanks. Advocacy think tanks establish strong policies reflecting a particular ideology and mix them with extensive marketing to manipulate policy debates. As observed by Richard Fly, some of the institutions like heritage Foundation are highly driven by ideology, while some like AARP, Public Policy Institute and the Economic Policy Institute are funded by an association of labor unions. Another technique of ensuring influence is to establish close ties with particular agency. This is reflected particularly in the case of RAND Corporation, which is a contractual research for the Depart of Defense.

Think tanks as registered under Non-profitable organizations rely on endowment and donations from organizations and individuals. AEI raises almost between $20 million to $25 million a year. At times, the sources of funding are not revealed. Most of the donors include huge business and financial corporations. As simple as it may seem, these donations are instrumental in directing the content of the research undertaken by these ‘idea brokers’.

Not surprisingly, the policymakers get influenced by the agenda-driven think tanks. This gives rise to domination of a particular ideology which gets reflected in American foreign policies. US has almost twice conservative think tanks than liberal ones. The elite theory holds that “the political system is dominated by select group of individuals and organizations with common goals like an interventionist foreign policy”. Even the media citations enjoyed by conservatives is higher that the centrists or leftists. This is visible in the following figure.

Some think tanks attempt to stretch their ideological sphere to other countries by establishing overseas affiliations, namely, The Urban Institute, Carnegie Endowment. Even though some regard this as a step to enhance policy analysis abroad, it can also be criticised for endorsing ideologies to countries where the think tank sector is at an infant stage. This also shows that more and more think tanks use the media to propagate their ideas and perspectives.

The ‘revolving door’ no matter how useful can be viewed as a negative aspect of the American foreign policy process. After every change in the government, there are a high number of government positions. In order to fill that void, think tanks offer experts. Even though, this gives an opportunity for experts to offer researched opinions, this practice easily opens door for think tanks to embed their ideological stance in actually policies. The main goal of these ‘idea brokers’ is to influence the government, but the ‘revolving door’ gives them direct access to the government. Also, there are times when the experts do not get places in areas of their expertise. Thus, such experts often have inadequate knowledge about the program assigned. Some have also criticised this practice by terming it as “government in exile”. The Center for Strategic and International Studies, for example, has so many top ex-government officials that it has gained the nickname "National Security Advisors Stud Farm. Consequently, the whole network of think tanks is not just a simple arena of scholarly research to enhance understanding, as it may seem.

To sum up, US foreign policy is not purely a creation of the executive and legislative branches of the government, but external actors. As noted above, think tanks thrive due to the setting offered by the political system making it exclusively an American affair. The reliance of policymakers on think tanks for advice on foreign policy marks the importance of external actors and public in the process.

Nevertheless, it is also important to realise that extreme reliance on private entities for foreign policymaking may result in policies that are lopsided and bias. Private entities like think tanks may possess ulterior motives and may even be sensitive to other actors like business corporations and lobbyists. A foreign policy of a country reflects it domestic political landscape and perceptions. Privatising the policymaking process is not wise decision, especially when the foreign policy of a powerful country like US shapes the affairs of the globe today.

Notes

Alexander, K. ‘The Impact of Think Tanks on US Foreign Policy: Examining the Case of Iran and Nuclear Proliferation’, Paper presented at the annual meeting of the International Studies Association, Town & Country Resort and Convention Center, San Diego, California, USA, Mar 22, 2006 .

Asmus, R. ‘Having an Impact: Think Tanks and the NATO Enlargement Debate’, US Foreign Policy Agenda, 7:1-47, , 2002.

Dolny, M. ‘Think Tank Coverage: More attention, but not more balance’, Fairness and Accuracy in reporting (FAIR), < http://www.fair.org/index.php?page=1182 >, 2004.

Fly, R. ‘What's In for Presidential Hopefuls: Think Tanks’, Business Week- Reports, 1986 (accessed 23 March 2009).

Gowan, P. ‘Global Economy’ in US Foreign Policy, eds. Cox. M & Stokes. D, Oxford University Press, Oxford, 2008.

Haass, R. , ‘Think tanks and U.S Foreign Policy: A policy-maker’s perspective’. US Foreign Policy Agenda, 7:1-47, < http://photos.state.gov/libraries/korea/49271/dwoa_120909/ijpe1102.pdf>, 2002.
Jacobs, L. & Benjamin I, ‘Who Influences U.S. Foreign Policy?’, American Political Science Association, 99: 107-123, , 2005.

McGann, J. Think Tanks and Policy Advice in the US: Academics, Advisors and Advocates. Routledge, Philadelphia, 2007.

Safire, W. ‘Tanks for the Memories’, New York Times, 1986.

Strobe Talbott, ‘The Brookings Institution: How a think tank works’. US Foreign Policy Agenda, 7:1-47, < http://www.scribd.com/doc/3210628/the-role-of-think-tank-in-us-foreign-policy>, 2002.

Weaver, R. ‘The Changing World of Think Tanks’, American Political Science Association, 22: 563-578, , 1989 (accessed 23 March 2009).

Aditi Malhotra is a Research Assistant at the Centre for Land Warfare Studies (CLAWS)

Source: Eurasia Review

The Dynamics of US International Security Cooperation Programmes

2010-11-09T22:13:00.000-08:00

The way the security landscape of South Asia has been unfolding is one of the most important areas of focus for US defence industry and its international security cooperation programmes. With the changing contours of the world order and the skepticism revolving around the peaceful rise of China and expected strengthening of terrorism, the alterations in Washington’s attitude are inevitable. As stated in Joint Operation Planning document of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, “Security cooperation is the means by which Department of Defense (DOD) encourages and enables countries and organisations to work with us to achieve strategic objectives. It consists of a focused programme of bilateral and multilateral defence activities conducted with foreign countries to serve mutual security interests and build defense partnerships.”

While all the countries of South Asia have a role in influencing regional stability (whether positively or negatively), the most significant countries are China, India and Pakistan. China’s growing assertiveness in South Asia and its plans for dominance in the region will decide the course of regional stability or instability. Furthermore, the Sino-Pak alliance is an association with potential to threaten stability of the region. India’s rising economy and prominence in the international arena is another aspect that will influence the future course of action. On the other hand, it is important to state that Pakistan’s political future is currently uncertain and the risky situation makes it inevitably tough to predict its positive contribution to regional stability. Rather, further deterioration of the country would only worsen acts of terrorism, hence hampering the security scenario of the region. The future of Afghanistan will also play an inevitable part of regional stability. Nevertheless, Pakistan currently remains indispensible for the US as a strategic partner and it is important for the US administration to pamper them so that Obama’s objectives in Afghanistan are met.

Considering the recent developments in the world order, the idea of a fading US hegemony is surfacing strongly and the US attempting to align regionally to maintain their standing. Evidently, the traditional challenges that the US is facing from emerging powers such as China, has compelled it to seek alliances with those who can ensure continued US dominance. A tough decision for Washington would be to balance its equation with both India and China. Obama’s visit to India reflects Washington’s desperation in seeking alliances, especially in business, in order to balance its still-so-precarious economic situation.

The recently confirmed deals between Indian and US companies are worth more than $10 billion and will create almost fifty-thousand jobs in America. The most prominent among them are the $2.7 billion deal with Boeing for 30 Boeing 737s and $5.8 billion for the purchase of 10 C-17 Globemaster aircraft for the Indian Air Force, in the offing. Evidently, the US has found a new market for its hi-tech goods. It is ironical that while they are flooded with Chinese goods, the US cannot convince China to buy its goods. China’s unpredictable conduct is a source of both, concern and befuddlement for the Obama administration. China’s labile attitude reflected through recent incidences makes it unlikely to be considered a robust ally of the US. However, any overt inconsonance with China may snowball into a weaker economy owing to the American economic dependency on China.

Under these dynamic and complex circumstances, it is incumbent on Washington to carve out security cooperation programmes that can counter Chinese influence and ensure US supremacy. An US alliance with India to balance China has been been talked of in both countries. However, Indo-US relations face periodic fluctuations that tends to hinder the upward trajectory. Nonetheless, both countries have come to an agreement on security cooperation and are likely to follow it up in the coming future. The road map of Indo-US defence relationship for the period from 2005 to 2015, has been set through the New Framework for US-India Defence Relationship signed in June 2005.

Apart from this, a prominent change in the American stance comes in the wake of the US’s national security report that was released in May 2010. Obama administration emphasised on the need to look beyond the military might and employ diplomatic tools and international partnerships/cooperation to achieve their security goals. The report stressed on increased diplomacy with other countries and economic discipline and stated that the armed forces of the US will always be a cornerstone of their security but it needs to be complemented. With this recent stand in view, one will be able to perceive the prominence of diplomatic tools as opposed to sole military might in future international security cooperation programmes formulated by the US. The pessimism and damages of US’s military involvement in Iraq and Afghanistan is undoubtedly a pivot for the present change in US diplomatic-speak.

While diplomacy will continue to be an important policy tool, the rise in nuclear trade and nuclear cooperation is evident. Nuclear industry is on the rise globally and would continue to do so even in the future. With more and more countries wishing to use the nuclear option for meeting their energy needs, the nuclear cooperation programmes will inevitably overpower other industry sectors. The world demand for energy is projected to rise by about 50 per cent by 2030 and to nearly double by 2050. Specifically in case of India’s fast-growing economy, the energy needs are bound to expand. Experts estimate that India’s civil nuclear energy sector will need at least $100 billion worth of investment in the next 20 years and therefore countries are signing agreements with India to reap the benefits. The commercial benefits and strategic options will have to be carefully deliberated upon, keeping in view the short term and long term implications of any move. The security dynamics of the region and the domestic strategic environment of the United States will test their ability to employ a balanced strategy framework for security cooperation programmes and defence cooperation in the future.

Aditi Malhotra is a Research Assistant at the Centre for Land Warfare Studies (CLAWS)

(Disclaimer: The views expressed in this article are those of the author and do not represent the views either of the Editorial Committee or the Centre for Land Warfare Studies).

SOURCE: The Centre for Land Warfare Studies http://claws.in/index.php?action=master&task=678&u_id=119

Re-examining the Nuclear Deterrence Theory

2010-11-07T23:16:00.000-08:00

Aditi Malhotra revisits the theory of nuclear deterrence in light of current trends including nuclear proliferation, increasing mulipolarity in global power, and terrorism. The article concludes that the cold war logic of nuclear deterrence cannot be used to justify continued development and maintenance of nuclear weapons systems.

Nuclear weapons are an inevitable reality in the contemporary world and they continue to dominate international politics and foreign policy. While few countries are expanding their nuclear stockpiles or proliferating through illicit means, some countries are undergoing what may be termed as “nuclear interphase” or the preparation stage. The current century is witnessing the preparation stage for what would eventually result in a few more nuclear babies in the international community. While nuclear proliferation is widely justified through the validity of the nuclear deterrence theory, it is important to reconsider the potency of the concept in relation to the challenges in today's changing world order.

Nuclear Deterrence Theory

The concept of deterrence became prominent during the Cold War era with the end of the nuclear monopoly previously enjoyed by the USA. Deterrence is defined in simple terms by Glenn Snyder as "the power to dissuade."[1] Alexander George and Richard Smoke describe it as, "simply the persuasion of one's opponent that the costs and/or risks of a given course of action . . . outweigh its benefits."[2] Thomas Schelling calls deterrence "a threat . . . intended to keep an adversary from doing something."[3]

When applying deterrence to the nuclear dimension, as some may argue, the whole dynamics of deterrence becomes more dangerous, or, as nuclear optimists believe, makes relations more stable keeping nuclear exchange at bay.

According to the theory of nuclear deterrence, A can deter B by threatening to use nuclear weapons if B does not act in accordance with A. For successful implementation of deterrence, B has to consider A's threat as credible. In case another country possesses nuclear weapons say C, the theory holds that A would be deterred from attacking C, resulting in a deadlock. In addition to this, if C protects B under its “umbrella”, then A would be deterred from attacking B because of the fear of getting attacked by C.[4]

If A has a monopoly on nuclear weapons, then it can threaten other states without fearing a reprisal. Nuclear deterrence theory is based primarily on the logic that the damage caused by the use of nuclear weapons is intolerable and states would favor peace to the possibility of an acute war. In August 1945, Japan became the victim of the “ultimate weapon of mass destruction” when the U.S. introduced nuclear weapons into the arena of warfare. This created a situation in which the U.S. was free to threaten other nations without deterrence, while others would be deterred from threatening or attacking the US.

For nuclear deterrence to work effectively, some assumptions must be taken into account:[5]

The actors involved are rational.
The risk must be excessively higher compared to the possible gain.
The theory usually operates in a bi-polar set up where two or more nuclear powers exist.
Presence of a nuclear triad i.e. the capability to considerably decrease the likelihood that the opponent could wipe out all of the country's nuclear forces in a first strike attack; subsequently guarantees a credible threat of a second strike. This is also known as survivability.
The nuclear power clearly addresses to the adversary what is considered as an unfavorable act and does not pass ambiguous messages.
The adversary is convinced that the coercer has the capability and the resolution to inflict unacceptable damage. This would primarily be based on enforcement cost, compliance cost and resistance cost.
The theory of deterrence works only when the above mentioned assumptions are accepted. Similar to numerous other theories, however, the application of nuclear deterrence theory in real time politics is problematic.

Even though the nuclear deterrence theory establishes the role of nuclear weapons as a protector and an instrument of avoiding war rather than leading to one, this remains highly contested. With the evolution of nuclear strategies, nuclear deterrence theory has become dynamic. Albeit the basic logic it proffers remains intact, adjustments have been made to the theory to suit the complexities of global politics.

USA enjoyed a monopolistic position of nuclear possession till 1949, when USSR tested its first nuclear weapon. This marked a period of a complex game of nuclear deterrence. With two nuclear nations, the stakes involved were high. During the Cold War period, nuclear deterrence remained the hallmark of military strategies. Nuclear deterrence in this period meant that both countries, namely the USA and USSR, had nuclear capability and could inflict “unacceptable damage”. Nuclear optimists professed that this would form the basis of a stable world order as no country would wish to spark a nuclear war that would result in the complete annihilation of politically significant regions.

The outcome of a nuclear exchange inherently pointed towards “unacceptable damage”, which was proudly employed to promote the idea of nuclear deterrence theory. As per the theory, having a second-strike capability that overcomes a first strike is not sufficient. Second-strike capability should be able to counter-attack the opponent with a degree of unacceptable damage. Theoretically, the concept appears to be effective but it is important to define “unacceptable damage”. One of the clear limitations on the theory lies in this concept which may be misleading. There are no concrete stipulations about what degree of damage or destruction is deemed “unacceptable”. For this concept to suffice in practical strategic application, it is crucial to identify an acceptable level of destruction in tangible terms. To clarify the matter, optimists emphasized on the significance of comprehending the opponent's cost-benefit calculations, but no instructions were presented on how to gain it.[6]

Moreover, it is not possible to guarantee that after suffering from a nuclear offensive, the country will be capable of inflicting unacceptable damage on the aggressor, and even if it does, it is difficult to assure that the level would be considered unacceptable to the aggressor.[7] Evidently, this term is ambiguous and sparks a fruitless race of maintaining superior defensive measures.

George Lee Butler[8] believed that the “unacceptable damage” issue was impossible to quantify or operationalise. The US ended up targeting over 16,000 locations in the USSR with ready delivery systems, but could still never be sure that they could have an “adequate” second-strike capacity to cause the necessary amount of “unacceptable damage”. Butler revealed that he was himself so shaken, when he took over supreme command, by the revelation of the insane logic that was operating in US nuclear preparations in the name of deterrence efficacy that he began to systematically question the basic assumptions of such thinking and the security paradigm based on it.[9]

Another problematic issue within the concept of “unacceptable damage” is the moral paradox. Nuclear deterrence relies on a 'shock and awe' strategy, particularly in terms of city devastation. The possibility of an exchange is unlikely when the destruction of numerous cities is involved in the calculation.[10] If deterrence fails, non-combatants are automatically included, killing millions of innocent people. Hence, the use of nuclear weapons, even as a deterrent, involves significant moral implications.

When faced with the possibility of an extreme degree of destruction, countries can be expected to invest in a strong defensive system to deter the opponent. The Cold War evidently carved out such a picture of arms race owing to the “security dilemma” created by each others capacity to punish the opponent with a nuclear attack. The fear of a nuclear attack dominated every decision in Washington and Moscow, leading to a massive arms race. Challenging the very notion of stability offered by nuclear deterrence theory, the countries armed themselves with technologically advanced nuclear capabilities to gain a comparative advantage in the game of deterrence, eventually leading to global instability.

Statistics clearly show that Warsaw and NATO countries were amassing arms at a relentless pace. Warsaw pact tank holdings rose from 35,000 in 1961 to almost 51,000 in 1991, whilst NATO held approximately 23,000 (primarily because USSR focused on land invasion of W. Europe). During the same period, ballistic missile systems in USSR's possession augmented from 326 in 1979 to 1,624 in 1990. In comparison, US's ballistic missiles rose from 1,213 in 1979 to 2,322 in 1990. (See appendix)[11]

The concepts of “assured destruction” and “mutually assured destruction” punctuated the language of military strategists and governments, taking the theory of nuclear deterrence to a new level. While the concepts of first and second strike capability became vivid, there was a rising probability of a Soviet surprise attack on the States. The term assured destruction, articulated by McNamara in mid-1960s meant to: “Deter a deliberate nuclear attack by maintaining at all times a clear and unmistakable ability to inflict an unacceptable degree of damage upon any aggressor, or combination of aggressors—even after absorbing a surprise first strike.”[12]

In order to ensure this form of destruction, the superpowers developed portable land missile systems, submarine launched missiles, and warheads measured in 'multi-megatons'. Perpetual search for superior weapons paved way for the idea of mutual assured destruction (MAD).

Accordance to the logic of nuclear deterrence, nuclear countries would not be able to attack each other owing to the fear of MAD, thus creating stability in the global arena. Ironically, reality does not hum the same tune. Since each country's weapons and arsenals are subject to continuous technological progress, equilibrium between the nuclear nations is constantly re-establishing itself. Therefore, the idea of parity is based on a situation that is complex (if not impossible) to assess and, therefore, does not ensure stability.[13]

During the cold war, a nuclear stalemate did not prevail, as technology and the massive arms race continuously altered the conditions of competition. New offensive and defensive weapons came to the front, upsetting the so-called stability of the period. To name a few, security strategists were introduced to Intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBMs), anti-ballistic missiles (ABM), and Intermediate-range ballistic missiles (IRBMs), as well as the so-called “star wars” project of ballistic missile defense. Thus, rather than acting as a stabilizing force, nuclear weapons extended the “security dilemma” between powers, further undermining global stability.

Tensions and uncertainties engulfed the world during the cold war period, where two nuclear powers contested for relative advantage over the other. Even if we consider the temporary phases of stability between perpetual tensions across the iron curtain, nuclear deterrence theory may seem relevant. On the contrary, if we apply the same theory to the contemporary times, the theory would lack relevance.

In the multi-polar world of today, nuclear power is not just limited to two actors (as assumed in the theory), but is possessed by numerous countries, declared and undeclared. It has been argued that there we numerous instances where US-Soviet relations contributed to “nuclear peace”, and that a bi-polar confrontation made it easier to estimate potential threats.[14] Although this view is contested, it is important to realize that even if this statement is true; such a set-up would not be possible in today's world of multiple nuclear powers, which now include USA, Russia, UK, France, China, India, Pakistan, Israel, and possibly North Korea and Syria.

Tellingly, study on the cause and effect of nuclear proliferation has not found its basis in nuclear deterrence theory. Works devoted to this have not drawn much from the fundamental works of Hermann Kahn, Thomas Schelling, Glen Snyder, and other proponents of the theory. Certainly, some work has openly disregarded the notion of nuclear deterrence, considering it as an irrelevant and a misleading relic of the Cold War, although some nuclear optimists reinforce the belief that deterrence successfully discouraged the Soviet Union and argue for its continued relevance.[15]

To this effect, nuclear optimists argue that the stabilizing effect of the nuclear deterrence is responsible for the fact that the 20th century has not witnessed any total wars. Undoubtedly, nuclear attack has not been used in war since 1945, and the nuclear bomb has been kept at bay in the present conflicts. However, the world today is a victim of a different kind of instability. “Nuclear peace” at higher level has cultivated instability at lower level (regional), termed as “stability-instability paradox”.

Deterrence theory fails to explain the following cases: North Korea was not deterred from attacking South Korea in 1950, nor were Egypt and Syria deterred from attacking Israel in 1973. Additionally, Argentina was not deterred from capturing the British Falklands in 1982, Saddam not discouraged from seizing Kuwait in 1990 and Pakistan was not dissuaded from implementing the Kargil scheme.[16]

Moreover, the spread of nuclear weapons does not ensure global stability. Contrary to it, the hunger to acquire weapons of mass destruction clearly suggests that different states are ready to resort to the utmost level of destruction. Therefore, in an ambiance of persistent friction, nuclear weapons can never assure stability.

In the era of terrorism, there is a new dimension to the analysis. Possession of nuclear weapons, by state and non-state actors alike, provides its holder with a sense of security against opponents and sometimes used as a means of deterrence. “Nuclearisation” which was previously limited to recognized states now stretches across to terrorists and rogue states. The inherent power of nuclear power to deter, punish, or coerce makes it attractive for non-state actors that bear starkly different notions of victory and utopia. Nuclear technology may be used by terrorists or separatist groups to influence the political behavior of states.

Traditionally, state behavior has been regulated through periodic communication and mutual treaties. In regard to non-state entities, it is impossible to articulate treaties, or to have logical settlement through negotiation or agreements. Nuclear deterrence theory revolves around states and was earlier applied to strategies between military blocks. With the emergence of militant, non-state entities, deterrence theory requires a reorientation.

Perhaps one of the most severe criticisms of the nuclear deterrence theory is the main assumption of the theory, i.e. the decision-makers act rationally. Firstly, we would apply this assumption to the real time politics between states. Further ahead, we would test this assumption in case of a non-state or anti-state actor.

According to the theory, it is believed that states would be rational enough not to get involved in a nuclear exchange because of high stakes. Depending on nuclear deterrence for security is always a gamble, which may or may not fail. Trusting the theory for the notion of guaranteed safety is imprudent, as it is impossible to utilize the theory in the real world, where real time pressures and human element makes things unpredictable. As the theory works between two nuclear powers, it is difficult to state with certainty that both sides have mutually understood the basic concepts and the opponent's doctrine.

As described by Colonel Charles in 'Nuclear Deterrence in the Third Millennium', deterrence is a state of mind that prevents a deterree from acting in a way the deterrer considers harmful.[17] It is important to note that deterrence is considered a state of mind which must prevail in the opponent's mind. It has frequently been argued that during conflicts, where pressure dominates every move and analysis (because of a possible nuclear exchange), the possibility of miscalculations of messages cannot be ruled out. Nuclear deterrence has no answers for situations of an accidental nuclear launch or miscalculations and misinterpretations.

On October 24, 1962 (during the Cuban Missile Crisis), a Soviet satellite entered its own parking orbit, and shortly afterward exploded. Sir Bernard Lovell, director of the Jodrell Bank observatory wrote in 1968: "the explosion of a Russian spacecraft in orbit during the Cuban missile crisis... led the U.S. to believe that the USSR was launching a massive ICBM attack."[18] This could have sparked a nuclear war without reason, due to miscalculation.

Also, it is difficult to perfectly understand the real intentions about an enemy from whom one has been alienated. This was evident in the speech of General Lee Butler, where he emphasized that, “…deterrence left the antagonists to grope fearfully in a fog of mutual misperception. While we [USA] clung to the notion that nuclear war could be reliably deterred, Soviet leaders derived from their historical experience the conviction that such a war might be thrust upon them and if so, must not be lost…deterrence was a dialogue of the blind with the deaf.'[19]

Furthermore, if we consider this argument in the light of non-state or anti-state actors, the idea of rational actors becomes irrelevant. U.S has been maintaining nuclear weapons for apparent 'non-use' and is continuously enhancing its nuclear capabilities. This is done with a rationale of maintaining the power to deter rogue states and terrorist organizations. Objectively, the growing threat from such entities seems to entail states to rely on nuclear deterrence. On a subjective front, this seems to be conflicting. Deterring an enemy by threatening to destroy it may work with states but not with terrorists and rogue states, which (in political terms) have nothing to lose.

According to French social theorist Paul Virilio, speaking on Swiss Radio a month after September 11, the theory falls apart because the anti-state actors have no intention of reducing damage on his side. Contemporarily, suicide bombing marks out the strategy employed by terrorists (Al Qaeda, Hezbollah, and Hamas). Deterrence, structured around rational actors, is irrelevant in regard to terrorists who exercise erratic and self-immolating tactics, where force may not be rational at all.[20] Therefore, hoping that rationality prevails in every decision a state or non-state actor takes, is imprudent as otherwise considered by the theory.

Even though nuclear deterrence may have worked in some instances during the Cold War and otherwise, the theory fails to apply universally or convincingly in the changing environment of today. Holding nuclear power for security purpose is a diplomatic explanation which needs to be questioned now. It is hope camouflaged as strategic insight, and cannot be allowed to determine the future course of world affairs. Nuclear weapons, no matter how prestigious and important, are weapons of mass destruction. They can never assure stability through deterrence and should not be mixed with politics, which is dicey by nature.

[1] Glenn H. Snyder, ‘‘Deterrence and Defense,’’ reprinted in Robert J. Art and Kenneth N. Waltz, eds., The Use of Force: International Politics and Foreign Policy, University Press of America, New York, 1983, cited in Ward Wilson, ‘The Myth of Nuclear Deterrence’, The Nonproliferation Review, 15: 421 – 439,http://pdfserve.informaworld.com/33614__903544593.pdf, 2008, (accessed 18 March 2009).

[2] Alexander George and Richard Smoke, Deterrence in American Foreign Policy: Theory and Practice,Columbia University Press, New York, 1974, p. 11 cited in Ward Wilson, ‘The Myth of Nuclear Deterrence’, The Nonproliferation Review, 15: 421 – 439, http://pdfserve.informaworld.com/33614__903544593.pdf, 2008, (accessed 18 March 2009).

[3] Thomas C. Schelling, Arms and Influence, Yale University Press, New Haven: CT, 1966, p. 69 cited in Ward Wilson, ‘The Myth of Nuclear Deterrence’, The Nonproliferation Review, 15: 421 – 439,, 2008, (accessed 18 March 2009).

[4] David Krieger, ‘Nuclear Deterrence, Missile Defenses and Global Instability’, Nuclear Age Peace Foundation, , 2001 (accessed 28 February 2009).

[5] The assumptions have been articulated from different sources. Lawrence Freedman and Srinath Raghavan, Coercion in Security Studies, Routledge Publication, Oxford, 2008, p. 217. and Patrick M. Morgan, Deterrence Now, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 2003, p. 15-20. [6] Patrick M. Morgan, Deterrence Now, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 2003, p. 15.

[7] The idea reflected in this section of ‘unacceptable damage’ has largely based on the following article. Achin Vanaik, ‘Ten Dilemmas of Nuclear Deterrence’, The Little Magazine Vol III, Issue 5&6,, 2003 (accessed 6 March 2009).

[8] George Lee Butler headed the US Strategic Air Command for 12 years, was a key Presidential adviser between 1992, and 1995 and subsequently turned a nuclear disarmer.

[9] Achin Vanaik, ‘Ten Dilemmas of Nuclear Deterrence’, The Little Magazine Vol III, Issue 5&6,, 2003 (accessed 6 March 2009).

[10] Ward Wilson, ‘The Myth of Nuclear Deterrence’, The Nonproliferation Review, 15: 421 – 439,http://pdfserve.informaworld.com/33614__903544593.pdf, 2008, (accessed 18 March 2009).

[11] Rupert Smith, The Utility of Force: The Art of War in the Modern World, Penguin Books, London, 2005, p. 218, 220, 222.

[12] Enthoven, Alain, Smith and Wayne, How much is enough? Shaping the Defense Program 1961-1969, Harper and Row, New York, 1971, p. 174, cited in Lawrence Freedman, ‘Assured Destruction’ in The Evolution of Nuclear Strategy, Third Edition, Palgrave Macmillan, New York, 2003, p. 233.

[13] Anders I. Thunborg, ‘Doctrines of Deterrence and Other Theories’ in Nuclear Weapons, Frances Pinter Limited, London, 1981, p. 113.

[14] Lewis A. Dunn, ‘New Nuclear Threats to U.S Security’ in New Nuclear Nations: Consequences for U.S Policy,Robert D. Blackwill & Albert Carnesale, Council on Foreign Relations Press, New York, 1993, p. 40.

[15] Robert Powell, ‘Nuclear Deterrence Theory, Nuclear Proliferation, and National Missile Defense’, International Security, 27: 86-118, , 2003 (accessed 28 February 2009).

[16] Sitakanta Mishra, The Challenge of Nuclear Terror, Knowledge World International, New Delhi, 2008, p. 5.

[17] Lieutenant Colonel Charles W. Durr Jr, ‘Nuclear Deterrence in the Third Millennium’, Army War College, , 2002 (accessed 18 March 2009).

[18] Alan F. Philips, ‘20 Mishaps That Might Have Started Accidental Nuclear War’, Nuclear Files, http://www.nuclearfiles.org/menu/key-issues/nuclear-weapons/issues/accidents/20-mishaps-maybe-caused-nuclear-war.htm, 1998 (accessed 18 March 2009).

[19] The statement has been incorporated from a speech, ‘The Risks of Nuclear Deterrence: From Superpowers to Rogue Leaders’ given at the National Press Club by General Lee Butler on 2nd February, 1998 available at , 1998 (accessed 18 March 2009).

[20] Binoy Kampmark, ‘America's nuclear deterrence in the age of terrorism - a discussion of U.S. foreign policy and nuclear policy in the present and past 20 years’, Contemporary Review, , 2003, (accessed 18 March 2009).

Aditi Malhotra is a Research Assistant at the Centre for Land Warfare Studies (CLAWS), New Delhi, India.

SOURCE: University for Peace, Peace and Conflict Monitor http://www.monitor.upeace.org/innerpg.cfm?id_article=752

Karzai’s Unrealistic Decree: Banning Private Contractors In Afghanistan

2010-11-07T23:13:00.000-08:00

In August 2010, Afghan President Karzai ordered all the private security contractors in the country to close down their operations by January 1, 2011. While most analysts considered the deadline too near and the decree imprudent, some welcomed the move. Rolling back from the stipulations of the previous decision, on October 17, 2010, the Afghan government announced that private security firms that are responsible for the protection of embassies and military bases could continue their operations. Following this, on October 27, Karzai decided to extend the deadline for the ban.

The PMCs operating in Afghanistan have recently been in the news for all the wrong reasons. The report titled, ‘Warlord, Inc.: Extortion and Corruption along the U.S. Supply Chain in Afghanistan’ of the US House of Representatives released in June this year exposed the perils of Washington’s policy of outsourcing security roles in Afghanistan. The report brought out the disturbing aspects of the contentious practice of hiring private contractors in war zones like Afghanistan.

Securing and maintaining the supply chain in Afghanistan has been one of the most challenging tasks for the U.S. forces and therefore presents numerous difficulties in conducting military operations and offering logistical support to over 200 forward operating bases dotted around the region. Consequently, this function was outsourced to private contractors. The main contract sustaining the U.S. supply chain in Afghanistan is Host Nation Trucking, a contract worth $2.16 billion, which was divided among eight Afghan, American, and Middle Eastern companies. Such a move led to grave consequences not premeditated.

To ease their operations and ensure safety, the private contractors ‘subcontracted’ warlords that may be susceptible to attacking them. This unintentionally stoked the practice of bribing warlords who maintain private armies and the money proved to be an important source of funding for the insurgents. Statistically, a third of the costs of logistics in Afghanistan are spent on paying protection, bribery and safe passage fees. The U.S. Congress recently voiced its concerns about the perils of PMCs and has sought to develop standards for PMCs and ensure greater accountability. However, it is important to note that complete execution of the plans could take years.

Even after all these odds and qualms about the effectiveness of the PMCs, the banning of the PMCs in Afghanistan as promulgated by Karzai seems highly impractical owing to numerous reasons. The primary reason is the unpreparedness of the Afghan security forces and the burgeoning insurgency in the country. The nature of the insurgency on the ground is much more complex. A parallel Tier 3 Taliban system is operating in numerous provinces and sometimes local warlords or local frustrations result in uprisings. The present preparedness of the Afghan National Police or the National Army is nothing close to the levels of preparedness needed to undertake roles that are currently being performed by the PMCs. Considering Kabul’s reliance on PMCs and the highly complicated insurgency, operations without the involvement of PMCs would only lead to a vacuum. This would pave way for an increase in the number of insurgent attacks on Afghan soil, further exacerbating the situation.

Further, the move would negatively affect the lives of numerous Afghan nationals (in range of 15,000 to 20,000) who depend of the industry for their living. It is important to note that under the decree, foreigners in the industry would lose their residency permits and Afghan nationals would be allowed to apply through the interior ministry for jobs in the Afghan Police force. While this move may seem reasonable, a sudden shift would be resisted by the nationals who were working for PMCs. This will be primarily because the salaries offered to Afghan forces are drastically low as compared to the salaries of the PMCs. Further, the immediate vacuum would worsen the security situation which may also delay the international developmental projects.

Another issue that makes the immediate ban unrealistic is the fact that most PMCs are owned by powerful Afghans. To illustrate, the owners of many private security firms have their family links with President Karzai. Therefore, the widespread nature and involvement of high profile Afghans in the business makes the move highly unlikely to materialise. As stated above, the Afghan government softened its stance on the ban and allowed the functioning of few PMCs in the region. However, as the time for the closing of operation nears, one can hope to have numerous interpretations of the decree and terms of leniency from the Afghan government. It would not be highly unlikely to see the Afghan government picking and choosing the PMCs it wishes to grant permission for operations. Also, this may indirectly purge the competition which the powerful Afghans tend to face in the business.

Moreover, while it is tougher to operate in Kabul without a license, the illegal contractors are placed outside Kabul, where the reach of the authorities is quite limited. Also, most of the PMCs outside Kabul do not work for the U.S. Government but offer their services to ‘other customers’. With limited influence of the governmental authorities outside Kabul, ensuring that the operations of illicit PMCs are ceased is rather ambitious.

What remains important at this juncture is to embark on immediate steps to bring the shift from PMCs to national forces in slow and planned in phases. A smooth transition would be realistic and would also ensure that the security environment of the country is not hampered. It is also important to define the role of private contractors and review the history of the contractors before offering them contracts and undertake periodic auditing.

Aditi Malhotra is a Research Assistant for the Centre for Land Warfare Studies (CLAWS), New Delhi

SOURCE: Eurasia Review, http://www.eurasiareview.com/201011019357/karzais-unrealistic-decree-banning-private-contractors-in-afghanistan.html

Protecting the Jarawas

2010-11-07T23:11:00.001-08:00

The strategic and commercial importance of the Andaman and Nicobar (A&N) Islands has been widely debated in the Indian political scenario. Of the 575 islands, only 38 are permanently inhabited. While the commercial and strategic issues have enjoyed a relatively higher media attention, some aspects continue to remain out of focus. One of the most idiosyncratic, but surprisingly recondite facets of the islands is the Jarawa Reserve, home of the Jarawa tribe. The tribe is threatened by extinction and a merely 273 members are alive today. The concern of extinction is further exacerbated due to the extinction of the Bo tribe of the Andaman Island, a tribe that had lived on the Island for almost 65,000 years. In January this year, the last Bo speaking tribal died marking the extinction of the Bo tribe and their language.

The presence of the Jarawa tribal group was officially recorded in 1857 and they have been known to practice hostility towards both other tribal communities like the Great Andamanese and British colonisers. Throughout recorded history, Jarawas have remained insulated in their habitat but commercialisation and increased migration in the Island is threatening their survival.

In the 1970s, the government authorised construction of the Andaman Trunk Road (ATR- NH 223), a 343 km long road that connects South Andaman, Baratang, Middle Andaman and North Andaman, from Chiriyatapu in South Andaman to Diglipur in the North. The construction commenced in 1973 and resulted in an array of problems for the Jarawa tribe. The deforestation led to loss of Jarawas natural habitat and employment of machinery for construction traumatised their population. The Jarawas resisted the construction by attacking the workers, and were supported by the scientists of the Anthropological Survey of India and some international NGOs. Unfortunately, the disagreements were brushed aside by the authorities. It is important to note that the road cut off Jarawas access to the East Coast further affecting their habitat and survival.

Commercial activities and increased usage of the road facilitated the arrival of poachers, loggers and human safaris to the vicinity of the tribal reserve. The Jarawas resisted contact with the outside world till 1998, when they initiated contact with the non-indigenous population in the Andaman. Due to the low immunity towards common ailments present in the modern world, their contact with the outsiders has led to epidemics resulting in reduction of their population. Furthermore, there have been reports about sexual exploitation of the Jarawa women by poachers and tour operators. Owing to immense pressure from national and international NGOs, the government sought to review the situation.

In May 2002, the Supreme Court ordered the closure of the ATR, logging activities and the resettlement of the non-indigenous population to areas outside the Jarawa vicinity. Another seemingly landmark decision that proved nugatory was a new policy in 2004 averring that the Jarawas had the right to self-determination and no intervention would take place in respect to their habitat and domain. The reality on ground though is starkly different. Rampant logging and poaching continues to plague the Jarawa Reserve and threaten the tribal community. Despite periodic public warnings issued by government, tour operators continue to promote tours in the reserve, highlighting the Jarawa tribe as the main attraction.

The hypocritical attitude of the authorities further complicates the issue. In October 2007, the Andaman & Nicobar administration notified that a buffer zone of 5-kilometre radius of reserve would be created as a No-Go zone in order to protect the tribe from any external intervention. However, a resort stood within the 5-km radius and a legal case was registered in the Calcutta High Court. To the consternation of many, the final verdict was in favour of the reserve. Moreover, the execution of the buffer-zone notification was not seen anywhere except on the government papers.

In March 2010, the Union Cabinet declared the Andaman & Nicobar Islands as a major port with Port Blair as the headquarters. The issues of the island’s strategic location and the need to boost tourism were highlighted along with the need to construct maritime infrastructural projects. The July 2010 amendment to the Andaman and Nicobar (Protection of Aboriginal Tribals) Regulation Act of 1956 permits the islands’ administration to ban private tourism within the buffer zone.

While this move seems to be quite comforting, the decision to declare the islands as a major port undermines the effects of the Act and aggravate the situation of the Jarawas. This should be seen in light of the fact that the decision to make the 5-km buffer zone was taken in 2007 but was never implemented. The seriousness of implementing it now is doubtful considering the degree of commercialisation that will ensue. The timing of revisiting the buffer zone seems to have been arrived at to pacify the concern of the NGOs that stand for the cause. Most laws pertaining to the tribals are ignored by the local administration which continues to manipulate them to suit its vested interests.

Analysts have disparate views with regard to the Jarawa’s assimilation with the outside world. While many consider the idea of insulating them in their domain, others propagate the possibility of slowly including them in the mainstream and gifting them with the benefits of a modern lifestyle. As noted by the late Govinda Raju, editor of The Light of Andamans,

“The people who know the ground realities are not incorporated in the decision making while others work for commercial benefits or are migrants and remain in [sic] the island for short period and therefore lack the much needed seriousness to tackle the problem. Sadly, it is the Jarawas who suffer while the authorities ignore the idea of approaching them and comprehending their concerns and desires before formulating policies. The absence of a credible plan of action or objective assessment of the needs of the Jarawas makes the case more complicated and they are left at the mercy of time and a nonchalant administration.”

Keeping in view the ecologically vulnerable location of the Andaman group of islands, the preservation of the Jarawa tribe would help in preventing natural disasters. The government can enforce this by deploying an ecological Territorial Army (TA) battalion on the periphery of the 5-km buffer zone to effectively enforce the Supreme Court ruling and preserve the flora and fauna of the region.

Aditi Malhotra is a Research Assistant at the Centre for Land Warfare Studies (CLAWS), New Delhi

SOURCE: Pragati, The Indian National Interest Review http://pragati.nationalinterest.in/2010/10/protecting-the-jarawas/

Time to strengthen India's Look West Policy

2010-09-28T02:57:00.000-07:00

In 2005, Dr. Manmohan Singh first mooted India’s “Look West Policy” at the Prime Minister’s Trade and Economic Relations Committee (TERC) meeting. The commencement of the policy was marked by launching negotiations for an India-GCC free trade agreement and a Comprehensive Economic Cooperation Agreement (CECA) with individual nations of the group. India and the Middle East have a long history of , trade. Many Indians are employed in the Middle East. These countries are also a major source of oil for India, besides having collaborated in fighting terrorism.

India’s rising international profile has been an impetus for greater economic integration and has highlighted the need to secure its energy interests. While the ‘Look West Policy’ is important and welcomed, its impact remains restricted to only the Middle East. After all, India’s Western neighbours stretch from the Horn of Africa, the Middle East, Persian Gulf to the Central Asian Republics (CAR) and the Caucasus. What is starkly evident in the PM’s Look West Policy is the absence of the CAR which cannot be ignored. While these regions are not conterminous with India, one cannot ignore that any events in these regions have a domino effect on India. Additionally, India has tried to deal with each region separately through bilateral agreements and ‘as and when’ the need to cooperate crops up. India cannot look the other way, especially at a time when China is asserting its global superiority in all spheres of international politics. Additionally, Pakistan continues to regard the region important in order to trammel any Indian presence in the region. There is an imperative need to study the current scenario in CAR, assess the current influences pertaining to China and Pakistan and formulate policies to counter those influences and carve a niche for Indian interests.

Chinese Interests in Central Asian Republics

China has a long border with numerous Central Asian States, namely, Kazakhstan, Kyrgystan and Tajikistan. The economic linkage between China and CAR has been growing steadily and is benefiting both parties. China’s core interest in CAR is oil and gas as manifested in the ‘New Great Game.’ The country has been tapping the CAR’s natural gas to secure it as an alternative source of energy. The energy dependence of China and CAR’s potential for foreign investment in such sectors has been a point of fortifying friendship.

The Shanghai Cooperation Organisation (SCO), a successor of the original Shanghai Five organisation has been an important instrument for Beijing as it has offered them the platform to cooperate with Russia, CAR and exercise its influence.

Pakistan’s Interests in Central Asian Republics

Islamabad has always been aware of CAR’s geopolitical role and the importance of Pak-CAR cooperation which can be effectively employed as a leverage. More importantly, one cannot gainsay the significance Pakistan has for CAR because of the sea-access (through Gwadar port) Pakistan offers the land-locked nations. CAR remains significant for Pakistan because of the natural gas supplies and pipelines from these countries. India and Pakistan, both have attempted to gain an advantage over the other in terms of energy needs. While Pakistan has tried to capitalise on Islamic commonalities, it has not been able to achieve a lot. Rather than viewing CAR through the tints of ‘strategic depth’, they have pushed hard to impede the prospects of Indian presence there.

The Afghan factor also brings prominence to the CAR. The Indian support to Northern Alliance in Afghanistan through Tajik links had alarm bells ringing in Pakistan. This further highlighted the need to secure the CAR connection in order to exercise indirect influence on verging regions. While India has invested heavily in Afghanistan to ensure a positional advantage, it has failed to offer an equivalent degree of investment in the CAR.

The need for an Indian response

With such strong Sino-Pak interests in the region, India needs to take note and carve out a policy that counters the growing influence of its not-so-friendly neighbours. Even though, India has inked numerous bilateral treaties and agreements with the Central Asian countries, the level of commitment is superficial. There is an urgent need to take the extra mile and cooperate with CAR to a higher degree to ensure that India is not marginalised in the ‘New Great Game’ and is able to safeguards its energy needs. The recent agreement signed on the Turkmenistan-Afghanistan-Pakistan-India (TAPI) gas pipeline and the proposal to induct a private partner in the agreement brings new hope for the pipeline. However, India need not lay supine but use the impetus to sign more deals with Tajikistan and other countries in Central Asia.

The greater influence India can exercise in Central Asia in terms of energy, access and investments, the stronger it would turn out in the regional game. India’s nuclear cooperation with Kazakhstan has opened doors for a long-lasting friendship but the need is to nurture the alliances for long-term benefits.

Additionally, Tajikistan’s adjoining borders with Uzbekistan, Kyrgyzstan, Afghanistan, and China and its proximity to PoK makes the country extremely important. Tajikistan can aid India’s effective functioning in Afghanistan, especially at a time when the future of the country seems bleak. The fight against drug trafficking and terrorism can be easily facilitated through a stronger alliance. It is important to note that Tajikistan is the only foreign country where India has a military base. Unfortunately, the Farkhor Air Base has not become operational due to numerous frictions between the two sides.

Other potential areas of cooperation with the CAR can be space and military technology. Considering the potential, the present scale of economic dealings with CAR is on a very small scale. Building stronger bonds (in terms of economics, military and politics)with a country is not a matter of days but require sustained efforts over years, that are further nurtured though cultural and diplomatic exchanges and cooperation. India needs to wake up and focus attention towards its distant-yet-important neighbours in the Central Asian region, before other countries grab the opportunity and carve a niche for themselves.

Aditi Malhotra is a Research Assistant at the Centre for Land Warfare Studies (CLAWS)

Source: Centre for Land Warfare Studies, http://claws.in/index.php?action=master&task=648&u_id=119

(Disclaimer: The views expressed in this article are those of the author and do not represent the views either of the Editorial Committee or the Centre for Land Warfare Studies).

China’s nuclear ‘gigawatt’ steps in South Asia

2010-09-28T02:53:00.000-07:00

On 20 September, 2010, China National Nuclear Corp (CNNC) revealed that it had entered into negotiations with Pakistan for the export of a one-gigawatt (GW) nuclear plant to the latter. China had previously constructed nuclear reactors Chashma-1 (operational in 2000) and Chashma-2 (set for completion in 2011). In April 2010, China had initiated the plans of building two additional 300 MW reactors, Chashma 3 and 4, alongside its previous projects. For now, the Sino-Pak nuclear equation seems to have reached its peak with its fresh plan of building a one-GW plant. Considering that the U.S. has been a stentorian advocate of non-proliferation, its minimal reaction to the Sino-Pak nuclear deals stands in stark contrast.

The one-GW plant deal highlights the extreme brazenness with which China continues to operate in the international arena. Considering the U.S.’s official opposition with regard to the construction of Chashma 3 and 4, the fresh plans of constructing the one-GW plan can be construed a strong message from Beijing to Washington. Stating that its agreements are in line with its international obligations and were “grandfathered” before China’s entry into NSG, China has not sought an exemption. It’s disregard for international opposition makes it evident that the rising power would continue to execute its plans without paying any heed to its ‘international image’ or reputation. The U.S’s indolence would only result in further flexing of Chinese muscles. These events resemble those of the Nazi era when the Allied Powers followed a policy of appeasement and discounted the untoward acts of Nazi Germany till its transformed into a leviathan.

The American reluctance on tackling China’s boisterous conduct has much to do with the strong economic linkage the two opponents share. China’s deep integration with the American economy has made the U.S. highly dependent on China. The recent financial crisis highlighted the precarious situation the U.S. grapples with and the importance of China in sustaining their economic stability. Underestimating the Chinese power in previous years has led to a challenging situation for Washington. For the first time, it has had to deal with a rival that is also an indispensable economic partner, further trammeling its options. However, the American passivity in dealing with the Chinese dragon would result in a bigger conundrum that would become almost impossible to tackle at its zenith.

Another challenge that is seemingly at a preliminary stage is Pakistan’s shifting allegiances. The fortifying Sino-Pak bond and Pakistan’s increasing reliance on China could wean the former away from the current US-Pak strategic alliance. The U.S’s necessity for Pakistan’s support in its war efforts in Afghanistan only benefits Pakistan, as it gains from aid and defence benisons that continue to materialise owing to it’s periodical practices of pressure tactics.

The recent disclosures of the U.S’s frustration with Pakistan’s attitude show Islamabad’s actions do not always conform to Washington’s desires and with a stronger Sino-Pak link, the degree of importance attached to the U.S may well wane.
The recent nuclear deals have serious implications for regional stability as it can easily spark off a nuclear arms race in South Asia, further threatening world peace. The glib of ‘peaceful nuclear intentions’ has for long been the initial explanation for an ensuing nuclear build-up for military employment. There are no clear indications that the current rhetoric originating from Beijing and Islamabad would turn out any different.

If Pakistan continues to stockpile more nuclear warheads, then India couldn’t be faulted for following suit, deteriorating the already menacing conditions in the South Asian region. In addition, Pakistan’s nuclear security is contentious and the fear of nuclear material ‘falling into wrong hands’ has become more prominent due to the current wave of terrorism in Pakistan. Additional nuclear facilities in the country would only increase the threat to its stockpiles, therefore resulting in a potential international scare.

Implications for India

The Indo-US nuclear deal in 2008 gave The Chinese an opportunity to strike a similar deal with Pakistan. While the Indo-US deal started on a positive note and was intended to act as ‘India’s passport to the world’, the reality on ground is diametric. The deal has failed to show any signs of commercial implementation and has exacerbated the Indo-US relations due to certain contentious issues like the nuclear liability bill.

Unfortunately, in regard to commercial realisation, India has not benefited much so far, whereas China and Pakistan have used the pretext of the Indo-US deal to justify their deals and profited from them. Pakistan’s increasing nuclear stockpile and China’s assertiveness in the subcontinent should not be seen through a laissez faire lens and it is time India gears up its diplomatic strength to make arrangements to secure its national interests.

The U.S. and India need to foster their relations to a much higher degree in order to counter the rising China and an unstable Pakistan. Any delay in achieving a lucrative equation between Delhi and Washington would only harm the interests of both parties. The energy of the upcoming Obama visit should be directed towards ironing out differences, adjusting strategic postures and securing a stronger bond, keeping in mind its long term benefits. India’s inactivity at this hour will strengthen the perception of India being a ‘door mat’ in the international arena.

Aditi Malhotra is a Research Assistant at the Centre for Land Warfare Studies (CLAWS)

Source: Indian Defence Review, http://www.indiandefencereview.com/2010/09/china%E2%80%99s-nuclear-%E2%80%98gigawatt%E2%80%99-steps-in-south-asia.html

Pakistan's Nuclear Complex: Threatening World Peace?

2010-09-13T22:07:00.000-07:00

Finally the realisation is dawning that the proposition that because Pakistan’s nuclear arsenal is under the exclusive control of the Pakistan Army it is safe and secure and not likely to fall into terrorist hands is fundamentally flawed. Simple arithmetic will prove that since military dictator Gen. Ziaul Haq introduced the imported Saudi brand of Wahabi Salafi-ism as the credo of the armed forces every soldier from the Chief of Army Staff down to the soldier has been dyed in the deepest shade of Islamic fundamentalism. The recent Rand Corporation study has underscored that the Pakistan Army is using the nuclear arsenal to help jihadi operations against India.

South Asia is yet again in the spotlight for its ‘enthusiastic’ nuclear attitude. With the recent unveiling of China-Pakistan nuclear cooperation, the issue of Pakistan’s nuclear security has once again gained momentum. Pakistan’s Foreign Minister Shah Mahmood Qureshi proclaimed that post-nuclear summit “the world is comfortable with them” [Pakistan’s nuclear assets] and Pakistan “attaches the highest importance to the security of nuclear materials and facilities.” Some officials in the West seem to regard their [Pakistan] nuclear assets as safe but it would not be wrong to state that this belief prevails primarily owing to the strategic importance of Pakistan in US’s Af-Pak policy. The overriding concern about Pakistan’s nuclear security is overtly pronounced in the reports of some Western analysts.

As internal turmoil dominates the political landscape of Pakistan, the criticality about the safety of its nuclear complex needs to be revisited. Pakistan’s nuclear discourse has many dimensions and this article will explore certain crucial aspects. Specifically, they are the Army-Jihadi complex, supra-national individuals like A. Q. Khan, intentions of terrorist groups, theft of nuclear material and lastly, assassination of key nuclear commanders. One of the most (seemingly) comforting arguments lies in the belief that Pakistan’s nuclear weapons are safe, purely because they remain under the jurisdiction of the Army. Examining the Pakistani case, there seems to be a serious susceptibility from individuals and factions within the military and intelligence services, who are in cahoots with terrorist groups. What places the vulnerabilities at the peak is the dangerous relationship between the army, intelligence services and the terrorist groups. While a segment of Taliban may be against some sections of Pakistani society; several elements in Taliban continue to maintain a cosy relationship with the Pakistani Army, especially its intelligence establishment. Therefore, the struggle within the Pakistani Army and the perils of Army-jihadi complex pose a serious security problem for Pakistan‘s nuclear arsenals.

Tracing historical accounts, extreme religious ideas penetrated the military during the rule of General Ziaul Haq, which led to ISI’s strong links with religious groups. Extreme Islamisation became a part of Pakistan‘s foreign policy and was evident with unbound support given to the mujahideen during the Soviet-Afghan war. When the US imposed sanctions on Pakistan for establishing its covert nuclear programme, the young officers of those times bore anti-American sentiments. Additionally, they were most receptive to Islam fundamentalist ideology and anti-Americanism. Unfortunately, those young officers today are two and three-star generals. Taking into account the extreme Islamisation that dominated the army for decades, there is a clear-cut dichotomy in the present demand of a ‘moderate Islam’ outlook. The “war on terror” has compelled these same officers to crack down on Islamists. This reaction is obviously something new to the officers who were indoctrinated to support the mujahideen in Afghanistan and then in
Kashmir. The allegiance of some officers does remain with the current objectives, while some consider it as anti-Islamic. This is evident by the rising ‘bear count’ in the armed forces that reflects their strong religious attitude. The case of Khaled Sheikh Mohammed best reflects the connection between terrorist groups and the military. Khaled, the alleged
mastermind of 9/11, after escaping many arrests was finally arrested in 2003, at a ‘safe house’ of a serving army officer with links to Jamaat-i-Islami. For this reason, this dangerous link cannot be forestalled.

Pakistan established the practice of Personnel Reliability Programme (PRP) to weed out terrorist sympathizers and ensure a high degree of reliability among its members. It is stated that any personnel that do not adhere to PRP standards are not allowed access to nuclear facilities. The PRP standards include religious orientations, personality complications, sexual deviancy etc. Further, the Pakistani Army has introduced the practice of two-man rule system which ascertains that it is mandatory to have at least 2 personnel at a sensitive area at all times. Such preparations are believed to guarantee that no unsound individual gains control of nuclear weapons.

The practice in itself is commendable and theoretically assures a high degree of security, but its application is questionable. What is not in the public domain is how well these procedures are implemented and if any defectors have ever been identified or removed. It is true that unreliability can crop up in various forms and even if all individuals are not a threat, some are likely to be. The unknown figure is what causes added anxieties and results in severe doubts about Pakistan‘s claims. According to Asian News International, civilians that access highly enriched uranium (HEU) are not scrutinised as thoroughly as the military personnel involved in weaponry operations.

It is important to bear in mind that Pakistan‘s nuclear evolution relied on illicit nuclear procurements, which reveals its inherent dependence on rogue actors. Therefore, it would
become difficult to weed out the inappropriate personnel easily, from a system so deeply entangled with rogue elements. It is partially reassuring that former President Musharraf purged many top and middle level officers of the ISI because of their links to the Taliban or Al Qaeda but it is not unreasonable to believe that none are aware of the actual number of Islamic sympathisers in the military or ISI presently. As the line goes, “Who watches the watchmen?” Allied to the intentions of terrorist groups to employ WMD for mass killing, these connections and links are a cause of grave concern.

The secrecy surrounding Pakistan’s nuclear assets and procedures to safeguard them has added to the international unease. Even though the 2010 Nuclear Posture Review focuses
on the issue of nuclear terrorism and illicit nuclear trade, little has been done in Pakistan to ensure such regulations. The case of A. Q. Khan is one such incident. Khan, who was never actually “punished”, was kept under house arrest till the Pakistani court recently declared him a ‘free citizen’ and allowed him to ‘move freely and continue his activities’. Dr. Khan, known as the father of Pakistan‘s nuclear programme, eventually became the ringmaster of a nuclear black market, which was revealed in February 2004. When former Pakistani President Pervez Musharraf was questioned on this case, he maintained that the army did not know about such activities. He said, “...if there was some individual
who for personal gain wanted to sell national assets ... it could be possible because it was not under strategic checks and controls.” The statement reveals a daunting fact. In case the army wasn’t aware about the activities (a highly unlikely scenario), it reflects that the army did not exercise serious control over its nuclear establishments.

Pakistan remains a serious concern because the black market network established by A. Q. Khan has been instrumental in nuclear proliferation. Most of the States that have relied on this network for their nuclear efforts are prone to instability, viz North Korea, Iran, Libya and allegedly Myanmar. However, A. Q. Khan’s case is not in isolation. Another example is that of Sultan Mahmood, an Islamist who eventually gave up his position as director of Pakistan’s Atomic Energy Commission (PAEC). He reportedly revealed some rough designs of creating a nuclear weapon to Osama bin Laden in 1999. Apart from this case, Prof. Chaudhry Abdul Majeed and Sultan Bashiruddin Mahmood, two renowned nuclear scientists in the region, with deep religious orientation, have also been involved in leaking nuclear information to the Taliban. These reports contradict Pakistan‘s continuous pronouncements that their nuclear assets are in safe hands.

Another worrying dimension is the intentions of terrorist networks and their reach. Although Al Qaeda has, so far, employed conventional explosives for destruction, reports reveal that they may be willing to employ nuclear weapons for the same. American accounts have reported that Osama bin Laden has declared the
possession of nuclear weapons as a religious duty. Furthermore, International Atomic Energy Agency
(IAEA) has reported about his efforts to acquire an atomic bomb. Adding to the scare was a fatwa issued by
Sheikh Nasir bin Hamid al-Fahd, allowing the use of WMD, even if it involves killings of innocent Muslims. An important and rather intimidating characteristic of Pakistan‘s nuclear infrastructure is that major nuclear sites are in close proximity of violence prone regions on their western frontiers. The establishment of the same away from the eastern border was originally intended to minimise the likelihood of an Indian attack on the infrastructure. Unfortunately, this has got the facilities closer to the instable Af-Pak region. These areas remain the hub of terrorist activities and sectarian violence in the country.

According to the South Asia Terrorism Portal, there are approximately 47 terrorist and extremist organisations in Pakistan. While some are involved with strong ties to infiltration into Jammu and Kashmir, others are a part of Pakistan’s Taliban with strong ties to Afghanistan’s Taliban or foreign jihadis. Apart from these, there are groups involved in sectarian violence, specifically, insurgents involved in Baluchistan, Shia / Sunni and Punjabi / Sindhi violence. Consequently, the presence of such groups contributes to security threats to the nuclear facilities. Numerous attempts have been made by terrorist groups to accumulate enough nuclear fuel to create dirty bombs or a nuclear weapon (which is highly unlikely to happen in the near future). Pakistan is capable of making plutonium and HEU for nuclear use. The potential theft of nuclear fuel directly implies the ease for the terrorists to make a dirty bomb. Pakistan has been unable to account on the quantum of nuclear fissile material within its boundaries. This further leads to worry because without a record of the nuclear material present, it would be difficult to track stolen material (if any).

Presently, no available accounts declare that a terrorist group, functioning independent of a government, have the skills to develop a nuclear weapon. Certainly, developing a nuclear weapon is not easy even if the terrorists gather the needed nuclear material. Besides, one cannot deny that outsiders cannot get access to nuclear fissile material. There have, however, been numerous recorded cases of thefts. According to UN agency reports, in 2005 and 2006 alone, there have been more than 250 cases of unauthorised possession, theft or loss of nuclear or related materials reported to the UN IAEA Illicit Trafficking Database (ITDB). Having noted this, it is particularly important for Pakistan to keep a track of its fissile material, strictly monitoring the movements of fuel. There are strong reasons to believe that Pakistan does not have fissile material protection, control and accounting (MPC&A) systems installed at its nuclear facilities. These systems are easily available but seemingly Pakistan neither will be able to afford nor possess the expertise to produce a similar technology.

Another major situation involves the fears that fundamentalists could assassinate the most important personnel of nuclear command and control, thus creating a gap in the organisation, making it more vulnerable to unauthorised usage. This fear gained much momentum and weight with three attempted assassinations of Musharraf in 2000, 2003 and 2007. All attempts had links to army personnel and Al Qaeda. Benazir Bhutto’s killing is also considered as an evidence of Islamic anger and also points towards the role of Pakistan army. One cannot ignore that in order to fulfil their plans of eliminating key commanders the fundamentalists will have to resort to simultaneous attacks on numerous commanders. Despite the pattern of previous attacks, eliminating all key leaders seems highly improbable. As mentioned before, many back-up plans and contingency remain untested, therefore adding an element of uncertainty to the scenario.

Based on reports, there have been three suicide attacks at, or close to Sargodha Air Base (nuclear weapons and missile storage facilities). Other attacks were in Punjab, NWPF and Wah Cantonment ordnance factory. It is important to note that the sites targeted provided security facilities for Pakistan‘s nuclear programme. Clearly, Pakistan is at war with itself. In view of the drone attacks in the tribal agencies of Pakistan and the offensives launched by the Pakistani Army, acts of violence by insurgent Taliban forces will continue to escalate and be a source of constant threat for Pakistan’s nuclear security.

It is prudent to consider that no security arrangement is foolproof but Pakistan should adopt measures to minimise its vulnerabilities and direct its efforts to a relatively more secure nuclear complex. Primarily, it is essential to ensure the existence of stable democratic institutions in the country. Serious efforts should be made to implement a version of ‘dual-key system’, with a balance of civilian and military participation in it. To facilitate enhanced security, a guardianship system that was once practiced by the US in 1940s should be adopted. Pakistan should adopt a more rigorous PRP in order to identify their malcontents better. Accordingly, Pakistan should adopt a much more transparent attitude regarding their nuclear doctrine, nuclear assets, PRP defectors etc. This will facilitate its relationship of trust and cooperation with the international community. Genuine efforts should be directed towards employing internationally trusted systems like the MPC&A. Such systems provide higher guarantee of nuclear safety internally and externally.
It is important for Pakistan to practice recessed deterrence and comply with it even under extremely tensed situations. This reduces the chances of any potential theft or unauthorized usage. In the nutshell, Pakistan should not evade the issue of nuclear security but rather work towards a more secure nuclear complex.

The writer is a Research Assistant at Centre for Land Warfare Studies (CLAWS), New Delhi.

SOURCE: Defence and Security Alert, Vol. 1, Issue. 12, September 2010.

Globalisation And The Illicit Trade Of Small Arms And Light Weapons

2010-09-13T21:50:00.000-07:00

In June 2010, the representatives of all United Nations (UN) Member States came together at the Biennial Meeting of States in New York to consider the implementation of the 2001 Programme of Action (POA) on the illicit trade in small arms. The program was initiated in July 2001 to keep a check on the ever-growing illicit trade on Small Arms and Light Weapons (SALW) and to help countries, combat this pernicious problem. While the forum has worked continuously for the cause and attempts to achieve a certain degree of success in implementing the POA, there are numerous areas that still remain extremely challenging to deal with. Even though, the campaigns for combating illicit arms trade stirred reasonable support for the cause but largely, the progress has not been noteworthy. A few such disappointments can be incapability to act on setting international standards of marking and tracing of SALW and regulating illicit arms brokers.

While most of the issues relating to the illicit trade of SALW are highlighted in the media, few talk about ways and methods through which globalisation has spurred the black market of SALW. It Is imperatively important to realise the magnitude of illicit activities that take place under the garb of globalisation and work towards it comprehensively. Globalisation is not new and neither is the black market. In the contemporary times, terrorism has been regarded as a major threat to world security. Intensive media coverage devoted to terrorism obscures other similar threats that haunt international security. Black market of arms and ammunitions is one of them. The illegal market for munitions encompasses top-of the-line tanks, radar systems that detect Stealth aircraft, and the makings of the deadliest weapons of mass destruction. One prominent example in the history of arms black market is the sale of 87 Hughes helicopters to North Korea in the mid-1980s.

While the issue of global illicit trade of small arms does not attract much attention in the international arena, it evidently is an issue of pressing importance. The global illegitimate business in small arms is valued approximately around US$ 1 billion. Even though, the figure does not seem very outrageous, it’s important to realise that it’s the small arms that fuel crime and sustain armed conflicts world over, for example, 4 decades in Columbia and continues to plague the country of Afghanistan. It is equally responsible for facilitating terrorism and creating anarchy after civil wars. Burundi, Ghana, Yemen, Kyrgyzstan, Nepal, Pakistan are few of many countries that suffer from this form of ‘black globalisation’.

The structure of the small arms black market today is a complex network stretching across the globe, siphoning the gains of globalisation. At heart, it’s essential to map out the structure of illicit arms trade which not only includes black market, but also grey market and craft production.

The journey of small arms begins from the legal circuit and eventually falls into illegal clutches. There are multiple ways through which the legally originated arms get diverted to illegal spheres. Shipping through dangerous routes, stockpile mismanagement, loots, corruption among officials, warzone seizures are a few of them.

The world of Globalised Crime

Tom G. Palmer of the Cato Institute defines Globalisation as "the diminution or elimination of state-enforced restrictions on exchanges across borders and the increasingly integrated and complex global system of production and exchange that has emerged as a result.” (1)

The ideation of globalisation advocates free market forces with minimised economic barriers and open trade for world development. This forms the basis of expansion of arms black market. With minimised custom regulations and border control, trafficking of small arms becomes easier. A miniscule percent of container ships have cargo checks, therefore making the arms movement smooth. Faking documents (bills of lading, forged end-use certificates) (2), bribing officials and concealing arms as humanitarian aids are common practices. In 2002, traffickers acquired 5,000 AK-47s from Yugoslavian army stocks and moved them from Serbia to Liberia under the guise of a legal transaction with Nigeria. One of the planes used in this shipment came from Ukraine and made a refuelling stop in Libya while en route. (3)

Political and economic integration are coupled with lesser restrictions in migration and human movement. This helps the arms dealers to fortify their present business connections and tap new ones. Dealers migrate to various regions, motivated by business expansion or reduced operational risks. In case of arrests, arms dealers travel to countries where it is not possible to get extradited. The following case sheds some light on the argument. Abu Salem, an underworld criminal from India, who besides having a lengthy criminal record, was involved in providing illegal arms for 1993 serial bomb blasts in India. To escape arrest, he left for Portugal. After 3 years of legal disputes, Indian authorities managed to extradite Abu Salem from Lisbon, Portugal. It was after this case that India and Portugal signed an extradition treaty in 2007.

Further, banking reforms and capital mobility have aided the black market to spread its trade internationally, utilising every angle of the well linked financial market. This also gives rise to offshore markets and tax shelters. An illustration of banking innovation is Emoney. Banks have introduced cards bearing microchips, which are able to store large sums of money. These cards are portable outside conventional channels or can be easily bartered among individuals. The money involved in illegal arms deals is exorbitant and the use of Emoney makes transactions easier.

The linkage of banks with the internet has posed a new challenge in combating illegitimate activities in the financial sector. E-banking has digitised money making it prone to criminality. Even though, it has numerous benefits for the world at large, it is misused for money laundering, credit card scams and check-kiting (4). Adding to this, economic integration among regions blesses arm brokers with more opportunities to shelter their money, by investing in different stock exchanges. Numerous other illegal practices are a by-product of a deregulated financial sector, but money laundering is at the apex.

Money Laundering or ‘cleansing of money’ is an unlawful practice of concealing the point of origin, identity or destination of the funds, when performing a particular financial transaction. The criminals manoeuvre money across borders gaining from banks in countries with lax anti-laundering policies.

Profound expansion of commercial airline and freight industry (making transport cheaper and easier) are instrumental in increased penetration of arms in conflict zones. Global merger of airline companies, supply chains, shipping firms make it tough to supervise unlawful practices in air and water.

The growth of global communication in the past two decades has been unfathomable. This has enhanced the ability of arms dealers to communicate internationally through the web at a cheap rate. Arms dealers use ‘cloned’ cellular phones and unsecured broadband networks to surpass any chances of getting traced. Satellite phones are an option in remote areas where other means cannot be operated, providing an uninterrupted channel of contact and reach. Sometimes, arms deals are conducted through wires, where the privilege of anonymity prevails. In 2004, British police arrested more than 50 people in a series of raids to crack down criminals who bought illegal arms from abroad over the internet (5).

Illicit arms trade is not isolated from other global illegal activities. When small arms flow to the black market, they become one of many illegal commodities there. The arms can be exchanged for money, drugs, conflict diamonds, endangered species etc. It becomes extremely tough to distinguish individual illegal acts in a web of transnational crime. Activities of arms dealers stretch across to other transnational criminal organisations (TCOs), like the drug and human traffickers, smugglers, terrorists’, mafias etc. For instance, members of Al Qaeda hail from numerous countries, bearing fake passports and identities for security and ease of functioning. Their arms belong to black or grey markets ranging from Afghanistan, North West Pakistan, Uzbekistan, Latin America etc. Some arms were siphoned by ISI during the Soviet-Afghan war. Additionally, they also rely on profits incurred from drug trade originating in Afghanistan.

Global Governance

United Nations (UN) Programme of Action to Prevent, Combat and Eradicate the Illicit Trade in Small Arms and Light Weapons in All Its Aspects.

The UN initiated the Programme of Action after initial study on effect of small arms on the societies. In July 2001, UN conducted a conference on the Illicit Trade of SALW in All its Aspects. The conference focussed on the measures nations could take to combat the widespread problem of illicit arms trade. During this period, International Action Network on Small Arms (IANSA) took birth, which was an amalgamation of numerous NGOs. Today, IANSA has 700 members which are growing continuously.

The program bought the issue of the proliferation and abuse of SALW. It focuses on making illicit gun manufacturing a criminal act, destroying surplus arms, issuing end-user certificates for transfers, marking and tracing of guns, sharing information, documenting the records of gun production, imposing stricter enforcements on weapons sanctions (6).

UN Firearms Protocol

Another program commenced by the UN was the UN Firearms Protocol, which came into effect from 3rd July 2005. This program was to supplement to the United Nations Convention against TCOs. The protocol seeks to encourage, assist and build up cooperation between states to combat illegal trafficking in SALW and monitoring its activities.

Till September 2005, 44 states approved the Protocol. A major problem that hinders in the success for this program is the acceptance of majority of the states. Its important to penetrate the will of the global community, so that the measures proposed in the program are effectively implemented and not in words (7).

Control Arms Campaign and the Arms Trade Treaty

Control Arms is a global campaign launched in October 2003 by Amnesty International, Oxfam International and IANSA. It centres on the global trade of SALW and advocates against irresponsible transfers of arms to countries which practice human rights abuse. It clearly endorses striker arms trade laws which would prohibit the augmentation of grey market and black market.

Even after numerous efforts to do away with the illicit arms trade, there has not been any international treaty that binds countries into a common cause. The control arms campaign proposes an International Arms Trade Treaty (ATT). The ATT would be a legally binding treaty which would unite the country’s present commitments under an international law. Presently, the treaty has the support of almost 153 countries and more that 800 NGO’s. (8, 9)

International Criminal Police Organisation (Interpol)

Interpol is an organisation that facilitates cooperation of international police. It was established in 1923 and today enjoys a membership of 186 member states. It focuses on transnational crimes like terrorism, money laundering, drug, human and illicit arms trafficking etc.

Interpol has been aggressively involved in the illicit arms trade and have been tracing and tracking arms trafficking activities world over, with cooperation from its members. One of the admirable examples of their work is the arrest of Victor Bout, world’s largest arms dealer, alleged of delivering weapons to Al Qaeda and the Taliban. The arrest was result of a multi-country operation (10).

In 2006, Interpol was working on a study in collaboration with International Criminal Court, to launch a pilot project comprising of data collection and information analysis concerning primary figures involved in illicit arms brokering (11).

Regional Level

Latin America and Caribbean

Major Problems:

Increasing demand due to general increase in criminal and cross-border activities.
Approximately 90% of illicit arms enter through Columbia, Panama and Guatemala
Illicit homemade firearms post a challenge. They flow from Central and North America.

Regional efforts:

Countries like Paraguay have toughened their small arms legislations and are cooperating to share information on the issue (member states of Mercosur).
The United Nations Regional Centre for Peace, Disarmament and Development in Latin America and the Caribbean (UN-LIREC), the Organisation of American States (OAS), and Mecosur are working towards supportive ventures to build small arms control programmes.
Organisations from different regions are coming together to act. For example, Andean Community is coordinating with Nairobi Secretariat, SaferAfrica and EU for the cause.
The Caribbean Community (Caricom) set up a ministerial body to counsel on small arms and seeks to launch a Weapons Intelligent Unit to trace arms within the region.
OAS adopted the Inter-American Convention against the Illicit Manufacturing of and Trafficking in Firearms, Ammunition, Explosives, and Other Related Materials (CIFTA) in 1997, the first international treaty to target illegal arms trade.

The Pacific

Major Problems:

SALW are readily available and there is a lack of control and regulation
Availability of old stocks in the region
Lack of infrastructure for stockpile management

Regional Efforts:

Pacific Islands Forum Regional Security Committee (FRSC) has established processes for an effective regional approach to combat the problem by regular control, tracing the production, possessions etc.
FRSC were instrumental in developing two important documents, namely, the Honiara initiative, Nadi Declaration (established framework of legislation to be used in national authority) and also the Biketawa Declaration (2001).

South East Asia

Major Problems:

Illicit trafficking in SALW is causing instability and threatening security
Number of intra-state conflicts that plague the region are instrumental in increasing the demand
Long maritime regions are tough to monitor and national inventories are not managed properly.

Regional efforts:

In 1999, the ASEAN Plan of Action to Combat Transnational Crime was adopted, which comprised a major section of illicit arms trafficking.
Improvement in information flow and coordinated work between ASEAN Chiefs of National Police (ASEANPOL), customs and immigration officials facilitates better working.
In May 2000, ASEAN focussed exclusively on SALW, together with Indonesia, UN Regional Centre for Peace and Disarmament in Asia and the Pacific and Japan.

Sub Saharan Africa

Major Problems:

Demand due to inter/intra state conflict and other ethnic and religious disputes.
Firearms have fuelled uncontained conflicts like Liberia, Congo etc.
Slow progress in developing national and regional points of contact on the issue.

Regional efforts:

The Southern African Development Community (SADC), the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) and the Nairobi Secretariat have recognized national and regional divisions purposely regarding the illegal small arms trade.
SADC and Nairobi Secretariat collaborated through lawfully binding understanding directed towards the eradication of the problem; Nairobi Secretariat is also jointly working with Eastern Africa Police Chiefs Cooperation Organisation (EAPCCO) and Inter-Governmental Authority on Development (IGAD) on developing methods of control the trade.
The Programme for Coordination and Assistance for Security and Development (PCASED), (ECOWAS + UN Development Programme) has supported 13 out of 15 ECOWAS Members to create commissions for the execution of ECOWAS Moratoriumon Importation, Exportation and Manufacture of Light Weapons.

The Arab World

Major Problems:

US-led invasion of Iraq added to the already high number of small arms in the region.
The issue of Palestinian refugees and underdevelopment in the particular area have lead to increasing demands.
Insufficient regulation of SALW holistically in the Arab world
Regional efforts:

The League of Arab States is effectively monitoring the illegal activities related to small arms. The main point of concern for them is the Palestinian issue, which has given rise to the illegal arms trafficking and terrorism.
In December 2003, the League and the UN Department for Disarmament Affairs (UNDDA) employed the UN Programme of Action in the region.

Europe

Major Problems:

Major small arms exporters in the world hail from the Europe.
Some countries have high levels of gun violence across the region, whereas some have very low levels.
Uncontrolled proliferation of illicit trafficking in small arms in South-Eastern Europe.
Regional efforts:

The illicit arms trade issue was initially given emphasis in OSCE in 1996, and established the OSCE document on SALW, guiding countries on national regulation, monitoring illegal brokering, export restriction, weapons destructions etc.
The South Eastern Europe Clearinghouse for the Control of Small Arms and Light Weapons (SEESAC) is an important organisation in the struggle against illicit trade of SALW in South Eastern Europe, providing assistance and training to countries with lack of resources.
Even though numerous steps have been taken at different levels, they have been unable to produce reasonable results. Although holistically viewed, the actions seem to be inadequate and ineffective.

National Level

Illicit arms trade is a threat to majority of countries in the world. Primarily, all countries working towards this problem employ their national police service, administrative and bureaucratic services to combat the problem. The degree of devotion to the problem varies with countries majorly depending on the level of threat the problem poses to them.

Loopholes

- No internationally binding treaty to combat the problem.
- No agreed international standard of marking and tracing weapons.
- No transparency in arms export and transfer of arms to ‘high risk regions.’
- Covert authorised arms transfers.
- Arms supply to non-state actors/embargoes countries.
- Lax custom policies or careless officials.
- No agreement/treat directly targeting the illegal arms brokers.

Recommendations:

Establish a common international standard of marking and tracing the SALW. This should be followed by all countries so that there is no discrepancy in the markings. If followed properly, this practice would make it easier to trace the illegal weapons and the routes from where they reach the wrong hands.
Stipulate common paradigms of stockpile management and security. This would consequently make it easier for officials to minimise cases of stockpile loot. Adding to this, the practice of destroying surplus should be well promoted to avoid the arms reaching unlawful dealers.
The governments should make arms licensing stricter and lesser available for the civil population and establish tougher requirements for attaining arms. Parallel to that, laws should be devised to monitor the activities of arms brokers and clearly lay down the boundaries of their role.
National laws relating to illegal arms trade should be strengthened, regularly updated and reformed according to the progress and needs of the problem. The government should also control the activities of private companies within their jurisdiction. Private companies should be restricted to supply arms to states where slack law enforcements make it easier for illicit dealers to siphon arms.
The present multilateral agreements should be strengthened. The most effective action can be taken at regional levels, as the agreements are flexible to the needs of each region. Therefore, the more multilateral and regional agreements should be worked upon through better cooperation, information sharing and strictly adhering to embargoes imposed on various regions.
Arms sales should be regulated and monitored nationally and internationally and common international benchmarks of export practices should be ascertained for countries to act better and in coordination.
Transparency is the most important factor for pursuing responsible exports. Presently, the exporters of arms hardly practice transparency. It is not just important to transfer arms to countries but to trace that the arms are in responsible hands and not abused for inhuman purposes or illegitimate practices.
Lastly, it’s significant and inevitably important to pave way towards an International Arms Trade Treaty. The ATT proposed is a well documented treaty containing majorly all aspects of arms trade. If the treaty is accepted internationally, then it would form the basis of a strong mechanism to restrict the irresponsible sale of SALW and reduce the negative effects that it has on the global society.

The inevitability of the Black Market

After an extensive study on the illicit arms trade and its global governance, it is important to see the dark side of the same coin. It’s a universal perception that governmental actions, multilateral coordination and stricter laws would bring an end to this curse. Unfortunately, this is not true. The black market survives on the simple rules of economics where market forces dominate the game. Guns are illegal today, but there are people (terrorists, individuals, rebel groups etc.) who desire it. Consequently, this creates the demand. In order to satiate the demand, there needs to be a supplier. Supplying guns (which is an illegal act) involves a lot of risk because of the coercive actions of the state. In normal circumstances, this would be too perilous, but there is a catch. The people who demand SALW are ready to pay a higher price than the legal price. Therefore, this scenario gets the suppliers a heavy profit by taking the risk. Over a period of time, the supplier becomes adept in their work and finds new means to get new arms, whether they are by siphoning from legal market, looting from stockpiles or accumulating abandoned guns from conflict zones. With unbound profits from for each deal, the suppliers become richer and stronger.

Even with stricter laws and embargoes, the demand would remain. Now satisfying the demand means greater risk, which implies a higher price for the same gun. This in turn means higher profit for the dealers (12). This clearly reflects that the black market would never get eliminated. The only way to abolish this is to abolish the demand. This is best explained by Aaron Karp, ‘To eliminate the gray market would require universal acceptance of the political status quo, the end of international politics. Short of world government or a powerful system of collective security, states will continue to find the appeal of the gray market to be irresistible’ (13). In the nutshell, the future of black markets depends on the events of this globalised world which can either boost illicit trade or cripple it to an insignificant level.

Notes:

1. Tom G. Palmer, ‘Globalization Is Grrrreat!’, Cato Institute 1:2-6, < http://www.cato.org/pubs/letters/palmer-catoletters.pdf>, 2002.

2. End-Use Certificate, in shipping, a document intended to assure authorities of the eventual application (generally also the final customer and destination) of a particular actual or intended shipment. End-use certificates are needed in cases in which there are political controls on exports, such as advanced military weapons, MSN Encarta, < http://encarta.msn.com/encyclopedia_762505541/end-use_certificate.html>.

3. Rachel Stohl, ‘The Tangled Web of Illicit Arms Trafficking’, Centre for American Progress p. 21, < http://www.americanprogress.org/issues/2004/10/b217737.html>, 2004.

4. Check kiting is a form of fraud involving the sloshing of theoretical funds between two bank checking accounts. A check written to the criminal from one bank is deposited, and more importantly credited, to an account at a second bank. Because that second bank now shows a positive balance, the criminal can withdraw enough money to deposit back into the first bank before the check bounces for lack of funds, Wisegeek, < http://www.wisegeek.com/what-is-check-kiting.htm>.

5. ‘British police arrest over 50 for acquiring illegal arms via internet’, People’s Daily Online, 1 July, 2004, < http://english.peopledaily.com.cn/200407/01/eng20040701_148103.html>.

6. All the information in this section is abridged from the IANSA homepage > Specifically, the data was available in the section of UN Programme of Action on Small Arms and Light Weapons.

7. All the information in this section is abridged from the UN Office of Drugs and Crime homepage .

8. The information in the 1st and 2nd paragraphs is abridged form data available at the Control Arms homepage, .

9. Debbie Hillier & Brian Wood, ‘Shattered Lives: the case for tough international arms control’. Amnesty International and Oxfam International, Control Arms, p. 76 2003.

10. ‘INTERPOL praises international co-operation behind arrest of suspected international arms dealer by Thai Police’ INTERPOL media release, 7 March. 2008, .

11. The information was abridged from ‘Need for Global Action to Combat Illicit Arms Brokering Highlighted, as Preparatory Meeting for Small Arms Conference Continues’, United Nations Information Service, , 2006.

12. The idea reflected in this section is largely based on the following article. Curt Bolding, ‘The Layman’s Guide to Black Market Firearms’, 2AMPD,
< http://www.2ampd.net/Articles/Bolding/The_Layman's_Guide_to_Black_Market_Firearms.htm> , 2000.

13. Aaron Karp, ‘The Rise of Black and Gray Markets’, American Academy of Political and Social Science, < http://www.jstor.org/stable/pdfplus/1048134.pdf> , 1994.

SOURCE: Eurasia Review, 01 September, 2010 http://www.eurasiareview.com/201009017600/globalisation-and-the-illicit-trade-of-small-arms-and-light-weapons.html

The Sino-Pak nuclear deal: South Asia’s nuclear ailment continues

2010-08-27T00:59:00.000-07:00

In June 2010, the US officially voiced its stand against the Sino-Pak nuclear deal stating that it will vote against an exemption for China to sell two civil nuclear reactors to Pakistan at the next Nuclear Suppliers Group (NSG) meeting in Vienna in the month of September. This announcement came in the wake of Pakistan President Asif Ali Zardari’s six day visit to Beijing which appeared to be a reiteration of the pervasive Sino-Pak bond of military and nuclear cooperation. While the countries signed six deals ranging from healthcare, energy needs to containing terrorism, among other strategically important issues, the Sino-Pakistan civilian nuclear deal is considered to be of utmost concern and importance. China has previously constructed nuclear reactors for Pakistan, Chashma-1 and Chashma-2 and in April 2010, revealed its plans of building two 650-Megawatt nuclear reactors alongside its previous projects. Reportedly, China will lend Pakistan $207 million to buy Chashma-3 and Chashma-4.

The Nuclear Suppliers Group's (NSG) meeting in New Zealand did not deem the Sino-Pakistan deal contentious enough to make an official statement. Interestingly, China did not officially elaborate its plans of constructing two new nuclear reactors to Pakistan during the course of the NSG meet. Any concerns about the deal violating the NSG guidelines were quelled by the justification that the deal was “grandfathered” long before Beijing formally joined the NSG. Additionally, Beijing assured that the deal was in tandem with its international obligations.

China has coddled the Pakistani administration for many years and the bond has only become stronger with time. The military and nuclear cooperation is a core component of their long friendship. It would not be an understatement to say that the proverb, ‘the enemy of my enemy is my friend’ aptly befits the South Asian equation. Without a doubt, China’s unfettering support to Pakistan is intended to keep a check on India and is indicative of its growing aggressiveness in the international arena. China’s track record in terms of nuclear and missile technology reflects its strategy of employing these assets in securing economic and political concessions. One can easily discern that the Indo-US nuclear deal in 2008 presented an opportunity and precedent and paved the way for China’s ambition of exporting nuclear assets.

An interesting angle to the proposed deal was highlighted by Stephen Blank of the US Army War College, that the Sino-Pak nuclear deal was materialising in the context of renewed assertiveness by major nuclear powers to export reactors and technologies abroad. This enthusiasm is also enhanced by the demand of many Asian states for nuclear energy. The trend started by the Indo-US and Sino-Pak nuclear deals would also encourage other non-NPT signatories to request for similar deals, a circumstance clearly not beneficial for Obama’s dream of a nuclear-free world.

Any deal with a non-NPT signatory is bound to attract a certain degree of opposition, which was also evident in the case of India proposed exemption with the NSG. Palpably, this remains true even for Pakistan, but does not ensure that the deal would not be placed on the table in the coming years. This can be exemplified by the Indo-US nuclear deal, which faced opposition from many countries (Australia, Pakistan, Iran, Ireland, Switzerland, New Zealand and Canada) but eventually materialised. While the USA underwent a series of complex stages and negotiations in terms of the intricacies of the deal, expecting a similar conduct from China is seemingly idealistic. China’s missile assistance to Iran exemplifies China’s attitude towards US’s opposition. After perennial resistance from the US, China did “try” to strengthen its control over the export of missile-related technology, but the efforts did not satisfy the US administration. This issue of missile proliferation continues to remain an area of concern for Washington. It is also important to note that while the US may have taken a stern stand in regard to Iran, their perusal in terms of the Sino-Pak deal may not be as effective. In consideration of Pakistan’s indispensability due to their current engagement in Afghanistan and US’s reliance on China for sanctions against Iran and cooperation in dealing with North Korea.

Moreover, China’s passiveness towards the guidelines of the NSG reflects that it will continue to trade with Pakistan without paying much heed to international opinion. Also, Beijing and Islamabad are obviously aware that seeking an exemption for the deal at the NSG will not be a smooth sail. This would have been envisaged by both before announcing their intentions about the nuclear deal. Keeping this in mind, both China and Pakistan seem to have sowed the seeds for a deal, which may not materialise immediately owing to international pressure; but would certainly remain an agenda in Sino-Pak relations. The announcement can also be seen as a scheme to mentally prepare the world for this eventuality.

At this juncture, it is valid to bring to light the case of Pakistan’s questionable nuclear proliferation record and the culpable dealings of A.Q Khan. Notwithstanding this, one should not forget that international politics does not depend on ‘what’s right’ but on ‘what is beneficial’. Also, it is important to note that the NSG runs by consensus, but its decisions are not legally binding on its members. Not surprisingly, NSG members like Ireland, New Zealand and Austria, which criticised the Indo-US nuclear deal have not exhibited their opposition to the Sino-Pak deal. This remains so in light of China’s economic relations with almost all members of the cartel. Therefore, it should not come as a shock if some countries prefer to evade the seriousness of the deal and avoid looking askance. It should be incumbent on the US to follow up the stated opposition with concrete communications with Islamabad to ensure that the opposition holds weight instead of just being pro forma.

Aditi Malhotra is a Research Assistant at CLAWS

(Disclaimer: The views expressed in this article are those of the author and do not represent the views of the editorial committee or the centre for land warfare studies).

Source: http://claws.in/index.php?action=master&task=631&u_id=119

Changing Trends In Warfare: Private Military Companies And Iraq War

2010-08-27T00:55:00.000-07:00

On March 19, 2003, when Iraq was invaded by US forces, backed by the ‘Coalition of the willing’, little was known that this war would become a prime source of profit for private military companies (PMC’s). While the aspect of private warfare is being overtly discussed in the media, it is important to trace the evolution on PMCs in warfare, their role in the Iraq war and the changing trends in warfare. Carlos Ortiz defines PMCs as “legally established multinational commercial enterprises offering services that involve the potential to exercise force in a systematic way and by military means and/or the transfer or enhancement of that potential to clients.” (1)

Looking at history books, one can observe that PMCs are not a new entity in the field of security and warfare. They have been a part of the combat environment since history. The practice of deploying mercenaries (2) dates back to the 13th century B.C when they were employed by Greeks, Roman, Egypt, Rameses II etc. and the trend continues to be a part of the contemporary times. Interestingly, PMCs can be viewed as an ‘advancement of the mercenary culture’. Consequently, civilian participation and PMCs are not a new entity in the combat environment. The numbers in Table 1 clearly indicate the tendency of state to rely on PMCs and how that has augmented over a period of time.

Civil participation formerly included civilians who accompanied combatants for logistics and mercenaries. With the modernisation of wars, military started employing private firms that could offer highly sophisticated weaponry systems and personnel to operate them. This was prominent in the Vietnam War which was also called a “war by contract” by Business Week in March 1965. (4) The end of Cold war further boosted the private military industry due to the downsizing of national armies and growing global instability. Even though, a pattern of increase in the use of PMCs is evident in subsequent wars, the Iraq war is a perfect example that reflects a slant towards more dangerous trends.

It may be argued that if civilians have been a part of wars previously, then why PMCs are loathed for their participation in present conflicts, particularly Afghanistan and Iraq. What makes this subject important in the history of warfare is not the involvement of PMCs in the war field. Rather, it is the degree of their involvement in military and non-military functions that make them worthy of attention.

The invasion of Iraq required high number of forces and could have increased during the course of the war. In domestic terms, sending in regular troops was not an easy decision because the regular US forces were thinned with multiple global commitments. Additionally, such a decision could have sparked public outcry. The decision of invading Iraq had not received positive response globally and was subject to intense opposition from the international community. Therefore, the probabilities of receiving troops from other countries were minimal. An alternative for the US was to turn to UN or NATO. As US was not willing to offer tough commitments like handing over command of forces to UN or NATO, even this option was not viable.

Under such stressful condition, the easiest solution was to approach the private military industry. Therefore, PMC’s came to the rescue and deployed their forces. Forces deployed by PMCs filled the gaps of insufficient troops and bore no political costs to the US government. Initially, few PMCs participated in the war, but as the war progressed, number of contracts given to them swelled. (5)

In 2007, an internal census of Department of Defense stated that almost 180,000 private contractors were employed in Iraq. In contrast, there were approximately 160,000 U.S troops stationed in Iraq in the same year. Here, it is important to note that private military firms were excluded in the census. The inclusion would have made the figures much higher. (6) Employing PMCs consequently makes it easier for the decision-makers to evade political costs and implement their decisions. At times, these decisions may not be in congruence with public support. It cannot be disputed that US did not enjoy immense support domestically or internationally when it planned Iraq’s invasion. Therefore, PMC’s were deployed without creating any political costs for the war-goers. Iraq is not the only case. This was also practiced visibly in the Balkans and secretly in Columbia and Sudan.

As mentioned by Peter Singer in an interview, ‘...contractors offer the means for choices to be dodged at the onset of deployment, and for scrutiny and public concern to be lessened after deployment. Your home-front does not get as involved when its contractors are being called up and deployed...’ As reflected in the above statement, it is easier for policy-makers to go on a war without attracting much congressional and media scrutiny. This marks the extent of influence PMC’s have in present-day warfare. Affairs that required Congressional approval can now be easily implemented with the tactical use of the private military industry. Another important facet of this practice is observed by Francesco Francioni who notes that, “...a country can also exceed the limits on the number of troops deployed or allowed to serve in a theatre of military operations.” (7) Consequently, these traditions would eventually reduce the credibility that states have enjoyed among its subjects so far.

However, it is important to realise that the PMC’s deliver optimum results only if the scenario is conducive for them to operate. PMC’s are seen favourable in cases where other countries are reluctant to participate or lack enough foreign interest or motivation. Tracing back history, Sierra Leone benefitted from employing Executive Outcome (EO). As noted by C Spearin, Sierra Leone’s military appreciated EO’s effort and did not consider them as mercenaries rather people that bought some sanity. (8)

The advent of PMCs has made warfare an easier business. One of the prerequisites of waging any war is to contact PMC’s and negotiate a deal. Such ease makes a government reliant on contractors and also makes unjustified or illegal wars by far, doable. Hence, PMCs offer the possibility of circumventing the parliamentary procedures and authorization for specific missions. When viewing this through the political lens, it is predicted that the level of reliance would only increase with time. The exercise of not employing soldiers for missions and using PMC’s would shrink the effectiveness of national mechanism of control over defence forces.

Moving ahead, let us amplify the issue of increasing privatisation in military activities. The contemporary age belongs to globalisation and liberal trading practices. Interestingly, ‘privatisation’ and ‘outsourcing’ are defining characteristics of a globalised world. The currents of globalisation have also affected the behaviour of the state. As stated by Anna Leander, “State authority has moved upwards to international or regional institutions, sideways to firms and markets, but also downwards to (sub-national) authorities or regions.” (9)

Industries which were previously limited to the state authorities are now shifting towards private domain such as communication and transportation. Similarly, privatisation has enveloped the defence industry. Kathryn Peters states three major reasons for the rising importance of PMC’s: reduction in military personnel, increasing privatisation and outsourcing of military functions and growing reliance on PMC’s to maintain and operate highly technological weaponry. These reasons are embedded in the practices during the invasion of Iraq and visibly influence the trends of warfare. (10) Consequently the realm of warfare is shifting from the state, the protector of public interest, towards private actors which are solely driven by profits. This would overthrow the state centric conduct of war and diminish the level of sovereignty held by the state.

Today, core military functions are gradually being outsourced to private firms. The invasion of Iraq increased the influence of private firms in warfare. In the past wars, field training, logistics and support functions were considered worthy of outsourcing. Surprisingly, during the Iraq invasion, there were multiple other functions that crept into private hands.

Critical roles being outsourced include military intelligence and security of key military personnel. The significance of PMC’s can be clearly understood by the fact that the head of Coalition Provisional Authority, Paul Bremer (top US official in Iraq) was protected safeguarded by delegation of the Blackwater/Xe Services LLC firm. (11) The growing outsourcing is the result of the extreme reliance of forces on highly intricate and technologically-advanced weapon systems. Undoubtedly, the evolution of warfare demands weapons that offer high precision and the capability to inflicting maximum damage in no time. Dependence on PMCs for operating and maintaining complicated weapon systems is evident from the following illustrations.

The launch-pad for the invasion in Iraq was at Camp Doha in Kuwait. The launch-pad was constructed, operated and also safeguarded by a private contractor. Apart from the conventional roles, PMCs were also responsible for fuelling and operating highly sophisticated combat and air defence system. Additionally, they also armed with extremely sophisticated aircrafts, such as F-117 stealth fighters, U-2 reconnaissance aircraft, and Apache attack helicopters.

Let us address the trend of using private contractors by the following illustration. A few years back, Department of Defense (DoD) Directive 1130.2, Management and Control of Engineering and Technical Services, was formulated which made it essential for regular defence personnel to attain self-sufficiency (in almost 12 months) in the maintenance and operation of new weaponry, thus restricting the dependence on private firms. Presently, that directive has been wavered off, forcing the military personnel to rely on PMC’s for its operation. Evidently, the trend has changed and this marks a period of extreme reliance on PMC’s without a second thought. (12) This change is seemingly due to the high costs involved in training and maintaining military staff for new armaments. Downsizing is what makes it essential for contractors to accompany the weapons and perform military functions, making warfare a profession of the public domains.

It may be argued that outsourcing offers some advantages to the military staff as it minimises the range of activities for the combatants and they can concentrate on the core function of confronting the enemy. Seeing the debate in this view may be beneficial, but partly. Too much dependency on civilians for performing core military functions can prove disastrous in terms of crisis and increased hostility. As we see private contractors operate in an open and unregulated market, anyone with the potential money to hire them can approach them. Therefore, states are not the only source of contracts for the private firms. They are also recruited by international organisations such as the United Nations, humanitarian organisations, media and NGOs mainly for securing the areas inflicted with conflicts and violence. This perhaps makes it clear that someday any client whether a rogue state, terrorism organisation or failed state can hire PMCs for waging wars.

Now, let us concentrate on the status of PMCs under International standards. As mentioned before, warfare was not always divorced from civil participation. In former wars, especially in small states, with the declaration of war, almost all citizens took up arms and participated in conflicts. (13) Those were times when a clear distinction between combatants and non-combatants was neither necessary nor proposed. With the inauguration of nationalism and state sovereignty, the practice of maintaining national standing armies was followed. This gave rise to the concept of the state acting as a provider of security. Therefore, it was essential for the state to distinguish between the two participants.

Undoubtedly civilians were employed in conflicts for logistical services in the olden wars. This association was universally accepted with the notion that civilians could provide support services to combatants so long as they did not come in direct confrontation with the opponent. Clearly, the contribution of civilians was legal and remains so even today. Contrastingly, the status of PMCs is still not clear under international law.

According to the Article 43 under section, Combatants and Prisoners of War of Geneva Conventions 1949,

The armed forces of a Party to a conflict consist of all organized armed forces, groups and units which are under a command responsible to that Party for the conduct or its subordinates, even if that Party is represented by a government or an authority not recognized by an adverse Party. Such armed forces shall be subject to an internal disciplinary system which, inter alia, shall enforce compliance with the rules of international law applicable in armed conflict. (14)

In regard to this, Colonel Steven makes an interesting observation. He states that the participants who do not qualify for the above stipulated requirements cannot be considered as combatants. He presents particular reasons for not considering PMC’s as combatants. This implies that PMC workforce is not subject to the commander’s internal disciplinary system. In addition, neither are they essentially trained to perform operations in accordance with the law of armed conflict nor is their contractor subordinate to the field commander. (15)

Therefore, contractors are performing combat functions in Iraq without losing their civilians status. Thus, this makes them combatants and non-combatants at the same time, which cannot be an accepted status under international norms. Consequently, under this pretext, PMC’s can be considered illegal combatants on the war front. As a result, states that employ these illegal combatants are violating the laws of war. Even though states have violated laws of war in previous wars, Iraq war is testament to lavish employment of private contractors’ or rather illegal combatants. Thus, it would not be an exaggeration to believe that the Iraq war would not have been possible without private military.

Progressing ahead, let us concentrate on another side of the same coin of accountability held by the private military industry. The dangerous blend of private corporate interests and war bought many issues to the limelight in Iraq. Out of the many dark aspects, lack of accountability and unregulated business were the most prominent.

Remembering the numerous turning points in the Iraq war, some incidences automatically come to the forefront. The battle of Fallujjah, the shameful incidence of Abu Ghraib, random shootout Baghdad that killed 20 civilians are just a few prominent ones. Shockingly, one factor common in all these incidences is the involvement of the PMC’s such as Blackwater (name changed to Xe Services LLC), Halliburton etc.

Commentators like P.W Singer (16) , Colonel Steven (17) and Francesco Francioni (18) draw attention towards the problem of accountability held by PMC’s and the need to regulate the industry on this account. An important factor when considering PMCs is their motive of earning profit. Therefore, their objective would not always match the objective of their clients. The Iraq war has reflected many cases of over-pricing, insufficient services, delays etc, which put a question mark on PMCs as a fair player. Halliburton was accused of overcharging the Iraqi government almost $25,000 per month for each of 1,800 fuel trucks which had to deliver gasoline to Iraq. Another case involved KBR which was challenged by the Pentagon auditors for the justification of more than $200 million. (19,20) While some of the cases are still under investigation, the latest decisions prove their validity.

Furthermore, the state cannot rely on the private firms for tasks that demand high degree of loyalty and commitment. Private firms do not fall under military controls. Hence, the client should have alternatives in case the firm terminates the contract should the hostilities increase. According to contractual terms, a firm has the discretion of accepting or rejecting a particular contract, pulling out of the crisis if the dangers become too high.(21) Thus, in such case the military would be at the mercy of such private actors. The history of warfare has hardly seen examples of such level of reliance on private firms for military action.

During the run-up to Iraq war, almost 183 PMCs which were to contribute to the deployment did not have deployment terms in their contracts, thus leading to delays in getting forces to the warfront.(22) Additional to this, because of the rise of hostilities in April 2004 and mounting cases of contractor kidnappings of July 2004, some contractors terminated their contracts. This resulted in severe shortage of troops and supplies at a time very crucial for the US government. (23)

An added problem in this case is that many PMCs recruit employees with no previous experience in combat or employ people from 3rd party nationals in order to reduce costs. Such recruits have either minimal or no sense of party loyalty or patriotism. Another problem that was seen dominant in the Iraq war was the case of human right violation. Defence forces have been accountable for their acts. They fall under the purview of national courts or International courts in case of crimes or misconduct. Ironically, this does not apply to the forces employed by the PMCs.

Some analysts like Jeffrey Herbst argue that private firms differ from historical mercenaries. He adds that, in order to stay in business PMC’s would wish to hold a dignified reputation in the market. (24) This remains true in cases like MPRI or DynCorp but would not apply to firms such as Backwater/Xe. Private Contractors cannot assure sensible conduct of their employees, primarily because they recruit employees from different backgrounds and do not train them like defence personnel. Also, private employees are bound by contracts and not by an oath like the national armies.

The level to which human rights obligations apply to the PMC’s employee remains ambiguous. This is particularly because the private military industry remains unregulated and operates in an open market. With almost no control of the state over these firms, they violate basic norms and are not even held accountable. Firstly, it is disputed if such obligations apply to private entities and secondly, because the operations and acts of PMCs are abroad, the state cannot bring them to trial.

Contractors of Zapata confessed that they had witnessed private contractors indiscriminately firing not only at Iraqi civilians but also at U.S marines. (25) U.S. Army records show that there were 15 Titan translators and sub-contractors working at Abu Ghraib prison in late 2003 where a number of human rights abuses occurred. (26) In this incidence, all the military officials involved were court-martialled, whereas none of the private contractor was penalised or punished for their acts. This was primarily because the US army did not consider them under their jurisdiction. Consequently, the state cannot be held responsible for the acts of private contractors as the PMCs operate only through contractual terms and not through the state mechanism. Considering the above cases, it is imperative to monitor the private military industry, which is growing at a fast rate yet remains unregulated. Most importantly, the state needs to regulate these firms so that their inclusion in wars does not lead to disastrous consequences in future. Recently, on April 16, 2010, former president of Blackwater Worldwide (Xe Services), Gary Jackson, and four other company officials were indicted for illegally stockpiling automatic weapons at one of its facilities in the US (27). Earlier in the month, on April 1, 2010, the federal government sued KBR Inc., over improper charges to the Army for private security services. (28) Commenting on these cases, Stanley McChrystal, the commander of American and NATO forces said that the use of private contractors to support military and security operations in conflict zones had gone too far. (29)

The significance of private contractors in the arena of war making cannot be denied. With the level of involvement PMCs had in Iraq, we can see them getting intertwined in the art of warfare. The escalating privatisation of military affairs reflects an evolution of warfare rather than determine a completely recent trend in warfare. Undoubtedly, we see a shift in politics and warfare from state-centric to a more privatised form, but it is too early to call it a new trend.

PMCs have been prevalent in the international conflict environment for almost two decades and have achieved new heights with the recent Iraq war. As discussed before, mercenaries and civilians that figured throughout the history of warfare have now cropped up as private military firms. The use of PMCs in Iraq remains unprecedented and marks a towering level of involvement in present style of warfare. Besides this, it cannot be considered a new trend. In the final reckoning, the use of private military organisations in Iraq does not illustrate a new trend in warfare rather an evolution of olden practices.

Aditi Malhotra is a Research Assistant at the Centre for Land Warfare Studies (CLAWS), New Delhi

NOTES:

1. Carlos Ortiz, 'The Private Military Company: An Entity at the Center of Overlapping Spheres of Commercial Activity and Responsibility' in Jäger, Thomas and Kümmel, Gerhard (eds). Private Military and Security Companies. Chances, Problems, Pitfalls and Prospects, Vs Verlag, 2007, p. 60,
, 2007.
2. Article 47 of Geneva Conventions, 1949 defines mercenaries as ‘a person who recruited locally or abroad in order to fight in an armed conflict, takes a direct part in the hostilities and is motivated by the desire for private gain’, ‘Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949, and relating to the Protection of Victims of International Armed Conflicts (Protocol 1)’, Office of the High Commissioner of Human Rights,.
3. Colonel Steven J. Zamparelli, ‘Contractors on the Battlefield: What Have We Signed Up For’, Air force Journal of Logistics, 23: 11-20,
4. P. W Singer, Corporate Warriors Cornell University Press, New York, 2003, p. 247.
5. P. W Singer, Corporate Warriors Cornell University Press, New York, 2003, p. 244-245.
6. T. Christian Miller, ‘Contractors outnumber troops in Iraq’, Los Angeles Times, 4 July, 2007
.
7. Francesco Francioni, ‘Private Military Contractors and International Law: An Introduction’, European Journal of International Law, 19(5):961-964, , 2008.
8. C Spearin, Executive Outcomes in Sierra Leone: A Human Security Assessment cited in ‘The Private Military Companies Perspective’, House of Commons- Foreign Affairs, http://www.publications.parliament.uk/pa/cm200102/cmselect/cmfaff/922/2061322.htm, 2002.
9. Anna Leander, ‘Global Ungovernance: Mercenaries, States and the Control over Violence’, Columbia International Affairs Online, .
10 . Kathryn McIntire Peters, ‘Civilians at War’, Government Executive, July 1996 cited in Colonel Steven J. Zamparelli, ‘Contractors on the Battlefield: What Have We Signed Up For’, Air force Journal of Logistics, 23: 11-20, .
11. Peter W. Singer, ‘The Private Military Industry and Iraq: What have we learned and where to next?’, Geneva Centre for the Democratic Control of Armed Forces (DCAF)- Policy Paper, < www.dcaf.ch/_docs/pp04_private-military.pdf>, 2004.
12. Robert D. Kaiser and Richard M. Fabbro, DoD Use of Civilian Technicians, Washington DC: Logistics Management Institute, July 1990 cited in Colonel Steven J. Zamparelli, ‘Contractors on the Battlefield: What Have We Signed Up For’, Air force Journal of Logistics, 23: 11-20, < http://bit.ly/9s3tsW>
13. L. C. Green, The Contemporary Law of Armed Conflict, New York: Manchester University Press, 1994, 99-100 cited in Colonel Steven J. Zamparelli, ‘Contractors on the Battlefield: What Have We Signed Up For’, Air force Journal of Logistics, 23: 11-20,
14. Section II. Combatants and Prisoners of War, Additional Protocol I, Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949, < http://www.tamilnation.org/humanrights/genevaconventions/gprotocol1c.htm>, 1949.
15. Colonel Steven J. Zamparelli, ‘Contractors on the Battlefield: What Have We Signed Up For’, Air force Journal of Logistics, 23: 11-20,
16. P.W Singer, ‘Can’t Win With ‘Em, Can’t Go To War Without ‘Em: Private Military Contractors and Counterinsurgency’, Foreign Policy at Brookings, 4:1-21, < http://www.brookings.edu/papers/2007/0927militarycontractors.aspx>, 2007.
17. Colonel Steven J. Zamparelli, ‘Contractors on the Battlefield: What Have We Signed Up For’, Air force Journal of Logistics, 23: 11-20,
18 .Francesco Francioni, ‘Private Military Contractors and International Law: An Introduction’, European Journal of International Law, 19(5):961-964, , 2008.
19.
20. James Glanz, ‘Halliburton Audited for Overpriced Operations in Iraq’, The New York Times, 07 November 2006, < http://www.truthout.org/article/halliburton-audited-overpriced-operations-iraq>
21. Peter W. Singer, ‘The Private Military Industry and Iraq: What have we learned and where to next?’, Geneva Centre for the Democratic Control of Armed Forces (DCAF)- Policy Paper, < www.dcaf.ch/_docs/pp04_private-military.pdf>, 2004.
22. David Isenberg, ‘Corporate Mercenaries: Myths and mystery’, Asia Times, 20 May 2004,

23. Peter W. Singer, ‘The Private Military Industry and Iraq: What have we learned and where to next?’, Geneva Centre for the Democratic Control of Armed Forces (DCAF)- Policy Paper, < www.dcaf.ch/_docs/pp04_private-military.pdf>, 2004.
24. Herbst, Jeffrey, The Regulation of Private Security Forces, Prepared for the Conference on the Privatization of Security in Africa, hosted by the South African Institute of International Affairs, 10 December 1998 cited in ‘Private Military Companies: Options for Regulation’, Foreign and Commonwealth Office, House of Commons, , 2002.
25. P. W Singer, Corporate Warriors Cornell University Press, New York, 2003, p. 251.
26. Pratap Chatterjee, ‘Outsourcing Intelligence in Iraq: A CorpWatch Report on L-3/Titan’, Corpwatch,
, 2008.
27. Citizen News Services, ‘Ex-Blackwater officials indicted on gun charges,’ Ottawa Citizen, April 17, 2010,
28. The Associated Press, ‘Contractor Sued for Charges to Army’, The New York Times, April 1, 2010,
29. Citizen News Services, ‘Ex-Blackwater officials indicted on gun charges,’ Ottawa Citizen, April 17, 2010,

Source: Eurasia Review http://www.eurasiareview.com/201008187150/changing-trends-in-warfare-private-military-companies-and-iraq-war.html

India’s options in Afghanistan – The Iran factor

2010-08-11T09:51:00.000-07:00

While The WikiLeaks “revelation” has not uncovered anything radically new, it has highlighted the prevailing intricacies and complexities of the conflict. Pakistan’s “offer” of negotiating a deal with the Taliban and the Haqqani network has regained prominence. Former Canadian diplomat Chris Alexander’s disclosure of Gen Kayani’s plans of demolishing Indian consulates in Kabul has re-emphasised the importance of the Afghan theatre in the Indo-Pak equation. India’s perennial attempt to carve out a niche in Afghanistan has suffered many set-backs.

With such limited options, India should look at its potential partners to ensure that its national interests are safeguarded across the Durand Line. Iranian Deputy Foreign Minister Mohammad Ali Fathollahi’s recent visit to India illustrates this change in the diplomatic mood in New Delhi. This visit followed the 9 July joint commission meeting between India and Iran where Afghanistan was a key point agenda was under discussion.

New Delhi and Tehran have enjoyed a fairly comfortable relation with few contentious issues. The two countries had supported the Northern Alliance after the fall of the Taliban regime in 2001. India has been a victim of the Talibanisation of Afghanistan, when it was used as a haven for training camps for spurring militancy in Kashmir. The case of Kandahar IC-814 hijacking further accentuated Delhi’s acrimony towards the fundamentalist elements in Afghanistan. While Shia majority Iran has the benefit of influence on the Hazara tribes in Afghanistan, it has no conviviality with the Sunni-Pashtun Taliban’s control on its borders. Additionally, Iran’s animosity towards the Taliban was further fuelled by the killing of 11 Iranian diplomats in Mazar-e-Sharif in 1998, which sparked a military conflict. As such, the strategic interests of India and Iran have conjoined in terms of Afghanistan.

In the present context, both countries have not fully embraced the idea of reconciliation process with the Taliban, as proposed by the Karzai government. They continue to stand unconvinced about the advantages of the process owing to the horror of a renewed wave of Islamic fundamentalism on their periphery. This feeling is also shared by Russia, which holds similar fears about heightened Islamic fundamentalism near its borders and those of the Central Asian Republics.

Iran has qualms with regard to almost the three million Afghan refugees it hosts, who may have connections with Taliban and may use Iran as a substitute to Pakistan as it ensures a net of safety due to strained Iran-US relations. On the other hand, India is wary of Pakistan’s military-ISI nexus that is inflaming the insurgency in Afghanistan and using the Afghan Taliban, the Lashkar-e-Taiba and the Haqqani network as proxies to target the Indians in Afghanistan. While India has set conditions to facilitate the Taliban’s reintegration, it continues to remain leery about the result. The suspicion is also due to the fear that the Pakistan-friendly Afghan Taliban would obstruct India’s access to Central Asia. Similarly, Iran has voiced out its opposition stating that there can be no differentiation between “good and bad Taliban.”

Recent developments testify that Pakistan holds the main key to Afghanistan’s future, which visibly remains an unpalatable fact for the New Delhi administration. With few options to exercise, India approach towards working with Iran to counteract Pakistan’s influence is inevitably important. Interestingly, Islamabad is working towards a better relation with Iran as well and has even highlighted its “good” deed of helping Iran in the arrest of Abdolmalek Rigi, the leader of the Baluch Sunni rebel group Jundollah. Despite this step, Iran-Pakistan relations continue to be plagued by tenuousness. This is more so because of Pakistan’s comfortable equation with Saudi Arabia and Iran’s rival, the United States, both of whom are opposed to Iran’s nuclear program.

Iran is a strategically essential player for India and Pakistan’s thawing relationship with Iran would worsen the already almost lost situation. Iran’s geographical location is a plus point for continuous engagement in Afghanistan. Its long border with Afghanistan and its long-standing cultural ties are imperative to exercise geo-political and geo-strategic influence in the region. India’s trump card in the situation is Iran’s Chabahar port, which will provide direct New Delhi direct access to Afghanistan and Central Asia.
The port would minimise New Delhi’s need to negotiate with Islamabad for any access to Afghanistan. The last Indo-Iran talks have highlighted the need to expedite the operationalisation of the India-aided Chabahar port. As noted by Dipanjan Roy Chaudhury in India Today, the port is strategically important because it is placed barely 73 km from Pakistan’s Gwadar port, which has been built with Chinese assistance. The already constructed Zarang-Delaram road in Afghanistan, when joined with the Chahar-Milak road (being upgraded with Indian assistance and will connect a bridge on route to Zaranj) would bestow upon India and Iran a higher degree of access to Afghanistan, ensuring greater influence in the region and also bypassing Pakistan.

While India is emphasising on “structured, systematic and regular consultations” with Iran, one should understand that it is not a win-win situation. In the recent past, India-Iran relations have been affected by turbulence, mainly because of India’s support for the US-driven IAEA resolution that condemned Iran over its nuclear programme and led to sanctions. Another point of contention may arise in the future owing to Iran and India’s contrary stance on the NATO forces in Afghanistan. While India’s strategic need prefers continued US presence in Afghanistan till a reasonable degree of stability is achieved, Iran desires an immediate withdrawal of the US-NATO coalition forces. Even though this posture of both the countries has not led to any friction, one cannot rule out such an eventuality in the future. Therefore, it is important for India to have a realistic assessment and cooperate with Iran to find a middle ground, which favours both New Delhi and Tehran. With potential odds at play, the perennial US pressure on India to support sanctions against Iran would continue to overshadow India-Iran relations.

At this juncture, India needs to define its national interests and choose options to safeguard them, rather than distance its potential partners in order to coddle the Obama administration. Pakistan is US’s present preference in the region and is likely to remain so in the coming future. India’s diplomatic proximity with Iran may also force the US to have a re-look at its priorities in Afghanistan and may stimulate the Obama administration to think about India. However, expecting Washington to take a U-turn and undermine Islamabad’s role in the Af-Pak region would be highly idealistic. Therefore, New Delhi needs to shun its long-practiced apprehension and take a firm stand militarily and strategically. India should move with a sense of reality and bring into shape its own Af-Pak policy, one that safeguards its own interests.

Aditi Malhotra is a Research Assistant at the Centre for Land Warfare Studies (CLAWS)

Source: Indian Defence Review http://www.indiandefencereview.com/2010/08/india%E2%80%99s-options-in-afghanistan-%E2%80%93-the-iran-factor.html

Blacklisting the Haqqani network: One step forward, two steps back?

2010-07-29T03:12:00.000-07:00

General David Petraeus recently broached the idea of blacklisting the Haqqani group. This move, if implemented has the potential of being an affront to Islamabad. The idea of labelling the Haqqani network as a Foreign Terrorist Organisation (FTO) is intended to challenge the group’s links with Al-Qaeda. Coupled with General Petraeus’s message to Pakistan to “do more” [in tackling terrorism], the bold move of blacklisting the Haqqanis will clearly not win Pakistan’s support. The Haqqani network is one of the strongest insurgent networks and stands as a formidable antagonist of the U.S, NATO Coalition forces in the Af-Pak region. The long standing connections of the Haqqanis with the Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI), its redoubtable equation with Al-Qaeda and its high degree of influence in the Federally Administered Tribal Areas (FATA) makes it a hard nut to crack.

The Haqqani network dates back to the Russo-Afghan war in the 1980s when Jalaluddin Haqqani, an influential mujahid established his base in Miram Shah, which ultimately became the foundation of the present Haqqani network. It was during this period that the network closely worked with the Al-Qaeda, ISI, the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) and influential mujahideens hailing from the Arab states including, Osama bin Laden. The thirty year old network continues to remain one of the most influential forces dominating the agency of North Waziristan. The present leadership of the network is held by Jalaluddin’s son, Sirajuddin Haqqani, who directs the network’s operations against the U.S. and NATO forces in Af-Pak region.

Reports reveal that Islamabad was allegedly involved in brokering a deal (as a part of the reconciliation process) between the Haqqani network and Kabul. This illustrates the degree of importance the group holds in Pakistan’s Af-Pak strategy and the bigger picture of Afghanistan’s move towards stability. Pakistan has persistently resisted the idea of dismantling the Haqqani network purely because it views the network as a strategic asset to promote Islamabad’s interest in the region.

The relationship of the Haqqanis with the ISI, Afghan Taliban and Al-Qaeda is a complex one. The anti-Soviet war resulted in a strong bonding between Jalaluddin Haqqani and the Arab fighters. A major portion of the Haqqani network’s funding originates from the Persian Gulf owing to the relation the network continues to enjoy with the Arab fighters. Furthermore, they are also tied to other foreign groups like the Uzbek Islamic Jihad Union. Primarily, Al-Qaeda assists the Haqqani network in facilitating attacks (includes field and weapon training, funding, arms procurement) and provides them with suicide bombers. While their equation has enjoyed a consistent high, Haqqani’s alliance with the Pakistani government has been a point of contention. Al-Qaeda views Pakistan as an enemy, a sentiment that has been further exacerbated by the drone attacks.

The relations of the Haqqanis with the ISI, like their origin, dates back to the Afghan-Russo war when Jalaluddin was assisted by the ISI and CIA in the anti-Soviet insurgent operations. Islamabad continues to employ this group to promote its interests in Afghanistan. Reportedly, the 2008 car bombing at the Indian embassy in Kabul was a joint operation between the ISI and the Haqqani network. Consequently, while there are reports of a certain degree of disenchantment on the part of the Haqqani network vis-à-vis the al-Qaeda, one would do well to consider within the complex nature of the relationship between the two groups, rather than take them at face value.

With so many complexities at play, the idea of blacklisting the network may not reap many benefits for the U.S. On the other hand, it is bound to impede President Karzai’s already failing efforts to conciliate the Afghan insurgents. While the reconciliation process has been supported in the Obama administration by many, declaring the Haqqanis as a FTO will obstruct the progression. Moreover, the intention that such a move will strain the relations between the Haqqani network and Al-Qaeda may well backlash. In view of Haqqani’s reliance on Al-Qaeda and their long standing history, this step could fortify their bond and their joint efforts could be galvanised towards increasing the number of attacks on the U.S. and NATO forces. It is also believed that blacklisting may drive away numerous mujahideen fighters who wished to surrender and reconcile with the government forces.

The blacklisting of the network is also projected to affect their funding routes by freezing their bank accounts and trade relations abroad. However, the announcement of the “idea” of blacklisting the Haqqanis would provide them enough time to consolidate their funds and withdraw them from the accounts that may end up being the target of U.S. policies. Therefore, the time spent by the US mulling on a course of action will prove beneficial to the Haqqani network and will be used to take all measures to minimise the effects of blacklisting. In addition, the process of declaring groups as FTOs is not a new practice but has been followed by the U.S. and Pakistani government for a long time. Unfortunately, the groups re-emerge with different names and modified front organisations. This trend can be traced in Pakistan, where banned groups like Jamaat-ud Dawa and Markaz Dawat wa’l-Irshad continue to function under a new name with impunity.

Therefore, it may be discerned that General Petraeus’s announcement about considering the blacklisting of the Haqqani network may be a move to warn Islamabad and the Haqqani leadership about a harsher outlook towards terrorism in the region. Rather than antagonising the Pakistani government by implementing such a move, the idea may be spilled over to reprove them, with the hope that Islamabad may understand the message and ‘get its act together’.

Aditi Malhotra is a Research Assistant at Centre for Land Warfare Studies (CLAWS).

(Disclaimer: The views expressed in this article are those of the author and do not represent the views either of the Editorial Committee or the Centre for Land Warfare Studies).

Source: http://claws.in/index.php?action=master&task=609&u_id=119

The Militant Beehive of North Waziristan

2010-06-05T08:22:00.000-07:00

With the end of Pakistan Army’s offensive in Orakzai, Washington continues to convince Islamabad to undertake an operation in North Waziristan. Pakistan’s reluctance to tackle North Waziristan diminished with a blunt message from the US, warning that any future aggression on US homeland hailing from the region would have serious consequences. While the Pakistan Army has agreed to launch a military operation, it has reserved the right to decide the timing and strategy of the same.

North Waziristan is home to the Mehsud warriors, like former Tehrik-i-Taliban Pakistan (TTP) Chief Baitullah Mehsud (believed to be killed in a US drone strike in August 2009) and the present leader, Hakimullah Mehsud. Additionally, it remains an integral part of Al-Qaeda’s command and harbours the powerful networks of Jalaluddin and Sirajuddin Haqqani that have organised many attacks in Afghanistan. Numerous militant groups have sprouted in the area with prominent training camps and a pervasive jihadi culture; an area that can be rightly termed as the ‘militant beehive’ of Pakistan. The make-up of militant groups in North Waziristan is complex and volatile. On one hand, the Haqqani network and militants like Hafiz Gul Bahadur have an alliance with the Pakistan government and target the NATO and US forces. On the other, groups like Al-Qaeda and TTP remain anti-Pakistan, and attack the security forces. Apart from these, North Waziristan continues to be a safe haven for foreign militant groups like the Islamic Jihad Union (IJU). At times, anti-West groups like Hafiz Gul Bahadur’s have also been confronted by the Pakistan Army due to changed attitudes or new accords with anti-Pakistan groups like Al-Qaeda.

Islamabad’s present priority is groups that bear enmity towards the (Pakistani) government. While the army would want to confront the anti-government groups, it fears treading into North Waziristan. The main reason for this trepidation remains its alliance with the Haqqani network and the equation the latter shares with other militant groups in the region. Thus, even though the Pakistan Army has conducted small operations on the borders of North Waziristan, it has remained unwilling to forge ahead.

The Haqqanis have had a long history of alliances with the Pakistani military and have acted as useful interlocutors between anti-Pakistan groups and the state. It is important to note that Haqqanis facilitated the peace accords between Islamabad and the extremist groups in February 2005 and again in January 2008. In summer 2006, Sirajuddin Haqqani and Taliban commander Mullah Dadullah orchestrated a cease-fire between Hafiz Gul Bahadur’s group and the Pakistan government, further persuading them to concentrate their efforts against US forces in Afghanistan. Clearly, the Pakistani military considers the Haqqani network as an asset to counter India’s influence in Afghanistan, post the potential US withdrawal and ensure Pakistan its ‘strategic depth’. Any action against the Haqqanis would affect its longstanding relation with Islamabad.

Besides, the Pakistan Army has expressed its concern on undertaking an offensive currently, with the pretext that it faces limitations due to overstretched troops and inadequate resources due to its engagement in South Waziristan and FATA. However, the recent India-centric military exercise Azm-E-Nau 3 exhibited an entirely different picture. The exercise comprised of more than 50,000 troops while a major chunk of the army continued to remain in position in the North-West, reflecting Pakistan’s reasonable capability to undertake more operations. Tracing the history of India’s non-initiation of a war against Pakistan, the Pakistan Army can easily divert almost half of its troops to the western sector without fearing any serious threat on its eastern front. Clearly, there are other things playing on Islamabad’s mind.

The aftermath of Operation Rah-i-Nejat in South Waziristan was marked by many attacks in reprisal within Pakistan, majority of which were traced back to North Waziristan. Drone attacks in North Waziristan have ignited the region’s ire towards the Pakistani establishment, and an offensive would further unleash a high degree of terror. Adding to this fear is the recent threat of a “big war” issued by the Shura Ittehad-ul-Mujahideen (SIM), in case the government violates the peace accord. SIM is a consortium of Baitullah Mehsud’s TTP, the Hafiz Gul Bahadur group and the Mulla Nazir group.

While the death toll resulting from direct attacks (post-Operation Rah-i-Nejat) has plunged, the military faces the threat of casualties ensuing from improvised explosive devices (IEDs) and attacks from militants in North Waziristan. More importantly, the after-effects of an offensive are most likely to echo in Punjab, the heart of Pakistan. North Waziristan is home to several new militant groups, primarily offshoots of extremist factions like JeM, LeT, Sipah-e-Sahaba Pakistan and Lashkar-e-Jhangvi. Given their strong linkages and sleeper cells in central and southern Punjab, any action undertaken in North Waziristan may lead to numerous attacks in the Punjab.

Although these aspects are being covered up with statements of “limited resources”, there are some genuine rationales for forswearing an immediate operation. Considering the mountainous terrain of the province, the advantage always lies with the guerrilla warriors. It is imperative to have a reasonable knowledge of the terrain and proper planning before engaging in any operation in North Waziristan. Taking into account that the Pakistan government has minimal control over the region, any potential offensive will require sufficient time for acquiring reliable intelligence and understanding the pulse of the region.

The Pakistani military’s current formula is focused on delaying the operation and buying time till the US troops start withdrawing in 2011. Pakistan holds the strings to decide the strategy and timing of any offensive in North Waziristan. Therefore, it would avoid disturbing the ‘militant beehive’ till 2011. The present hold-up can also be used by the Pakistani military to give its allied groups time to consolidate their strengths and establish alternate havens in areas, just in case the United States coerces Islamabad into launching an offensive in North Waziristan.

With the likely withdrawal of US troops in 2011, the Pakistan government may end up repeating history by negotiating peace accords with groups in North Waziristan or undertake selective targeting of anti-Pakistan groups, which would not be possible while the US remains in the AfPak region. For the time being, Islamabad wishes to exhibit its ‘supportive side’ to Washington and pocket the $7.5 billion economic aid package approved by the Congress. It will also continue to support the United States in order to receive more weapon packages in return that will clearly never be used against its own malcontents.

Aditi Malhotra is a Research Assistant at CLAWS

Disclaimer: The views expressed in this article are those of the author and do not represent the views either of the Editorial Committee or the Centre for Land Warfare Studies).

Source: http://claws.in/index.php?action=master&task=576&u_id=119

Nuclear Posture Review 2010: The Darker Side

2010-05-04T05:32:00.000-07:00

On April 6, 2010, the US Department of Defense released the much awaited Nuclear Posture Review (NPR). While the NPR comprises of an optimistic promise and asserts Obama’s path towards a nuclear-free world, a careful study of the document reflects a rather different side, possessing numerous caveats. Primarily, it is important to laud the NPR for a few positive changes vis-a-vis Bush’s NPR 2001. This is the first time in history that the notion of elimination of nuclear weapons has been included in an NPR. Another most important reversal in the latest review is the restricted possible use of nuclear weapons as compared to Bush’s review which threatened to employ nuclear weapons against any WMD attack (nuclear, chemical or biological) on the US or its allies. The NPR gives immense importance to the “changing international security environment” and focuses on nuclear terrorism and its equation with other nations, such as Iran, North Korea, Russia and China.

Many analysts have hailed the NPR for clarifying the nuclear carrot. Although the review has achieved a sense of restriction in terms of possible nuclear use, it is important to read between the lines. The NPR declared that “that the U.S. will not use or threaten to use nuclear weapons against non-nuclear weapons states that are party to the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) and in compliance with their nuclear non-proliferation obligations.” These assurances are seemingly offered to encourage states to sign the NPT and conform to it, but its effectiveness in terms of realpolitik is uncertain. Countries like India, Israel and Pakistan have not taken the NPT road, but certainly face no US threat presently, therefore making the statement extraneous. Moreover, the NPR has singled out Iran and North Korea for their nuclear ambitions, thereby justifying a first strike on these countries, if need be. Iran, which is not a nuclear state presently, will be further forced to accelerate their efforts toward nuclear weapons, to ensure their survival or offer credible threat to deter the U.S. North Korea on the other hand may enhance its nuclear capabilities, which could also result in augmented illicit nuclear trade.

Further, the statement means that the U.S. reserves the right to strike nations that it feels has violated the NPT. The Iraq war has shown that the U.S. is not above ‘modifying’ facts to suit it motives. Therefore, the US can regard any state as a violator of the NPT, even if it is not deemed so by the IAEA, and justify a nuclear strike. This notion is further strengthened with the mention that the U.S. “reserves the right to make any adjustment in the assurance that may be warranted by the evolution and proliferation of the biological weapons threat and U.S. capacities to counter that threat.” This can also apply to states that adhere to the NPT but are considered a threat to the U.S., owing to their chemical and biological weapons.

A significant part of the NPR centres on the need to prevent nuclear proliferation and nuclear terrorism. It emphasises on the need to “enhance capabilities to disrupt illicit proliferation networks and interdict smuggled nuclear materials, and identify the source of nuclear material used or intended for use in a terrorist nuclear explosive device.” While this statement looks good on paper, the US seems to be ignoring this in terms of application. Undoubtedly, the US is perpetuating the illicit nuclear network, by supporting Pakistan, an epitome of illicit nuclear proliferation, which allows rogue actors like A Q Khan to remain unpunished for his misdeeds (especially when reports indicate his involvement in resurrecting the once disbanded nuclear network).

In addition, the review claims that the US intends to move away from nuclear weapons and would focus on missile defence to deter its adversaries. “Improvements in missile defenses and counter-weapons of mass destruction (WMD) capabilities” may seem to be an inferior yet good replacement, but would facilitate a conventional arms race globally. While the statement of lowering the utility of nuclear weapons may make good public relations, it results in an arms race of missiles, proving to be a greater threat globally.

Post-Cold war, the NPR called for reduction in the nuclear force levels especially when, Russia is no longer an adversary. The START which adds to the hope of nuclear reduction has many lacunae. The NPR has no mention of a reduction in the size of the total nuclear weapons stockpiles, which is estimated at 5000 warheads. Another important part that reflects a sense of optimism for nuclear-pessimists needs to be examined. The NPR states that the US will not develop new nuclear warheads. Life Extension Programs will use only nuclear components based on previously tested designs, and will not support new military missions or provide for new military capabilities. Hans Kristensen of Federation of American Scientists, points out that this policy clearly gives the US an option of extensive modification of nuclear warheads and also permits production of the Reliable Replacement Warhead (RRW) which may be considered dead by officials. The NPR also states that the options for replacement of nuclear components are open “if critical Stockpile Management Program goals could not otherwise be met and if specifically authorized by the President and approved by Congress.”

Apart from this, there seems to be no change in the structure of US’s nuclear forces, which enjoy a land-sea-air triad. While there was much debate about subtracting one leg, the review asserted the American decision to retain the “triad of SLBMs, ICBMs, and heavy bombers” with the justification that they would “best maintain strategic stability at reasonable cost, while hedging against potential technical problems or vulnerabilities.” This clearly does not reflect any difference as compared to its triad arrangement during the Cold War or as mentioned in Bush’s NPR.

Additionally, the NPR called for “increased investment in the nuclear weapons complex …to ensure security and effectiveness of nuclear arsenal.” This statement evidently reveals that the officials believe that Obama’s idea of a nuclear-free world will take numerous more years as compared to the idea reflected in Obama’s Prague speech in 2009. While Obama professed to offer a cake, the modest NPR appears to be nothing more than an empty box.

Aditi Malhotra is a Research Assistant at CLAWS

(Disclaimer: The views expressed in this article are those of the author and do not represent the views either of the Editorial Committee or the Centre for Land Warfare Studies).

SOURCE: http://claws.in/index.php?action=master&task=554&u_id=119

Punitive Deterrence through Covert Operations

2010-04-07T06:40:00.000-07:00

India for long has been a victim of numerous terrorist attacks. Covert operations by Pakistan’s ISI, which were once limited to J&K have now engulfed other parts of India as well. According to the South Asia Terrorism Portal, India has suffered almost 1050 civilian deaths from 28 major Islamist terrorist attacks since 2000 (excluding J&K and the North-east). The numbers clearly reflect the dismal internal security situation in India. The ISI’s unbridled support to home-grown fundamentalists in fighting a proxy war with India is considered good investment by the Pakistan establishment, an extension of Operation Topaz, initiated by Zia ul Haq. India has suffered immensely and responded only diplomatically, and it is time we redefine our war on terror. It is important to realise that so far, no government, agencies or laws have been able to defeat terrorism, primarily because terrorists are a faceless enemy and do not provide a viable target. Threatening Pakistan or negotiating with them to close their terrorist camps has not produced results. On the contrary, covert operations of the ISI have only become more intense with time and are likely to continue. Kashmir is the primary but not only agenda.

Left with limited options, India needs to exploit the prevailing fissures within Pakistan and inflict a degree of pain that compels Pakistan to abate its nefarious acts, if not stop them completely. Formerly, R&AW possessed the capability to carry out covert operations and were politically backed to nurture this potential. However, in 1997, Prime Minister IK Gujral shut down the Counter Intelligence Teams (CITs) on moral grounds. It must be noted that building up capabilities is the product of many years of consistent effort and cannot be done overnight.

The basis of covert actions is to identify fissures that could be an entry point for covert operations. In terms of region, Sindh, Baluchistan and Northern areas of Pakistan are important for consideration. Sindh is the second most populous province of Pakistan, where the native population is threatened by the Punjabi majority and influx of non-Sindhis in the region. In 1992, acute domestic unrest in Sindh resulted in the imposition of army rule. The tension between Balochistan and Pakistan’s national government has been perennial. The plight of the Baloch people has been incessantly ignored and their periodic calls for autonomy have been ruthlessly crushed, while the blame is affixed on R&AW for supporting them. India has not exploited these vulnerabilities but should do so now by strongly supporting such movements through liaison with Sindhi and Baloch leaders, working within and outside the region.

Another region that poses a threat to Pakistan’s unity is the North-West Frontier Province (NWFP). NWFP holds a majority of Pashtuns and has always tilted towards Afghanistan due to shared identities. Furthermore, US operations in Af-Pak region have raised tempers in NWFP, owing to Pakistan’s alliance with the US and deaths resulting from drone attacks. Consequently, the region is a fertile ground for anti-government movements.

In the ongoing war against terrorism in Afghanistan, India has invested heavily in Afghanistan’s development projects. To counter this, Indians have been targeted by Pakistan-backed-groups, in an attempt to force them to leave the country. The recent London Conference has also marginalised India’s role in Afghanistan. However, we should remain undeterred, foster our relations with Afghanistan, and ensure a strong presence there. Current anarchy in Afghanistan should be utilised by undertaking covert operations from Afghanistan, thereby coercing Pakistan army to concentrate on its Western borders. This would further constrain Pakistan to think of a probable “Kargil-II”.

In terms of issues, discrimination of minorities, like Ahmadis, Pakistani Hindus, Sikhs, Christians and the Shia-Sunni divide offer numerous options for exploitation. The wave of Islamic fundamentalism in Pakistan threatens these minorities. The latest beheadings of two Sikhs by the Taliban echo the threats faced by Pakistani Sikhs. Ahmadis, on the other hand, are branded as non-Muslims by the Pakistan government and are repeatedly oppressed for their religious beliefs. The recently released figures of 11 Ahmadi deaths in 2009 clearly reflect that they are not spared by Islamic fundamentalists. These communities not only need moral support, but also assistance to assert their rights. Moreover, there is a stark divide between Shia and Sunni Muslims within Pakistan. Pakistan, a Sunni majority claims to be a truly Islamic nation, but has been unable to iron out differences between Shia and Sunni elements. Therefore, India’s action on this issue would offer a threat to Pakistan’s unity, thereby establishing punitive deterrence.

In order to establish a stronghold on covert operations, intelligence cooperation is imperative, especially with countries that bear serious problems due to terrorism originating from there. In order of preference, India should strengthen intelligence ties with Israel, Afghanistan, France, UK and USA. Covert operations should be directed towards creating instability by sagaciously utilising present fissures within Pakistan. India also needs to target key leaders, like Hafiz Muhammad Saeed, who propagate and facilitate terrorism in India. This would not only threaten the future leaders of Pakistan’s terrorist organisations, but also hinder ISI’s despicable support to such terror outfits.

Such covert operations are likely to fulfill India’s goal, i.e. stop Pakistan from accelerating insurgency in J&K and terrorism in India, at large. Instability in Pakistan from covert actions would affect its economy, resulting in declining foreign investment and waning import-export activities and thus act as an effective deterrent. If India continues to follow a policy of appeasement and ad-hoc actions, then the future of internal security looks bleak. R&AW could focus on developing the capabilities to engage such actions, and if a strong political will is forthcoming, to legally embark on covert acts against terror outfits and the states promoting it.

Nevertheless, India herself needs to step up its internal security apparatus and prepare contingency plans for a probable backlash from Pakistan. We live next to a risk-taking-neighbour, which periodically attempts to destabilise India. There is a need to pre-empt future attempts by punishing Pakistan, through covert operations, the most viable counter-terrorism strategy.

Source: http://claws.in/index-new.php?action=master&task=535&u_id=119

A land they once called, Home

2008-01-24T12:32:00.001-08:00

After reading endless facts on the issues and listening to a few uncolored narratives of Kashmiri pundits, I felt it was inevitable for me to pen down my outlook on the issue which not hidden, but dormant.

The land of Kashmir lays numb under burdened headlines of a daily newspaper and manages to bounce as an issue of national concern occasionally on the national broadcasting units too. Wombing out of what many may call as ‘the burning paradise’ is another set of emotions, which were tied with time and buried deep under the coffin of past.

Kashmiri pundits are the offshoots of the same land that seems to have untied them with its identity. The Kashmiri pundits have a recorded history in the origin and life of the region. It was during the Islamic epoch of the valley, when the ire of the conquest destroyed numerous temples and paved the way for migration of the Kashmiri pundits to lands unknown. Sparing the pundits through conversion or killings was a known practice. As time blessed these people, they gathered their chunks of life and relived in their own land of Kashmir.

It was the black 1990’s that cursed their peaceful existence again and were ruthlessly targeted by the foreign militants and native Muslims. Reminiscence of those times bleed of hopelessness, a run into estrange lands and a feeling of being deprived by one’s own home.

The valley of Kashmir has earned its much needed mileage as a region where terror is a by-product of the Kashmiri life. This paradise has been the dog-bone for decades and continues to be a dreadful flashpoint for a lately expected world war (as anticipated by many).

Floating under the cloud of this heaven are several half-baked aspirations of some Kashmiris, who were orphaned by their soil in the yesteryears. The forgotten Pundits still have their sadly eventful past echoing between the mountains. The history of this territory has been a victim of umpteen numbers of overt and covert frictions that has wrinkled the sleeping mountains with agony and tears.

Swept away by the past are the unheard stories of Kashmiri pundits who have attempted to seed themselves in various parts of the country. For how long can one ignore or try to ignore the roots that remain embedded in their identity???

The worldy talks are still salted by the question over the claim of Kashmir, but how many words are peppered towards the pundits who were once an integral part of the same region. The disregarded past seems to be getting blanketed under every attempt towards the solution of Kashmir, as an authorized child of India or Pakistan.

Bhatts, Kouls, Zutshi'z are not just ancestral names of the natives, but the very identity of the people of Kashmir, the Hindu people of Kashmir. One can trace these names on online forums where many interact to share their commonalities and years of restless dreams that have become numb over years. Contemporarily, Kashmir has become ignorant to their existence but still hasn’t been able to divorce them from the very identity of a “KASHMIRI pundit”.

In a country, where secularism is the hallmark of its democratic setup, the government has failed to knit the fabric of secularism in the ‘much fought for’ state, Kashmir. Even years after the pundits being ousted, there have been minimal or almost no efforts by any government in power to highlight this problem. The unarmed Hindus were ousted by the passionate singers of Islam, who once practiced Sufism, but were attuned to conservative Islam by foreign militants. The Kashmiri Muslims were made to unlearn their indigenous culture and relearn the conservative interpretation of the religion by the militants and continue to preach so even today.
With this catastrophe in the area, the government slept covered under the sheet of diplomacy and in order to please the majority, sold itself to fundamentalists that threatened the very bedrock of peace in Kashmir.

While the authorities were slumbering in the ring of careless governance, different religions fought like immature kids and victory embodied itself in the fate of the kid who was poisoned by an unknown neighbor. The ultimate sufferer was the child whose mother did not come to rescue him. The child still sleeps without a mother and hopes to be in her lap some day.

It becomes very easy to breathe out one’s thoughts through text, but the dreams of thousand Kashmiri Pundits still remain frozen with the days, that marked their time of prolonged despondency and tear buttered nights …

As you read these lines, their night may still be humming the nostalgic tune of pain that they felt years ago, and would continue to do so even when you have flipped through this webpage to go to the other…

'Mujahideen Policy' backfired ??

2007-08-04T03:56:00.000-07:00

Pearl Buck once quoted, 'If you want to understand today, you have to search yesterday’. These words have been standing relevant for years that have passed by and continue to do so even today. Prioritizing the dangers that the globe is facing contemporarily, terrorism bags the first prize and seemingly would continue to maintain its fear and importance for generations to come.

Terrorist acts have been in existence for millennia, as early as the 1st -14th Century AD when the earliest known terrorist organization was the ‘Zealots of Judea’. It is completely inept to state that, terrorism is a concept arising from the religion of ‘Islam’. This mythical statement also tends to generalize them to the whole community and is the base for creating stereotypes.
Though the headlines created by terrorist acts have been flooding the newspaper and electronic media since 9/11 and has come to stay as another aspect of everyday news medium, the psychological fear created by the same can still be traced in not just specific regions, but the world as whole.

General statements and media interpretations make one believe that, it has sprouted from “Islam”. This to a degree may be considered acceptable but reviewing the chapters of history, one need not read between the lines to understand that the seeds of the terrorism trend of today were borne by the countries that are now crying out as a victim of the same. These countries cannot be just limited to the western powers but would also engulf Pakistan after the Lal Masjid siege. The cry babies of today may be making audacious statements about their ‘War against Terror’, but it is prudent (for them and others) to realize that it is their acts in the yesteryears which have made the planet a fertile ground for ‘Terrorism’.
With the latest Lal Masjid conflict creating a wave of protests and suicide bombings in Pakistan, some blanketed facts have come out in the open as a shameful truth. The country which was once on the verge of being declared a terrorist state is now suffering from its own creatures. Since 9/11, USA has been the most prominent country to wage a ‘War against Terror’ condoning the fact that these same organizations and so-called terrorists of today were financed and supported by it just a few decades before. Tracing back the name of Osama Bin Laden, Fazlur Rahman and organizations like Hizbul Mujahideen and Lashkar-E-Taiba, studies bring us to the era of the US supported Mujahideens and the proxy war against the Red Army of the then Soviets.
The Soviet Afghan War (1979-1989), a clash of the Soviet regulars with the rogue, indefinable and irregulars of the Afghan guerrilla force i.e. The Mujahideen. The covert war or the war by proxy was an effective political device exploited by the superpowers to contain Communism. This was not only cost effective tool but also gave legitimacy to ‘Jihad’, the same concept which haunts millions of heart and sends a shiver down the spine of many political citizens of the world. This episode was a boom period for the use of extremist form of religion which had no State borders, and no laws but its own. U.S.A assessed the importance of guerilla forces and tried to capitalize on them.
For Pakistan, this was only an experimental ground to reckon the strength and importance of irregular armies but was also perceived as a logical alternative for a country with a small armed force. Pakistan trained an estimate of 5000 Mujahideen and channeled aid to the Hazaras located in central Afghanistan. The covert war was funded almost unfathomably by the United States of America and can be considered the largest covert operation ever planned by the superpower. Pakistan’s feast with US funding the rain of arms and ammunitions was not an unreasonable or illogical one. ISI was too the gaining party with the above mentioned with the complete authority of the distribution of weapons and resources. The undying support of the CIA during the time added to the euphoria.
The glorification of Jihad and its unsounded application portrayed the war as ‘Just’ and religiously satisfying for people or potential recruits who has the slightest of doubt on the piousness of the mission. Thus, with the internationalization of the cause, there were umpteen amounts of recruits ranging from Turkey, Sudan, Bangladesh, Palestine, and indeed from all places with Islamists, who could relate themselves to the religious nature of the War and wanted to be a participant for the ‘Call for Jihad’ against the Soviets.
There was also an element to the wars which could not be considered a budding factor for the funding of the war, and this was none other than drugs and narcotics. There was a non-accountable funding of the mission by the use of drugs. Thus, the war was not only limited to the use of Jihad but also the undying use of drugs and money generated by it.
The war escalated with the success with the Afghan’s supported by its then dear friend U.S.A. the camps and madrassas became the recruitment agencies for people hailing from multiple countries. It was during this time, that the organization of Jamaat-e-Islami was thriving. Hit and run tactic was the most unbeaten ploy as the Mujahideen’s were novice when it came to frontal attack.
The ‘Mujahideen policy’ used by the U.S. to contain communism proved triumphant as the walk towards success was eventually complete. Thus, the use of Mujahideen’s through the support and training of Pakistan, U.S had nothing to regret as the war was won with almost no casualties on the U.S’s side.
Then was the era when the seeds of today’s terrorism can be vividly seen. It was reported that a major sum of the arms directed towards the Mujahideen irregular army was siphoned by the Pakistani army which added to their store of arms and artillery.
After experiencing the success of the Mujahideen’s in the war, Pakistan computed the potential of this strategy and deployed the same trained Mujahideens towards the Kashmir valley with another call for Jihad, hoping it to be an accomplishment for the second time in a row. The training took place in high spirits and the infiltration of the Indian land started from the mid-1988. This newly defined cause was not limited to India but its waves could even be felt in the autonomous region of Xinjiang. With the overt utilization of these Mujahideen’s, there was a threat on Pakistan and high probability of it being considered a ‘Terrorist State’.
With this swords hanging over the region, it withdrew its support from the organizations officially but covertly shored up the terrorist groups through retired ISI officers. This in due course led to the ‘Privatization’ of these groups with less backing with names like Jamiat-e-Ulama-e-Islam (JUI), Lashkar-e-Taiba, and Markaze-Dawa-al-Ishad mushrooming in the region. These new groups were highly trained and skilled in their actions and had independent funding systems from abroad and home.
Over years, Pakistan has condoned the activities of the groups and maintained globally that Pakistan would never resort to any support to the groups branded as terrorist organizations. The Superpowers seemed to have been repeating the ‘Policy of appeasement’ used during the pre-second world war era. The same policy with alterations and higher degree of diplomacy is being used contemporarily.
All the terrorists groups of today are dominating the Pak-Afghan border and their tactics and strategies are coming becoming more and more heinous with the latest technology pouring up in their favor through their loyal friends in the International arena. The Mujahideens that were fashioned during the Afghan-Soviet war have now produced an undisputed tree that has its roots cleft throughout the ground of globe.
The armies rule in Pakistan is off-late suffering from the same rotten fruits that it has trained and supported in the olden times. Multiple factors that confluence together and stand responsible for the present threat of the imposition of emergency in Pakistan, is not just 'extremist's owned' (as they brand it) but also politically backed by Pakistani government (government here can be synonymous to Pakistani army) which it cannot deny. The conflict of Lal Masjid is a perfect example to cite in order to uncover the underground activities of the extremists within the political premises of Pakistan. Throughout its existence, it has enjoyed patronage from influential members of the government, prime ministers, army chiefs, and presidents. The mosque has for many years been at the centre of radical and fundamentalist teaching and has been openly propagating its pro-Taliban slant. The recovery of numerous guns and arms from the Lal Masjid, President Pervez Musharraf has been ashamed of his lenient approach in fighting against the extremists. His words on the national television, "Unfortunately we have been up against our own people... they had strayed from the right path and become susceptible to terrorism”, are nothing but a diplomatic style of face saving and showing to the world that they are with the in the ‘War against Terrorist’.
Thus, he and his still so friendly superpower should realize that, in the garb of Mujahideen’s, they had created an army of terrorists which have backfired on to themselves. The only difference between the other countries suffering from terrorist activities and Pakistan is that, the former are suffering from elements outside their country and the latter is a victim of their own malcontents.

The final question that now springs up needles me to think...

...Has the ‘Mujahideen policy’, created by America and sustained by Pakistan backfired??
- AM

Covering Islam, Book Review

2007-04-21T03:38:00.000-07:00

Published by Vintage 1997, this book ‘Covering Islam’ by Edward W. Said is the third in the series of the book that had first hit the shelf a decade and a half ago. In this updated version, Edward W. Said spotlights the role of American Media in penetrating a hostile and orthodox image of Islamic people in the minds of American general public.

The book comprises of Introduction to the Vintage Edition followed by an updated introduction by the author. The book further on in its three chapters engulfs various aspects of misinterpretation and misinformation about the Islamic world in the western minds and media.

The introduction to the Vintage Edition explains the serious deterioration in the practice of fair portrayal of the Islamic world and illustrating the same by a highly inflated stereotyping and aggressive hostility. He grieves over the deformation of Islam in the west equating it to ‘fundamentalism’ and reinforcing every negative fact with Islam. This introduction also highlights the contributions from pro- Israeli books and journals which endeavor to portray Israel as the victim of Islamic violence.

In the first chapter of the book, namely ‘Islam as news’, Edward Said traces the history that mirrors how Islamic armies and navies threatened Europe and still persists as a ‘threat’ to the west (p. 5-6). Edward claims that America has lacked interaction with the Islamic world which makes it tough for Americans to understand the depth of this religion and customs, unlike France and UK which have sheltered a major Muslim populace in their country (p. 13-14). The writer seems to have failed to notice the rising Muslim population in America which contradicts his claim in the book.

Outlining the strategic importance of Iran, the author has impressively used news articles to accentuate criticism of American media machinery. He centers the subject of representation of Islam as a formidable competitor of the west and seemingly a latecoming challenge to Christianity. Effectively stating the use of Islam by the geopolitical strategists and liberal intellectuals, Edward supports his claims by highlighting relevant information and extracts from relevant articles that periodically appeared in newspapers over years. The last part of the first chapter provides particulars about the controversial film, Death of a Princess and the diplomatic incidences involved.

In the second segment of the book, he illustrates news reports and newspaper articles on Iranian revolution further clarifying the way generality and experts on Islam resulted in misinterpretation of Khomeini and ignored the positive aspects of the revolution. Said has criticized the American media on the aspect that it functions like the mouthorgan of the government. This analysis is justified to a degree but Said should comprehend that fact that during a time of instability and crisis, the media attempts to adjust its tone in order to maintain the sanctity of nation’s sovereignty and image.

Edward in his third section of the book overtly states that the knowledge and coverage of the Islamic world in the USA are defined by geopolitics and economic interest (p. 153-154). Said suggests the interpreters and writers to know thoroughly about the alien culture before they pen down a statement which exudes vibes of bias.

Some statements and arguments in the book tend to create walls of controversy which if battered could turn out to be irrational discussions against the west. Said has endeavored to portray the other side of the mirror with substantial statements and facts but when the accounts boil down to reality, the cartoon controversy and reaction of the Muslims concerning Pope’s statement make it difficult for the western world to swallow every word or argument in the book. In the nutshell, this book is a excellent piece of work to know about the unexplored side of Islam but somewhere the waves of bias make it a bit difficult to absorb every aspect of the book.

-AM

The Men Who Make Dreams Come True...

2007-01-31T08:56:00.000-08:00

The skies of dubai can never seen easily without at least one crane in your view. Industry experts cautiously estimate that 15% to 25% of the world's cranes are in Dubai. Presently. Dubai is experiencing a construction boon in Dubai and the UAE, in general is a much faster process than in any Western country.
Dubai, one of the leading business hub that has been facing criticism from the international community regarding the abusive labor practices. More than half of Dubai's one million people are poor immigrants from South Asia and the Philippines. The land of golden dreams has turned out to be a land of nightmare of thousands of workers.
Human Rights Watch on the November 12th, 2006 released a 71-page report on the appalling conditions faced by the UAE's migrant construction workers. Entitled 'Building Towers, Cheating Workers' the report is highly critical of the UAE Government and calls on them to hold employers accountable for breaking the law

Facts and Figure:
Number of expatriate workers in the UAE
2.738,000 million In 2005the number is a 17 per cent increase over 2004, when there were 2.342,000 expatriate workers recorded in the UAE.
Estimates: According to estimations from 10 consulates and embassies representing the bulk of UAE workforce, there are between 2.8 million to 3.4 million expatriates living in the UAE.
Where they come from: Estimates include residents and workers for some countries:

India: 1.1 million

Pakistan: 750,000

Bangladesh: 400,000? 500,000

Iran: 300,000? 400,000 (residents and workers)

Jordan: 200,000 (residents and workers)

Philippines: 200,000

Sri Lanka: 150,000 (officials suspect much higher figure in reality)

UK: 120, 000 (residents and workers)

Nepal: 70,000? 80,000

Lebanon: 60,000 (residents and workers)

Egypt: No figures available

Syria: No figures available

Number of workers in construction: 500, 000 workers directly in construction
Salary range of laborers: Unskilled workers: Dh400 to Dh650 skilled workers: Dh750 to Dh1, 500Other laborers: Between Dh2.5 to Dh6.5 an hour. (Source: Gulf News)

It is anticipated for the population of the UAE to reach 5 million in census reports that have yet to see the light of day. No official figures exist but it is generally accepted that the breakdown of the population is roughly as follows. There could, therefore, be as many as 2.5 million unskilled migrant workers in the UAE.

World Bank Facts
In the report of April 2003 on Global Development Finance, World Bank reckoned that the remittances sent home by migrant workers shot to $80 billion in 2002, up from $60 billion in 1998.
These payments are significant and stable sources of finance for the developing countries in comparison to the private lending and development assistance by authorities.
The major countries receiving large remittances include Bangladesh ($2.1 billion in 2001), Egypt ($2.9 billion), India ($10 billion), Indonesia ($1 billion), Jordan ($2 billion), Lebanon ($2.3 billion), Morocco ($3.3 billion), Pakistan ($1.5 billion), the Philippines ($6.4 billion), Sri Lanka ($1.1 billion) and Yemen ($1.5 billion).
(Source: World Bank Site)

Tracing back the Conditions of the workers :
The demonstrations and aggression by some laborers in the recent past are distressing and alarming. The construction companies have been facing the ire on numerous issues ranging from poor living conditions to less or sometimes ‘no salaries’. The unreasonable standards of food and accommodation to the workers have also been highlighted upon.
As reported by AFP and Reuters new agencies, a demonstration of immigrant workers was organized on September, 2005. The procession engulfed the discontent of thousands of workers who expressed their ire against the terrible living conditions and non-payment of salaries.
Another incident came to pass on the December 23rd 2005, when Dozens of unpaid workers protested against the authorities at their labor camp for 10 days. The workers had a cut off from the outside world and survived on dates from a nearby farm.
(Source: Prol-position newsletter)
These unorganized forms of protests are just the tip of the ice-berg and gradually, time has made us realized the true facts of the maltreatment of the expatriate workers. In the present context, ‘good treatment’ of workers just stays a mere paper promise with bare differences in the condition of the workers.
The HRW report highlights the fact that the workers toil hard to sum up the money for the arrangement of a work visa and pay the recruitment agency around US $2,000 to $3000. The workers are pressurized to repay the debts and receive an insignificant amount ranging from $106 to $250 per month, contrast starkly with the national average wage of $2,106 per month. It is not viable to change the employer visa once inside the country. It is unlawful to form association of union which the fundamental reason of an unorganized resistance or one voice against the ills committed on the expatriate workers.
The practice of confiscation of the passports of the workers for the duration of the stay in the UAE. They are kept as "security" to stop workers from leaving which is not news but a usual affair which id accepted as a part of the game.
There are scores of Human Right Watch reports and local media articles that raises copious abuses inflicted upon the workers and diverting the attention of the officials towards this imperative issue of human rights abuse.
A report of HRW featured the facts that included extremly low wages, several years of arrearage for the money spent for the process, withholding employees’ passports and hazardous working conditions to the point of being deadly, resulting in high death rates and injury.
Independent research by a construction trade publication, Construction Week, found that a total of 880 migrant construction workers died in the UAE in 2004: 460 from India, 375 from Pakistan and approximately forty-five from Bangladesh. As informed by the Indian consulate in Dubai, 971 death cases have been registered in 2005.”
(Source: From the Human Rights Watch Report - “Building Towers, Cheating Workers”)
With the passage of time, Dubai authorities have been working towards the betterment and the welfare of the workers. The Labor ministry is shouldering the responsibility of undertaking multiple steps in accordance with the international organization and international labor law. There have been many promises and inspections but one can never be certain without having a glimpse of the changes and improving conditions.

Steps proposed by government:
On the November 9, His Highness Sheikh Mohammad Bin Rashid Al Maktoum, Vice-President and Prime Minister of the UAE and Ruler of Dubai regulated the authorities to take fundamental measures to ensure the safety of the rights of the expatriate workers and significantly improving the living conditions.
There is an order to mushroom a mechanism that empowers workers to receive what is rightfully theirs. It is proposed to initiate a plan which enables the workers to switch jobs without any obstacles in accordance with the rules set by the UAE and the Ministry of Labor. The procedure concerning the change of job is an imperative scheme that will avoid inhibiting mobility.
There are negotiations regarding laws regarding a labor court, setting fixed working hours for domestic help and regulating the contracts of guest workers. A need of a watchdog to monitor the conditions of the workforce is a highlighting concern of the present. There are negotiations concerning this supervisory body. Provisions of health insurance schemes and a machinery to prevent delays in age payment of the workers are being initiated by the authorities.

Other measures projected to help laborers
- Creation of a specialized court for dealing with labor complaints and mistreatment cases.

- Setting up of a special inspection unit, comprising of 2,000 inspectors to monitor labor accommodations and workplaces.

- An urgent study to be conducted to investigate the roles and capabilities of labor supply companies, and to make sure that they comply with the laws and prevent them from abusing workers' rights.
(Source: Gulf News Report)

UAE’s agreement with 4 Asian countries:
A gulf news report accounted that a labor agreement is to be signed between the UAE and four Asian countries namely, India, Pakistan, Bangladesh and Sri Lanka. The agreement would leave no scope for the middlemen to take advantage of the laborers.
There would be a high degree of transparency among the parties regarding the structure, obligations and responsibilities. The countries will be receiving a draft of the Memorandum of understanding which is scheduled to be signed by the end of this year which is directed towards regulation of the entry of foreign workforce. We welcome this ‘swift response and inherent acknowledgement of the problem of abuse', but its vital to highlight the continuation of the ban on trade union, despite earlier promises to legalize the same.
We therefore hope that the new proposals don’t share the previous fate of broken promises and mushroom into a concrete solution for the workers, who are the base of the heights that Dubai has achieved in the past few years.

- AM

Backing of the Immoral

2006-07-26T11:27:00.000-07:00

After experiencing a journey from the unforgettable arena of the Second World War to the present age of so called 'Clash of civilization’s, its inevitable to see a clear and fair frame in the International politics. It can never be said that politics in the past was clean because I have always believed that the term 'Clean Politics' is an oxymoron.

Tracing the events of the latest Middle East crisis, it is reasonable to criticize Hezbollah for the abduction of the two Israeli soldiers. It is predictable for any country (in this case Israel) to react to any affair of this sort. To top it all, Israel has become victim of continuous attacks by Hezollah's rockets. It all started with the 'usual Israel-Palestinian friction' but it has now taken a whole new shape and seems to be a result of an overreacted country backed by a dear friend named United States Of America.

The International summit of the world leaders was conducted with a fundamental purpose of restoring peace, which failed. This was not shocking for me because since the starting it was evident that the whole blown up conflict was a pre-planned American-Israeli scheme. To some extent, Israel is evenhanded in reacting to Hezbollah's conduct but Is it sound and sensible to annihilate a city and destroy it into rubbles. Is it fair to have numerous civil casualties on the name of two soldiers?

It may be bias if said that Lebanon and Middle East nations are saintly souls in the ring of this conflict but the ire of Israel at this point of time seems to have crossed its limits. The use of white phosphorus as an incendiary weapon is a violation of the Geneva Conventions, which highlights the fact that Israel did not comply with the International law. When U.S.A has always been the 'savior' of the world trying to get justice and highlighting democracy everywhere then why is the criticism on such a low scale or even insignificant??

There are many facets to this issue, which cannot be explained with concrete evidences but clearly understood by the world. Can a sane man believe without any doubts that America is a just player in this latest game of Middle East conflict? The visit of Rice was another failure which cannot be overlooked but isn’t it vivid that America can gain a lot of advantages from this politics?When Hezbollah originally is an Iranian group, is there is no room for Americans to provoke Iran into the whole crisis? Is the statement that 'Israel is not backed or supported by America', realistic enough to be believed?? Doesn’t the whole US-Israeli relation seem like a 'You scratch my back, I scratch yours' game??

Some answers can be argued upon but very few can be supported with facts and evidences. People may ventilate their anger on American policy and some may support it, but the truth lies in some unexplored or latent corners of loud statements, written accounts, testimonials or proclomations. Some things are just left on the mercy of time and situation, this is one of them.

- AM

Straight from the heart!!

2006-06-01T16:44:00.000-07:00

The traffic was gushing in the busy streets under the gloomy sky. My eyes roved for a cab. With cars speeding by, I compared every gesture of this foreign land to my country but failed to console my heart. The artificial orderliness of the place fed my desire to go back, even if war haunted the roads of my motherland. This first trip overseas was not out of choice. Every moment reminded me of my parents, relatives and friends back home.
With all turmoil inside, I waved at the cab. The driver readily stopped. I forced myself inside. I could feel my heart resting as the cool air pampered my hair. After naming the street and the house number, I waited for the driver to respond but he remained silent.
His look mirrored his origin and I assumed him to be sharing my nationality. The silent ambience made me feel a bit uncomfortable. I couldn’t stop myself from asking his name. Bhaiya, aapka naam kya hai (Brother, what’s your name)? Salim, he replied. Aap India se ho (Are you from India)? Nahi, Pakistan se. Mere abbu batware se pehle Hindustan…. (No, from Pakistan. My grandparents resided in India before the partition), he responded.
From an early age, Pakistan was taboo for me. The only relation we had with Pakistan was the past of irreconcilable pain. Listening to him, tales of grief and despair filled my heart and the cries of my relatives echoed. It reminded me of my grandmother who was still living with the tragic past of losing her brother during partition. It also brought back to me the childhood memories of anxiously waiting by the window for my father who then served in the defence forces. To divert my mind, I started looking outside. Many thoughts dragged me to the endless emotions of the past.
Salim intervened and brought me back to the present. He asked me if I had come from India. He spoke about dreadful conditions of the people back home. I felt a bit calm as he seemed to share the same concerns that I did. I spoke to him about India. He heard every word with concern and then began his side of the story.
He spoke of his brother who died fighting on the border. The family went through hell in retrieving his body back from India. His voice broke down as he told about his financial crises. He felt helpless as he faced problems in supporting his large family in Pakistan and could not meet their expectations. He aspired to stay with his family and work in his country. He missed their presence and concern.
He made me realize that the common people did not want war, bloodshed and loss of human lives. He seemed to strongly believe that one day humanity would prevail. I was amazed by his sheer optimism. Salim had changed my opinion of people on the other side. He reflected a truth that one does not need education to understand mankind but just a heart of love.
Time passed without realization and I reached my destination. I got down and walked towards the house. I felt light and connected, as though everything would be all right. That, the future still stood a chance. I turned around. I wanted to share my new found optimism. I walked up to the car and thanked him for the ride to which he responded with a beatific smile.
I felt that even if culture, religion and beliefs categorize people; we are all tied with the common thread of humanity. Even though we in our insecurities shackle ourselves down, in the end it is the innate humanity which God has endowed in us with which we triumph; and so did it today.

- AM

As Israel turns 58....

2006-05-18T08:24:00.000-07:00

I may hold an opinion which may be bias but forgive me for this because presently I am researching from the Palestinian point of view and is bound to influence my opinion.

Israel turns 58 and continues to be a young child in the international community of nations.
58 years back, it was the Israelis who bore the excesses of evil and after 14th May'1948, they were the ones who spread their hand across the geographical entity of Palestine and spread the message of mayhem and ruthless butchery. It was on that very day when it got a legal status and made their homes by destroying the peace of others.

The paradise which was once accompanied by humanity continues to be a victim of pool of blood everyday. They not only seem to destroy their houses but also snatch the element of family or life from them. With the passage of time, the citizens of the world seem to have been 'desensitized' by the whole conflict.The bloody tales of this land remain ' just another story' for them. The stacks of dead bodies have immune the land of Gaza Strip, West Bank, Golan Heights from the very day of Israel's creation.

As stipulated in the Article 49 of the Fourth Geneva Convention of 1949, "The Occupying Power shall not deport or transfer parts of its own civilian population into the territory it occupies. The International organizations and the globally 'much concerned ' European nations have become deaf and blind to the happenings . The convention remain merely papers having no practical importance but only nominal academic value.

The Israeli settlements in occupied areas goes unchecked. In an endeavor to establish their home(Israeli) in occupied territories, the coldblooded killings of the Palestinians have become a global concern. The irony is that the concern for this middle-east conflict is just till lip sympathy or seldom donations or aid. 60+ new Jewish settlements have been built by the Israeli government on confiscated Palestinian land between March 2001 and July 11, 2003. (Source-http://www.ifamericansknew.org/stats/settlements.html)

European countries overtly support Israel and are the selfish guardians of this illegimate child. There hostile attitude towards the Palestinian side of the story is evident of their connivance. Israeli army seems to cross the very threshold of humanity while dealing with Palestinians but there is no apprehension by any country and why have... when these actions which fade away with words and speeches....

It is thus hoped that one day ..one day... the Arabs who originally belong to this land get to see a recongnized country with the soft touch of humanity and peace. The dormant sovereign nations of the global community should wake up from the shackles of sleep and open there eyes to justice and humanity.

- AM

Who am I??

2006-05-11T16:40:00.000-07:00

In this world, where religion, cultures, geography, beliefs tear apart the fabric of humanity;

I am a dead man walking the road of bloody life,
I am a dumb person voicing out his emotions of death and loss,
I am a blind man who sees his brother die every night in front of his dark eyes,
I have a cold heart which cries to see the pain of a mother who hugs her dead child.

I am the CITIZEN of your globe but just unfortunate enough to see life in the areas ties with the shackles of bloodshed, loss and conflicts.

- AM

A home to live in????

2006-05-06T13:13:00.000-07:00

My first post is about my understanding on one issue that has haunted my mind and heart for a long time now....this is the Israel-Palestine issue!!
Any view that is built in the mind is more or less influenced by the media in any country.In my view, the media has always been stereotyped and show whatever suits the situation ;the content is altered to match the desires of either the government or an ideology.
I preferred not to learn about this case from the data and facts provided but to have a direct talk to the people who are a victim of this very problem. It has not been long but still i strongly withhold the opinion that IT IS NOT JUS' AN ISSUE BUT A LONG STORY.
I had always thought that the jews were subject to excesses that crossed the very emotions of humanity and love, this was prevalent especially during the time of the Nazis. My mind was embedded with an impression that it was justified for the Israelis to live in the land they rightly bought from the palestinians. The Israelis have always impressed me with their powerful resistance in all the wars that they have been a part of!!
Destiny has walked hand in hand with me and helped me find the right people whose views i respect wholeheartedly!!For the first time, I am putting myself in the shoes of a Palestine.
A friend of mine who is supporting me in the research of this issue (who is a palestinian) wrote a few lines which highlighted the frustration a common Palestinian bears in the present times.
'As a palestinian i have a huge problem with the israeli they steal our land, they have killed my people every day since 1948 and no one asks them to stop;they forced the palestinian to leave their houses and farm and every thing..and now they said that they own it..they own nothing at this land..and u ask me if we hurt the Israeli or not, we hurt them but what we do is nothing in comparison to wat they did with my people they killed and they destroy, they steal they do many bad thing i cant even count it...and if they should have another land...i do not know any where except palestine is ok for me...'
I questioned myself, How does it hurt when you see your own people suffer because of people you were once invited in your very home??
How frustrating it is, when the wrong doers (from a palestinians point of view)are supported by the strongest country and a super-power???
I may hold many biases with every word i type. I hope to know an Israeli's view also on the same and would like to learn without any biases but as of now I dedicate this post to the spirit of a patriotic Palestinian.
I have began the understanding of Pal-Israel conflict from a common man view and hope to know more about it!!
Inshallah, I would like to visit these two places and feel the very spirit of people there.
n hope that this conflict resolves some day!!

- AM

The silence voices itself...

2006-05-04T16:42:00.000-07:00

IDRAAK, is an Arabic word which means perception. I believe that the glasses of perception that we wear eveytime shape a thought and that very thought plants into an individual's outlook or is the seed of an ideology.

This blog is dedicated to my opinion, my perception about the international politics and events of history which continue to haunt the present in some way or the other.i would write about every and anything that intersts me and falls int the perview of politics.

I am not an intellectual person who is married to the knowledge of international relations, detailed history of every country or the origin of various ideologies and there effects...but i would still like to ventilate my grieviences on issues (my opinion), give suggestions, criticise events and actions...!!
All this , just bcz i dont wanna b silent but want to voice out my perception about the globe.

Before coming to the middle east, my outlook towards the world always stayed limited and other countries apart from my homeland seemed to be just any geographical entity not relevant in international environment but with time, i have realized the role of middle east & other areas in international politics and am always making an attempt in understanding the diplomatic game of the world.

I dedicate this blog to my journey of learning and to my perception about the world.

"In this world of ironical truths, I have started feeling alienated from my own
identity because every event that lives itself is a victim of supression!!
Supression of truth, supression of perception and supression of a voice."

- AM